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MADHVĀCĀRYA'S CONTRIBUTION TO INDIAN THOUGHT

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D.N. SHANBHAG

PREFACE

Śrī Madhvācārya is Jagadguru, the World-Preceptor. He has shown the way to understand the *Vedas*. He has interpreted the *Upaniṣads*. He has written commentaries on the *Brahmasūtras*. He has expounded Lord's message contained in the *Bhagavadgīta*. He has churned out the essence of the *Mahābhārata*. He has projected the highlights of the *Bhāgavata*. He has given etymological derivations of a number of Sanskrit words, both Vedic and Classical. His monographs establish conclusively (i) the supremacy of Lord Viṣṇu. (ii) means of valid knowledge, (iii) number and variety of categories, and refute logically illusory concepts like *Māyā* and *Upādhi*. He has revealed his mastery over Sanskrit language through his unique poem *Yamakabhārata*. His inherent devotion has flown out in the form of *Dvādaśastotra* and *Nṛsimhanakhastuti*. The precepts laid down by him in his religious tracts like *Sadācārasmṛti*, *Jayantīnirṇaya* are followed by his followers even today.

In fine, Madhvācārya's Contribution to Sanskrit Learning is manifold and multifarious.

Hence, when University Grants Commission, New Delhi sanctioned a Major Research Project to me to work on "Multi-dimensional Contribution of Madhvācārya to Sanskrit Learning", I had secured a sacred purpose to devote my retired life fruitfully.

In this work, 'Madhvācārya's Contribution to Indian Thought', an attempt has been made to bring together my articles throwing light on Madhvācārya's Contribution pertaining to a few of the fields of Sanskrit Learning. These articles are meant to serve as only a pointer, like showing a big elephant in a small mirror. I am aware of Madhvācārya's greatness and my limitations. But I confess that a sincere attempt has been made.

On this occasion my grateful salutations should go to Dr. B.N.K. Sharma and Prof. K.T. Pandurangi, the two great Dvaita Scholars, who initiated and inspired me to undertake an in-depth study of Madhvācārya and his thought, and who are still guiding me like ideal teachers.

I am thankful to the authorities of the University Grants Commission, New Delhi for sanctioning me the U.G.C. Major Research Project. I am also thankful to the authorities of the Karnatak University, Dharwad and of the P.G. Dept. of Sanskrit who provided proper facilities for my study.

Some more have helped me in completing this work. Prominent are, Dr.K.B.Archak, Pandit Jayateerthacharya Malagi, and Shri D.S. Bhat. many thanks to all of them.

I am thankful to *Samskrita Shodha Samsthana (Samshodhana)* Sirsi, for including this work in their SAMSHODHANA SERIES as number one.

30.11.1996

D.N.Shanbhag.

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CHAPTER I

BRAHMAN = VIṢṆU

One of the major contributions of Madhvācārya to Indian Thought is the emphatic assertion regarding the identification of Brahman, the Supreme Being with Lord Viṣṇu. He declares :

ब्रह्मशब्दश्च विष्णौ एव ।। (ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्य, I-i-1)

In this universe, every embodied soul desires to enjoy bliss and happiness. None wishes to suffer even a little of misery or sorrow. But the fact of universal experience is that no soul while existing in this universe gets the happiness desired by him, nor is he able to get rid of the unhappiness inspite of his trying and tiring himself for the same. As Bādarāyaṇa points out through the *sūtra* इतरव्यपदेशाद्धिताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिः ।(ब्र.सू. II.i.21) the embodied soul is unable to do what is beneficial, and to ward off what is malefic to himself. When one observes one's life and the surrounding happenings and experiences, one realises that one's own birth, death, growth, prosperity, poverty, happiness, unhappiness and the like which affect one's life are not wholly in one's capacities. One very often experiences the truth of the dictum 'Man proposes, God disposes.' Every one becomes a confirmed believer of the Upaniṣadic statement आत्माप्यनीशः सुखदुःखहेतोः । (श्वेताश्वतर, I.2) which declares that the embodied soul is not the master of the cause of even his own happiness and misery. On observing the world around,

he comes to know that the existence, maintenance and other activities of the entire world are going on because of some unseen force. This unseen force has been called variously as 'Brahman' 'Parabrahman' 'Ātman' 'Paramātman' and so on, by the seers of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads and by the authors of other sacred and authoritative treatises. They discovered and proclaimed the truth that the origin (*sṛṣṭi*), subsistence (*sthiti*), dissolution (*laya*), control (*niyamana*), knowledge (*jñāna*), ignorance (*ajñāna*), bondage of embodied souls (*bandha*) and their liberation (*mokṣa*), nay, everything of the sentient souls and insentient matter in this universe as well as above and below this universe, happens due to this sole agency, that is Brahman. One can note the following scriptural passages in this regard :

1. ईशावास्यमिदं सर्वम् । (इशोपनिषद्, 1)
(The entire universe is indwelt by God)

2. एष सर्वेषु भूतेषु गूढोऽऽत्मा न प्रकाशते । (कठ III.12)
(God is dwelling invisible in all beings and hence is not manifest)

3. यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते । येन जातानि जीवन्ति यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति ।
तद्विजिज्ञासस्व । तद्ब्रह्म । (तैत्तिरीय, III.1)
(That of whom these beings are born, by whom when born they live, into whom they dissolve, desire to know that; that is Brahman).

4. एष सर्वेश्वर एष सर्वज्ञ एषोऽन्तर्याम्येष
योनिः सर्वस्य प्रभवाप्ययौ हि भूतानाम् । (माण्डूक्य, I.6)
(He is the Overlord; He is Omniscient; He is the Indweller; He is the Source of all; He is the Origin and Dissolution of all beings.)

5. अहं कृत्स्नस्य जगतः प्रभवः प्रलयस्तथा ।
मत्तः परतरं नान्यत्किञ्चिदस्ति धनञ्जय ।।
मयि सर्वमिदं प्रोतं सूत्रे मणिगणा इव ।। (गीता, VII.6-7)

(I (Lord Kṛṣṇa) am the Producer and the Destroyer of the whole universe. There is nothing else, O Dhanañjaya ! higher than Myself; all this is woven upon Me , like numbers of pearls upon a thread.)

6. पिताऽहमस्य जगतो माता धाता पितामहः ।। (गीता, IX.17)
(I am the Father of this world, the Mother, the Nourisher and the Grand-sire).

7. सर्वस्य चाहं हृदि संनिविष्टो मत्तः स्मृतिर्ज्ञानमपोहनं च ।। (गीता, XV.15)
(I dwell in the heart of all. From Me come memory. knowledge and ignorance)

8) ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति ।
भ्रामयन्सर्वभूतानि यन्त्रारूढानि मायया ।। (गीता, VIII.61)
(O Arjuna ! God is seated in the region of the heart of all beings. He turns round all beings as though mounted on a machine, by His Māyā or prowess)

9. द्वाविमौ पुरुषौ लोके क्षरश्चाक्षर एव च ।
क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते ।।
उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः ।
यो लोकत्रयमाविश्य बिभर्त्यव्यय ईश्वरः ।।
यस्मात्क्षरमतीतोऽहमक्षरादपि चोत्तमः ।
अतोऽस्मि लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तमः ।। (गीता, XV.16-18)
(In this universe, there are two-fold sentient souls : *Kṣara* and *Akṣara*. All beings right from Brahmā are *Kṣara* (having destructible bodies). Goddess Lakṣmī, the unattached, is the *Akṣara* (having indestructible body). I am the Supermost Being, distinct from these two. I am called Paramātman or the Highest Self. I am the Inexhaustible Lord and do support all the three worlds having pervaded them. Since I transcend the *Kṣara* and since I am superior to even the *Akṣara*, I am glorified in the world (i.e. in human compositions) and in the Vedas (i.e. divine revelations) as Puruṣottama or the Supreme Being.)

10. उत्पत्तिस्थितिसंहारा नियतिर्ज्ञानमावृतिः ।
बन्धमोक्षौ च पुरुषाद्यस्मात्स हरिरेकराट् ।।
अज्ञानां ज्ञानदो विष्णुर्ज्ञानिनां मोक्षदश्च सः ।
आनन्ददश्च मुक्तानां स एवैको जनार्दनः ।।
बन्धको भवपाशेन भवपाशाच्च मोचकः ।
कैवल्यदः परं ब्रह्म विष्णुरेव न संशयः ।।(स्कन्दपुराण)

(The Person from whom the origin, subsistence, destruction, control, knowledge, ignorance, bondage and liberation proceed, that is Hari, the Overlord. Viṣṇu bestows knowledge to the ignorant, liberation to the knower and bliss to the liberated. He alone is Janārdana. Viṣṇu alone binds with fetters of mundane existence and He alone is the liberator from them. He grants absolute bliss. He is the Highest Brahman. There is no doubt about it).

11. द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।
वासुदेवात्परो ब्रह्मन् न चान्योऽर्थोऽस्ति तत्त्वतः ।। (भागवत, II.v.14)
(O Sage, in reality there is nothing higher than Lord Vāsudeva, neither the Insentient matter, nor Action, nor Destiny, nor Time, nor Innate nature, nor the Embodied soul)

12. द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।
यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया ।। (भागवत, II.x.12)
(Matter, Action or Destiny, Time, Innate nature, and Embodied soul exist only by His grace and cease to exist when He ignores them).

We have a galaxy of gods or deities and pertinent question may be asked - "Who is Brahman, the God among these gods?" As asserted in the beginning, Madhvācārya, following the Indian tradition emphatically replies :

ब्रह्मशब्दश्च विष्णावेव । (ब्र.सू.भा. I.i.1)

which means, "the term Brahman primarily denotes God

Viṣṇu only." And some of the scriptural passages quoted above clearly proclaim the overlordship of Viṣṇu. Some more are given herebelow :

1. अग्निर्वै देवानामवमो विष्णुः परमः । तदन्तरा सर्वा देवताः ।
(ऐतरेयब्राह्मण, I.1)

(Agni is the lowest and Viṣṇu is the highest among gods. In between come all the deities).

2. नामानि सर्वाणि यमाविशन्ति तं वै विष्णुं परममुदाहरन्ति ।
(भाल्लवेयश्रुति quoted in ब्रह्मसूत्रमाध्वभाष्य I.i.1)
(That Lord is said to be Viṣṇu whom all words by their connotation declare).

3. परं पदं वैष्णवमामनन्ति । (भागवत, II.ii.8)
(Lord Viṣṇu's is declared to be the highest abode.)

4. नारायणपरा वेदा देवा नारायणाङ्गजाः ।
नारायणपरा लोका नारायणपरा मखाः ।।
नारायणपरो योगो नारायणपरं तपः ।
नारायणपरं ज्ञानं नारायणपरा गतिः ।। (भागवत, II.v.15-16)
(Nārāyaṇa (Lord Viṣṇu) is the goal of Vedas. The gods have sprung from the limbs of Nārāyaṇa. All things have Nārāyaṇa as their goal. All sacrifices are meant to please Nārāyaṇa. Nārāyaṇa is the ultimate object of all Yoga. All austere penance is intended to propitiate Nārāyaṇa. All wisdom is directed towards Nārāyaṇa. All paths lead to Nārāyaṇa.)

5. स विष्णुराह हि । तं ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते । (दैवीमीमांसासूत्र5)
(That Viṣṇu said ; He is called Brahman)

6. ओमिति ब्रह्म । ओं नामा भगवान्विष्णुरधिकोच्चगुणत्वतः ।
(Quoted in तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद्भाष्य by Madhvācārya).

('OM' is Brahman. 'OM' is Lord Viṣṇu as He alone is full of excellent qualities).

7. वर्जितः सर्वदोषैर्यो गुणसर्वस्वमूर्तिमान् । स्वतन्त्रो यद्वशाः सर्वे स विष्णुः परमो मतः ।।

(परमोपनिषद् quoted in the विष्णुतत्त्वविनिर्णय (III.1) by Madhvācāraya.)

(Lord Viṣṇu is devoid of all defects. He is the embodiment of all virtues. He is independent and all are under His control. He is considered to be the Highest).

8. स एव तुरियं ब्रह्म ....स एव विष्णुः । स एव समस्त ब्रह्मवाचकवाच्यः.....परं ज्योतिः। त्रिपाद्विभूतिमहानारायणोपनिषद् .I.

(He is the highest Brahman .... He is Visnu alone. He is denoted by all worlds expressing Brahman.... Great light.)

9. विष्णुः परम उत्तमः । देवतानां संगतानामुत्तमो विष्णुरासीत् ।

(Quoted by Dr. B.N.K.Sharma, in his *History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and its Literature*. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi,1981,p.8 fn.2.).

(Viṣṇu is Parama i.e. the highest. In the communion of gods, Viṣṇu was the highest).

In this connection, it is quite pertinent to consider whether the term Brahman as Madhvācārya asserts, appropriately denotes Viṣṇu ; or, it is a case of his partiality for Viṣṇu as Dr.B.N.K.Sharma seems to understand.[1]

1. Read: 'Save for the immediate 'partiality' for "Viṣṇu", which is the result of theological exigencies, these are lofty sentiments of which the greatest Theists of the world may be proud and to which any Mystic might rise in moments of highest divine ecstacy. When one recalls that "Viṣṇu" stands only for the Highest Being, there is no difficulty in admiring the dizzy heights of mysticism to which Madhva takes us in these contexts" - Dr. B.N.K.Sharma, *Op cit.*, pp.169-70.

It is a fact that the etymological meanings of both 'Brahman' and 'Viṣṇu' establish that both the terms denote God or the Highest Being : 1. बृहत्वाद् ब्रह्म points out that Brahman is All-pervading. 2. व्यापकत्वाद् विष्णुः । वेवेष्टि व्याप्नोति इति विष्णुः show that Viṣṇu is All-pervasive.[2] But the problem of the identity between the two denotations arose because of the less number of hymns devoted to Viṣṇu in the *Ṛgveda*. In this connection the warning sounded by Aurobindo deserves attention : "The importance of Vedic gods has not to be measured by the number of hymns devoted to them or by the extent to which they are invoked in the thoughts of the

2. Cf. यस्माद्विष्टमिदं विश्वं तस्य शक्त्या महात्मनः ।
तस्मात्स प्रोच्यते विष्णुर्विशेर्धातोः प्रवेशनात् ।। .....
व्याप्ता मे रोदसी पार्थ कान्तिश्चाभ्यधिका मम ।.....
क्रमणाच्चाप्यहं पार्थ विष्णुरित्यभिसंहितः ।।महाभारत, शान्ति, 341.

See also the following etymological meanings given of the two terms (A) Brahman and (B) Viṣṇu :

A. i) बृहत्वाद् बृंहणत्वाच्च तद्ब्रह्मेत्यभिधीयते । विष्णु पु. 3.3.72
ii) बृहत्वाद् बृंहणत्वाच्च ब्रह्म । शिव पु. I.9.37; सौर पु. 45-41
iii) बृहत्वाच्च स्मृतो ब्रह्म । कूर्म पु. 48-6
iv) बृहत्वाद् बृंहणत्वाच्च भावानां सकलाश्रयात् ।
यस्माद्धारयते भावान् ब्रह्म तेन निरुच्यते ।। लिङ्ग पु. I.70.16
v) बृहद् ब्रह्म महच्चेति शब्दाः पर्यायवाचकाः ।। महाभा. शांति.336.2

B. i) विष्णुर्विक्रमणादेव । महाभारत, 5.68.3
ii) विभुत्वाद्विष्णुरुच्यते । कूर्म पु. 48.11
iii) विष्टब्धं यत्त्वया सर्वं जगत्स्थावरजङ्गमम् ।
जगद्विष्टम्भनाच्चैव विष्णुरेवेति कीर्त्यसे ।। मत्स्य पु. 248.40
iv) विश प्रवेशने धातुस्तत्र स्नुप्रत्ययादनु ।
विष्णुर्यः सर्ववेदेषु परमात्मा सनातनः । वराह पु. 72.5
v) विश्वं प्रजायते वस्तु समवैति च तत्र हि ।
प्रस्नौति च सदा सद्भ्यः पुरुषार्थं चतुर्विधम् ।।
वेः सचेश्च स्नुहेश्चैव विष्णुर्धातुत्रयान्वयात् ।। अहिर्बुध्न्यसंहिता, 52.45
vi) तद् विष्णोः व्यापनशीलस्य ब्रह्मणः परमात्मनो वासुदेवाख्यस्य प्रकृष्टं पदम् ।
Śaṅkarācārya, कठभाष्य, III.9

Rishis, but by the functions which they perform."[3] As Dr.B.N.K.Sharma rightly state, "In the opinion of modern scholars, however, Viṣṇu occupies but a subordinate position in the Vedic Pantheon. He is lauded in far fewer hymns than addressed to other gods like Varuṇa, Indra and Agni. "He is celebrated in not more than five whole hymns (*sūktas*) and in part of another and his name occurs only about a hundred times altogether in the *Ṛg Veda*" (Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, p.37) In a large number of short passages he is introduced just as one among a crowd of divinities from which he is in no way distinguished. Further, the *R.V.* contains numerous hymns in which Ṛṣis ascribe to Indra, Varuṇa and other gods, the same transcendental attributes and functions as to Viṣṇu .. The verdict of modern historical scholarship based on statistical evidence is not, thus, particularly favourable to Viṣṇu. But it is conceded that "his personality there, is, at the same time, more important than would appear from the statistical standard alone" (Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology* P.37)"[4] A.B. Keith remarks : "It would be impossible to deny to Viṣṇu the position of a great god in the period of the Ṛgveda"[5] After examining pertinent evidences, Dr.B.N.K.Sharma concludes, " From the beginning, then Viṣṇu appears to have been marked out for a great future. The opening line of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* of the *R.V.*:

अग्निर्वै देवानामवमो विष्णुः परमः । तदन्तरा सर्वा देवताः ।

bears testimony to the fact that by the close of Ṛg Vedic period, Viṣṇu had definitely come to be accepted as the head

3. Sri Aurobindo, *On The Veda*. Sri Aurobindo International University Centre, Pondicherry,1956, p.394.
4. Dr.B.N.K.Sharma, *Op. cit.*, pp.7-8.
5. *The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upaniṣads*. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1976, p.109.

of the Vedic Pantheon. No wonder that he had earlier attained to a position of such warm affection in the hearts of the seers as to be thought of and mentioned in terms of high regard in Monotheistic circles: i.164,36. Monotheism is the acknowledgment and worship of the One true God. It implies a denial of other gods at any rate, of their jurisdiction over the Cosmos."[6] " These combined with the testimony of the Post-Vedic literature, which uniformly applies the name "Nārāyaṇa" as a synonym of the primeval being in the waters, to Viṣṇu, leads Madhva assume that he alone, had from the beginning, the highest claims to be treated as the Supreme Being of Hindu religious philosophy."[7]

Now turning to the *Ṛgveda* we do come across such statements as

i) तद्विष्णोः परमं पदं सदा पश्यन्ति सूरयः । (I.22.20)

(Supreme is the abode of Viṣṇu; it is always perceived by the wise or liberated)

ii) विष्णोर्नु कं वीर्याणि प्रवोचम् । (I.154.1)

(Who can reckon up the glories of Viṣṇu ?) and the like. But a modern scholar can simply dismiss them as not sufficient to prove the superiority of Viṣṇu over all other gods, considering them to be cases of henotheism or kathenotheism, whereby the particular deity accepted for description is extolled as the supermost. Hence I wish to draw the attention of the interested scholars towards the most famous hymn of the *Ṛgveda* viz. the *Puruṣasūkta*.

There is no doubt that here in the *Puruṣasūkta*, the Parabrahman or the Supreme God is described. The moot

6. *Op.cit.*, p.8
7. *Ibid.*, p.10

question is : "Who is this Supreme God ?" The hymn does not mention the name of the God. But one can secure some external evidences to arrive at the right conclusion.

Firstly, the word '*Puruṣa*' draws our attention to the three stanzas of the 15th chapter of the *Bhagavadgītā* quoted above, wherein the same word occurs. But there also the God's name is not mentioned. Still, the last line calls Him *Avyaya-Īśvara* and Śaṅkarācārya comments : अव्ययः कः ? ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञः नारायणाख्यः ईशनशीलः । meaning thereby that the Supreme God is Nārāyaṇa, the Overlord of all.[8]

Secondly, there are statements in the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* which give the name of *Puruṣa* as Nārāyaṇa :

1. पुरुषं ह नारायणं प्रजाप्रतिरुवाच । (XII.3-4-1)
2. पुरुषो ह नारायणोऽकामयत । (XIII.6-1-1)

Thirdly, in the treatise *Ṛgvidhāna* of Śaunaka, the *Puruṣa-sūkta* has been called as *Hari-sūkta* :

पुरुषस्य हरेः सूक्तं स्वर्ग्यं धन्यं यशस्करम् ।
आत्मज्ञानमिदं पुण्यं योगध्यानमिदं परम् ।।

It is a fact that the शुक्लयजुर्वेद (अध्याय 31) has six *mantras* which are accepted to be the remaining portion of the *Puruṣa-sūkta* and it is called as उत्तरनारायणीय-सूक्त. Mahīdhara comments at the beginning of the first *mantra* :

'अद्भ्यः संभूत इत्युत्तरनारायणेनादित्यमुपस्थायेति (I.3.6.2.20) षट्कण्डिका उत्तरनारायणम् ।

Further, Vādirāja (A.D. 1481-1601) in his commentary on the *Puruṣasūkta* quotes following among other authorities:

8. गीताभाष्य, XV.17.

1. तस्मिन् काले महाराज राम एवाभिधीयते ।
   यथा हि **पौरुषे सूक्ते विष्णुरेवाभिधीयते** ।।
2. यथा हि **पौरुषं सूक्तं विष्णुरेवाभिधायकम्** ।
   न तथा सर्ववेदाश्च वेदाङ्गानि च नारद ।।
3. यथैव **पौरुषं सूक्तं नित्यं विष्णुपरायणम्** ।
   तथैव मे मनो नित्यं भूयाद्विष्णुपरायणम् ।।
4. पुरुषः पर आत्माऽजो ब्रह्म नारायणः प्रभुः ।।
5. सहस्रशीर्षं देवं विश्वाक्षं विश्वशम्भुवम् ।
   विश्वं नारायणं देवमक्षरं परमं पदम् ।।[9]

In Appendix-I, the Editor has given important portions from other commentaries on the *Puruṣasūkta*. The following quotations are given.

1. जगृहे पौरुषं रूपं भगवान् महदादिभिः ।
   सम्भूतं षोडशकलमादौ लोकसिसृक्षया ।।
2. परः परमो हरिः ।।
3. पुरुषो ह वै नारायणः ।।
4. ॐ नमो नारायणाय पुरुषाय महात्मने ।।
5. भूतैर्यदा पंचभिरात्मसृष्टैः पुरं विराजं विरचय्य तस्मिन् ।
   स्वांशेन तुष्टः पुरुषाभिधानमवाप नारायण आदिदेवः ।।
6. हृत्पद्ममध्ये पुरुषं नारायणं शाश्वतमादिदेवम् ।।
7. प्रकृतेर्व्यतिरिक्तो यः पुरुषश्चेति कथ्यते ।
   तं विद्यात्परमात्मानं वासुदेवेति यं विदुः ।।[10]

9. पुरुषसूक्तम्, श्रीमद्वादिराजतीर्थश्रीचरणविरचितव्याख्यानोपेतम्, Ed. Bannanje Govindacharya, Akhila Bharata Madhva Maha Mandala, Bangalore, 1966, pp.2-3.
10. *Ibid.*, pp.20-21

Lastly, coming to Sāyaṇa, the great Vedic commentator, in his introduction to the *Puruṣasūkta*, he states that the God extolled in the hymn is the same as the deity mentioned in the statement of the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, viz, पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित् (III.11). And we will hereafter see that the *Puruṣa* described in the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* is only Lord Viṣṇu.

Thus one can conclude that the *Puruṣasūkta* is also a *Viṣṇu-sūkta* and Viṣṇu and none but Viṣṇu is the Supreme God extolled in the Vedas.

Similar is the case with the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads. There is a feeling that both these are not related in harmony with the Vedas and also are not in harmony with each other. But the fact is quite different. As it has been pointed out, "The Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads are allied portions of the Veda and seem to present the Vedic interpretation which was contemporaneous with it. They form the continuity of a tradition, which flowed from the commencement of the Veda." (P.3). "What we observe in the thinking of the Brāhmanical or the Upaniṣadic age is only a shift of emphasis. The seers of the Saṁhitā age, although they are seemingly worshippers of various deities, they had also a sense of unity behind all divinities." (pp.4-5)[11] And this is how the Brāhmaṇas proclaim the supremacy of Viṣṇu. It is well known that for the seers of the Brāhmaṇas, *Yajña* or Sacrifice was the all-in-all. And by identifying Viṣṇu with *Yajña* they admit the over-all supremacy of Viṣṇu.[12] A.B. Keith rightly observes :

11. Dr. A.S.Tiwari, *Madhva and the Veda - A Study of Dvaita interpretation of Vedic Myth, Ritual And Philosophy.* Ph.D. Thesis approved by the University of Poona, 1976.

12. यज्ञो वै विष्णुः । शतपथब्रा, I.i.1. अग्निर्वै सर्वा देवताः । विष्णुर्यज्ञः ।
---गोपथब्रा .2.1.12.

Cf. यज्ञो विष्णुः प्रजापतिः ।। मैत्रि, उप VI.16.

"In this account (of the Śatapatha) is to be seen the most important factor in the elevation of Viṣṇu to his rank of a most high god, his constant identification with the sacrifice. The precise train of thought by which this identification was reached cannot be reconstructed with certainty : it is not to be supposed that Viṣṇu's importance is accidental, or due merely to this identification : he must have been a great god both for the people and priests before he was given the similitude to the sacrifice, the greatest of all things in the estimation of the priesthood, but his identification undoubtedly aided in the increase of that greatness, and made it permanent and abiding."[13]

When we come to the Upaniṣads, following the Vedas they too proclaim the *parama-pada* of Viṣṇu. As an example the following declaration of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* can be cited.

यस्त्वविज्ञानवान् भवत्यमनस्कः सदाशुचिः ।
न स तत्पदमाप्नोति संसारं चाधिगच्छति ।।
यस्तु विज्ञानवान् भवति समनस्कः सदा शुचिः ।
स तु तत्पदमाप्नोति यस्माद् भूयो न जायते ।।
विज्ञानसारथिर्यस्तु मनः प्रग्रहवान् नरः ।
सोऽध्वनः पारमाप्नोति **तद् विष्णोः परमं पदम्** ।।
इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा ह्यर्था अर्थेभ्यश्च परं मनः ।
मनसस्तु परा बुद्धिर्बुद्धेरात्मा महान् परः ।।
महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात्पुरुषः परः ।
पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः ।।
एषः सर्वेषु भूतेषु गुढोऽऽत्मा न प्रकाशते ।
दृश्यते त्वग्र्यया बुद्ध्या सूक्ष्मया सूक्ष्मदर्शिभिः ।। (III.7-12)

13. *Op.cit.*, pp.110-111.

(One who is devoid of proper knowledge, having an uncontrolled mind and is ever impure (in conduct) does not attain that abode (of Viṣṇu); he obtains only this transmigratory existence (of birth and death). But he who has the proper knowledge, full control over the mind and is ever pure (in conduct) certainly attains that abode (of Viṣṇu) from where there is no return (to this mundane existence). He who has proper knowledge as his charioteer and has the controlled mind as the rein, reaches the other end of the path (of his life) and that is the supreme abode of Viṣṇu. The objects are superior to the senses; the mind is superior to the objects, the intellect is superior to the mind ; the great soul is superior to the intellect ; the unmanifested Principle is superior to the soul and Puruṣa (Viṣṇu) is superior to the unmanifested Principle. There is nothing superior to Puruṣa (Viṣṇu). He is the highest, the supreme goal. That Viṣṇu is hidden in all beings. He exists unrevealed. But by His grace He is perceived by those who can see the subtle with their minute and sharpened intellect.)

Thus one can note that the supreme Vedic God is Viṣṇu alone and Madhvācārya was quite right when he identified Brahman with Viṣṇu.

Further there is an interesting incident narrated in the *Nārada Purāṇa*.[14] It states that in the Kṛtayuga, which is considered to be the period during which human society was in its most ideal state--socially, economically, religiously, ethically, politically and so on, all were always devoted to Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu.

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14. देवदानवगन्धर्वा यक्षराक्षसपन्नगाः । नासन्कृतयुगे सर्वे सर्वे देवसमाः स्मृताः ।। सर्वे हृष्टाश्च धर्मिष्ठा न तत्र क्रयविक्रयौ । वेदानां विभागश्च न युगे कृतसंज्ञके ।। ब्राह्मणाः क्षत्रिया वैश्याः शूद्राः स्वाचारतत्पराः । **सदा नारायणपरास्तपोधनपरायणाः** ।।
नारदपुराण, I.41.7-9

Moreover it has been rightly pointed out by Dr.A.S.Tiwari : "One feels more convinced of this fact when one finds that the original love and passion of Viṣṇu for his subjects and devotees is the same throughout the post-Vedic literature, inclusive of Purāṇas. Thus for the welfare of his subjects, he takes three giant steps(*R.V.* 1.155.6) which idea is further developed into the famous Purāṇic episode of Vāmana-avatāra.[15] It is the constant longing of a devotee to see the third and highest step of Viṣṇu where reside honey and heavenly pleasures.[16] The same idea is echoed in the *Katha Upaniṣad*.[17] Thus, the *paramapada* 'the highest step' of Viṣṇu had been from very early times the object of the devotees' meditation and paved the way for Viṣṇu's eminence in the mediaeval age whose philosophers were considerably influenced by the spiritual aspect of the highest step.[18] In the *Mahābhārata* 12.328 37.38, [19] we come accross references which clearly indicate the all-pervasive character of Viṣṇu which was adored so characteristically in the Veda and

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15. H.H.wilson, *The Ṛgveda* (Transl). Bangalore, Vol I.1946, pp.234-35. "There can be no doubt the expression was originally allegorical and it served as the ground work of the Puranik fiction of *Vāmana* or dwarf *Avatāra*."
16. *R.V.*1.22.20: तद्विष्णोः परमं पदं सदा पश्यन्ति सूरयः । दिवींव चक्षुराततम् ।
*R.V.*I.154.5 : तदस्य प्रियमभि पथो अश्य नरो यत्र देवयवो मदन्ति । उरुक्रमस्य स हि बन्धुरित्था विष्णोः पदे परमे मध्व उत्सः ।।
17. *K.U.*III.7 : विज्ञानसारथिर्यस्तु मनः प्रग्रहवान्नरः । सोऽध्वनः पारमाप्नोति तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम् ।।
18. J.Gonda, *Aspects of Early Viṣṇuism*, 1954, p.66 : "According to the philosophers of latter period God (Viṣṇu) pervades (*vyāpnoti*) the spiritual and non-spiritual entities of this world being their ruler."
19. गतिश्च सर्वभूतानां प्रजनं चापि भारत । व्याप्ता मे रोदसी पार्थ कान्तिश्चाभ्यधिका मम ।। अधिभूतनिविष्टश्च तदिच्छुश्चापि भारत । क्रमणाच्चाप्यहं पार्थ विष्णुरित्यभिसंहितः ।।

commanded the same reputation in the Epic period also. The *Brahmavaivarta-purāṇa* 2.10 [20] also glorified the highest step of Viṣṇu and it is mentioned that the aspirant earnestly sought reaching up to it. Thus, we see that the concept of all-pervasiveness is inseparable from Viṣṇu's personality and it has been an aspect of great importance in making Him the paramount deity of mediaeval Bhakti age when the *parama-pada* of Viṣṇu began to be regarded as the great solace for the devout heart."[21]

All this is sufficient to prove the fact that Viṣṇu by His very nature commands the highest place and universal reverence and devotion from every objective thinker and seeker of final emancipation. And a thorough study of the contribution of Madhvācārya to Indian Philosophy reveals clearly that he was an objective thinker *par excellance*. This is evidenced in his declaration.

ब्रह्मशब्दः विष्णौ एव ।

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20. कतिकालं परिमितं स्थितिर्मे तत्र भारत । कदा यास्यामि सर्वेश तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम् । ।
21. *Op.cit.*, pp.30-32.

CHAPTER II

MADHVĀCĀRYA'S INTERPRETATION OF THE ĪŚĀVĀSYOPANIṢAD

i. Upaniṣads and Their Importance

In world literature the Upaniṣads have been considered to be unique and inspiring. "The Upaniṣads are unique in the sacred literature of the world. They stand alone as beacon-lights on a mountain peak, showing how high man may climb, how much of the light of the self may shine out through the vessel of clay, how truly God may speak through man."[1]

The Upaniṣads are the fountain-heads of Indian Philosophical Thought and also of Indian culture. They have influenced the Indian thought-currents throughout several centuries. Prof. Deussen in his well known work "*Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*" estimates that the Upaniṣads have an inestimable value for the whole race of mankind. The delight which Schopenhauer, the great German philosopher, derived on reading the Upaniṣads has been expressed by him in the oft-quoted passage :"In the whole world there is no study, so beneficial and so elevating as that of the Upaniṣads. It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death."

Swami Vivekananda was very much influenced and inspired by the teachings of the Upaniṣads. In one of his

1. Annie Besant, *The Wisdom of Upaniṣads*. Theosophical Publishing House, Madras, 1925, Foreword.

speeches, he exhorts Indians to study the Upaniṣads : "Let me tell you, we want strength, and the Upaniṣads are a great source of strength. Therein lies power to invigorate the whole world. They call with trumpet voice upon the weak,miserable, the downtrodden of all races,all creeds and sects, to stand on their feet and be free; freedom, physical freedom, mental freedom and spiritual freedom are the watch-words of the Upaniṣads. The truths of the Upaniṣads are before you, take them up, live unto them and the salvation of India will be at hand."

Even many Western scholars and philosophers have been impressed by the study of the Upaniṣads. Schopenhauer has been already mentioned above. " The American savant Thoreau exhorted his countrymen not to read the *New York Times*, but to read the *Eternities,* meaning the Upaniṣads. The Spanish writer J.Mascaro described the Upaniṣads as the'Himalayas of the Soul'. Just as that great mountain height determines the climate, the rain fall and the physical features of the peninsula, so do these heights of light and wisdom determine the scope and the quality of the spiritual life of the race that inhabits it. Max Muller describes them as the light of the morning, like the pure air of the mountains, so simple and so true if once understood."[2]

"John Eglinton in his memoir A.E. has a passage which describes influence of the Upaniṣads and Gītā : "Goethe, Wordsworth, Emerson and Thoreau among moderns have something of this vitality and wisdom, but we can find all they have said and much more in the grand sacred books of the East. The *Bhagavad Gītā* and the Upaniṣads contain such godlike fulness of wisdom on all things that I

2. P. Nagaraja Rao, *Introduction to Vedanta*, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1966, P.46.

feel the authors must have looked with calm remembrance back through a thousand passionate lives, full of feverish strife for and with shadows, ere they could have written with such certainty of things which the soul feels to be true."[3] Sir John Woodroffe lays down the study of the Upaniṣads for the present generation to get rid of the prevailing degeneration: "The age which produced the ritualism of the Brāhmaṇas and the sublime teaching of the Upaniṣads was an age superior to the present in which so called civilized man has scarcely time to say his daily prayers and the soul seems to be irretrievably world-bound. This degeneration from the conditions of the glorious Vaidik ages is the fruit of racial Karma. The Brahamavidyā of the Upaniṣads has,however,permeated every section of Hindu society in varying degrees and given it a culture which even in the present day of its degeneration sustains the individuality of the race."[4]

It is rightly observed that the Upaniṣads are eternal and are capable to inspire all generations seeking bliss here and hereafter: "The Upaniṣads like all great classics,have the power of self-renewal.They are neither old nor new.They are eternal.They are ageless.They are modern and topical in a sense.They have a message for all ages and specially for our own. 'Modernity is not a question of date but of outlook'.When we read and ponder over the passages in the Upaniṣads they re-emerge in answer to our present problems.They have the power to produce from age to age the necessary corrective of men's sense of values and conduct of life, by creating the spiritual ideal which gives them the vision of Truth."[5]

3. *Ibid.* P.78.
4. *Īśopaniṣad,* Ganesh and Co. Madras, 1971, Pp.9-10.
5. P. Nagaraja Rao, *Op. cit.*, P.47.

The importance of the Upaniṣads has been highlighted in other manners also : "They attempt to answer the most important questions raised in the Vedic hymns regarding the origin of the world, the nature of the Supreme Being and Its relation to the human soul. In them a systematic attempt is made to understand the true nature of the Supreme Brahma and the manner in which He manifests Himself in the world. Thus we see that the Upaniṣad is really the theosophy of the Vedas. It is the most important division of the Vedic literature and is the most interesting within the whole range of Sanskrit literature. It represents Jñanakāṇḍa or gives preference to knowledge and diregards Karmakāṇḍa or the ritual portion, represented by the Brāhmaṇas of the Vedas. The end of both the paths, Jñāna and Karma is the same, namely, final liberation and the cessation of future births. In the Brāhmaṇas we find an advocacy of the rituals and ceremonials for the attainment of liberation, whereas the Rishis of the Upaniṣads held and proved that it is by knowledge of the Supreme Brahma, it is by meditation of His true form, and it is by a concentration of mind that the true liberation can be obtained. The Upaniṣads thus form the great reservoir of all the grand philosophical systems of India and the first key to the true conception of God and His manifold attributes. They will as Professor Max Muller rightly observes, "maintain a place in the literature of the world, among the most astonishing productions of the human mind in any age and in any country."[6]

In the words of Monier Williams, "these Upaniṣads do in fact lie at the root of what may be called the philosophical side of Hinduism. Not only are they as much Śruti, or

6. *Upanishads*, Published by The Society For the Resuscitation of Indian Literature, Calcutta, 1911, Pp.iii-iv.

revelation, as the Mantra and Brāhmaṇa, but they are practically only Veda of all thoughtful Hindus in the present day."[7] And Edward Gough observes : "The Upaniṣads are an index to the intellectual peculiarities of the Indian character. The thoughts they express are the ideas that prevail throughout all subsequent Indian literature, much of which will be fully comprehensible to those only who carry with them a knowledge of these ideas to its perusal. A study of the Upaniṣads is the starting point in any intelligent study of Indain Philosophy. As regards religion, the philosophy of the Upaniṣads is the ground work of the various forms of Hinduism, and the Upaniṣads have been justly characterised by Goldstucker " as the basis of the enlightened faith of India."[8]

Dr. B.N.K.Sharma has traced the advancement of thought from the Vedas and Brāhmaṇas to the Upaniṣads as regards the conception of future life : "We find in the Upaniṣads a steady advance on the Vedic and Brāhmaṇa conception of future life. While the Brāhmaṇas allowed for future life only in the next world, the Upaniṣads extended it to this world also. While the Mantras merely sang the glories of the gods and the Brāhmaṇas elaborated the sacrifices whereby to please them, and the Āraṇyakas meditated on their deeper significance, the Upaniṣads turned attention to the actual problems of religion and philosophy and questions of the inter-relation of the data of life here with the life beyond, the nature and limitations of personality of the ultimate destiny of man, his relation to the world of experience, the status of gods and the necessity for assuming Transcendental Principle underlying all phenomena and its relationships to the embodied spirit."[9]

7. *Indian Wisdom*, Cosmo Publications, New Delhi, 1978, P.33.
8. *The Philosopy of the Upaniṣads*, Cosmo Publications, New Delhi, 1979, P.vi.
9. *History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1981, P.20.

In fine it is well said,"The Upaniṣads by virtue of sublimity of thought, deep philosophical inspiration and profound teachings have become the most treasured possession of India,and their importance is still being felt in India and abroad."[10]

ii. The Īśāvāsyopaniṣad or Īśopaniṣad

ईशावास्योपनिषद् पञ्चनिमेषैरेव समग्रापि पठितुमर्हा, अथापि सर्ववेदार्थगर्भिता ब्रह्माण्डगर्भितश्रीकृष्णवदनमिवाश्चर्यजननी वहुगम्भीरा च ।।-

-श्री फलिमारु-तथा-भण्डारकेरी उभयमठाधीशाः श्रीमद् विद्यामान्यतीर्थश्रीपादाः।

The *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* or *Īśopaniṣad* is the most aphoristic and popular Upaniṣad. Though it is quite brief--it contains only eighteen stanzas-- it lays down the ethical and metaphysical truths in a unique form. International Society For Krishna Consciousness founded by His Divine Grace A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada[11] calls these eighteen stanzas as "Eighteen Age-old Secrets of Inner Peace and Fulfilment," and "The knowledge that Brings one nearer to the Supreme Personality of Godhead, Krishna." As His Holiness Śrī Vidyāmānyatīrtha Swamiji asserts in the Sanskrit quotation given above,[12] the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* is so brief that its reading can be finished in five minutes; but it contains in a miniature form the entire Vedic lore, as Lord Kṛṣṇa's mouth revealed the entire Universe when He opened it before His mother !

10. Bhattacharya, *Sanskrit Culture in Changing World.* Good Companions, Baroda, 1950, Pp.23-24.
11. *Śrī Īśopaniṣad*, The Bhaktivedanta Book Trust, Bombay, Ninth Printing, 1974.
12. Dr. K.B. Archak, *Śaṅkara and Madhva on the Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad* Vanavasi Rama Mandir, Dharwad, 1981, P.iii.

The *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* is the only Upaniṣad which is a part of the *Saṁhitā* -portion of the Vedic literature, whereas other Upaniṣads are parts of the several Brāhmaṇas. It constitutes the fortieth chapter of the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* or the *Śukla* (White) *Yajurveda*. Hence it is called '*Saṁhitopaniṣad*'. As the *Saṁhitā* -portion is earlier, the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* has been placed as the earliest Upaniṣad : "If the mantra portions are older than the Brāhmaṇas, and they must be so, as the text is always older than commentary, then there can be no doubt that this Upaniṣad is older than the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* which, according to some, is the oldest of all. Many mantras of this Upaniṣad are to be found in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. Thus, the traditional order of the Upaniṣads with the *Īśāvāsya* as the first, has an historical foundation."[13]

The merits of the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* have been lauded by many a scholar : "The *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* holds an invitation to Infinite living by unravelling the nature of Infinite Being and by prescribing a way which each little being, however small it may be and 'finite' we may call, can pass beyond the limits of his/its moral life to the bliss of infinite immortal life."[14] "The *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* is at once exoteric as it attempts a synthesis of the practical values of life and

13. B.D. Basu, *The Sacred Books of the Hindus* Vol.I, Allahabad, Introduction, P.ii.

    Contrast : (1) "Though forming the last chapter of the Vajasaneyi Samhita, it belongs to a rather late period." A.A. Macdonell, *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1972, P.240. (2) "The Isa Upanisad has succeeded in obtaining entry as a book (xi) of the Vajasaneyi Samhita, with which it has nothing really to do, and which has been much added to in the course of time" - A.B. Keith, *The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanisads*, Harvard Oriental Series, Vol.32, 1925, pp.499-500.
14. Dr. K.B. Ramakrishnarao, *The Īśāvāsyopaniṣad.* An article in Mysore University Journal, Section A-Arts, March-Sept. 1977.

esoteric as it reveals the highest goal of life in the best possible way."[15] "It affords an excellent survey of the fundamental doctrines of the Vedānta philosophy."[16] Jaya Chamaraja Wadiyar has highlighted the noble teaching of the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* : "There is no doubt whatever that to those who do believe in religion, there is no getting away from the fact that it implies belief in God, as well as the acceptance of the supernatural element. By supernatural I do not mean something that cannot be understood or grasped but something which stands out like a tall pinnacle, a light, far and above everything else, mysterious, awesome and ominipotent. It means that the person who has a living faith like this finds it reflected in the discipline of his own life leading to the assimilation of the light of his soul. This idea is indicated to us in the first few lines of the *Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad*. The message of the Upaniṣad may be briefly summarized : The whole world is encased by the living presence of Īśa, the ruler of the Universe. By coveting not that which belongs to others and by giving up greed and performing action without desires, man should desire to live for a hundred years. Here the stress is laid on disinterested action and the acceptance of the universe as His (God's) manifestation. Such is the noble view expounded by our scriptures."[17]

The *Īśavāsyopaniṣad* contains eighteen stanzas; the great epic *Mahābhārata* has eighteen books and the *Bhagavadgītā* has so many chapters. This sameness of number eighteen has been considered to be meaningful by B.D. Basu. He remarks: "the number eighteen is a suggestive figure--the Mahābhārata has eighteen books; the Gītā has

15. Dr. K.B. Archak, *Op. cit.*, p.1.
16. A.A. Macdonell, *Op. cit.*, p.240.
17. *Atman and Brahman in Vedic Religion*, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1971, Pp.8-9.

eighteen chapters; and this first in the series of the Upaniṣads has eighteen verses. Is there any coincidence? Ranga-Rāmānuja answers the question by saying that the whole of Gītā is the expansion of these eighteen verses. We say yes, not only the Gītā but the whole of the Mahābhārata is based upon these eighteen verses. The number is mystic, and whenever employed in any sacred book indicates that there is a hidden meaning underlying the apparent one, and that the reader should pause, reflect and meditate till he has reached the hidden sense. For, it is thus that his intuition can be brought into play."[18] "On this ground, it may be said that this *Upaniṣad* as it reveals an integrated synthesis of the paths leading to *Mokṣa*, can be considered an aphoristic summary of the whole Upaniṣadic philosophy. Hence, the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* though the shortest is called as the first and the oldest of all the Upaniṣads, and it occupies a unique place in the history of Indian spiritual and philosophical literature."[19]

That the universal purpose of bringing about peace in the world can be achieved by a study of the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* has been emphatically declared by His Divine Grace A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada : "In modern society there is always a great quarrel between the laborers and the capitalists. This quarrel has taken an international shape, and world is endangered. Men face one another in enmity and snarl just like cats and dogs. *Śrī Īśopaniṣad* cannot give advice to the cats and dogs, but it can deliver the message of Godhead to man through the bonafide *ācāryas* (holy teachers). The human race should take the Vedic wisdom of *Īśopaniṣad* and not quarrel over material possessions. One

18. B.D. Basu, *Op. cit.*, Vol.XXII, part I, Introd., P.i.
19. Dr. K.B. Archak, *Op. cit.*, P.7.

must be satisfied by whatever privileges are given to him by the mercy of the Lord. There can be no peace if the communists or capitalists or any other party claims proprietorship over the resources of nature, which are entirely the property of the Lord. The capitalists cannot curb the communists simply by political maneuvering, nor can the communists defeat the capitalists simply by fighting for stolen bread. If they do not recognize the proprietorship of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, all the property which they claim to be their own is stolen. Consequently they will be liable to punishment by the laws of nature. Nuclear bombs are in the hands of both communists and capitalists and if both do not recognize the proprietorship of the Supreme Lord, it is certain that these bombs will ultimately ruin both parties. Thus in order to save themselves and bring peace to the world, both parties must follow the instructions of *Śrī Īśopaniṣad*."[20] The inspiration derived by Mahatma Gandhiji from the knowledge of the first mantra of *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* is certainly commendable. During 1937, while writing on Hinduism, in his '*Harijan*' (Weekly), he declared:

"But I have fixed upon one mantra as containing the whole essence of Hinduism. Many of you, I think know the Ishopanishad (I read it years ago with translation and commentary. I learnt by heart in Yaravada Jail.) I have now come to the final conclusion that if all the Upanisads and all the other scriptures happened all of a sudden to be reduced to ashes and if only the first verse in the Ishopanishad were left in tact in the memory of the Hindus, Hinduism would live for ever. Remember that one verse of the Ishopanishad first and then all about the other scriptures. Peace on earth and good will among mankind needs nothing more nor less than an

20. *Op. cit.*, Pp.7-8.

acceptance of the truth underlying the mantra which is no abstruse formula, no exclusive cradle doctrine, but a universal law.

"And without fear of contradiction, I am here to say that every believer in this verse is wholly a Hindu..... I know no other road or better road to happiness than is contained in this first mantra of Ishopanishad. The 1st mantra describes God as the Creator, the Ruler and the Lord. The seer to whom this mantra or verse was revealed was not satisfied with the very frequent statement that God was to be found everywhere.....

"Since God pervades everything, nothing belongs to you, not even your own body. God is the undisputed, unchallengeable master of everything you possess. If it is universal brotherhood—not only brotherhood of all human beings, but of all living things — I find it in this mantra. It is unshakable faith in the Lord and Master and all the adjectives you can think of- I find it in this mantra. If it is the idea of complete surrender to God and of the faith that He will supply all that I need, then again I say I find it in this mantra. Since He pervades every fibre of my being and of all of you, I derive from it the doctrine of the equality of all creatures on earth and it should satisfy the cravings of all philosophical communists. This mantra tells me that I cannot hold as mine anything that belongs to God and that, if my life and that of all who believe in this *mantra* has to be a life of perfect dedication, it follows that it will have to be a life of continual service of fellow creatures."

5

iii. The Interpretations of the Īśāvāsyopaniṣad

It is rightly believed that the sacred knowledge cannot be acquired by a direct access to the sacred literature like Vedas and Upaniṣads. One has to take the help of a *Guru* or a preceptor to know fully its hidden meaning or to 'read it between the lines'. Fortunately now there is a huge mass of commentaries written by revered *ācāryas* like Śaṅkara, Madhva and their followers. But the bewildering aspect regarding this vast literature is that because of different interpretations, rather than revealing clearly the hidden meaning of the *Īśopaniṣad*, it confounds a serious aspirant of knowledge. In this connection, it is noted that there is a general belief among scholars both in the East and the West, that the interpretation of the Upaniṣads as given by Śaṅkara should be accepted as faithful to the intention of the seers of the Upaniṣads. As Edward Gough believes, "the greatest of the expositors of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads is Śaṅkara or Śaṅkarāchārya... The teaching of Śaṅkara himself is the natural and legitimate interpretation of the doctrines of the Upaniṣads."[21] Prof. Hiriyanna, while rendering the *Īśopaniṣad* into English faithfully follows Śaṅkara and advises "in commenting on this Upaniṣad Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, now and again touches on the following point which is of much importance in understanding his view aright."[22]

But many have expressed their dissent to this observation. The following observation of A.B. Keith, even though a lengthy one, can be read with interest in this regard:

21. *Op. cit.*, p.vii.
22. *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad*, Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore, 1972, Introd., p.vii.

"It was attempted by the great philosopher Śaṅkara to find in the Upaniṣads the expression of a single simple doctrine, carried out consistently through all, and in his commentary on the Vadānta as set out in the Brahma Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa it is his object to interpret that Sūtra and to bring out at the same time the doctrines of the Upaniṣads, the whole forming a great system of philosophy in which no contradictions should exist. The plan adopted by the philosopher for this purpose was simple: he found in the Upaniṣads the principle that knowledge was of two kinds, wholly different. On the one hand the higher knowledge recognized the existence of absolutely real, nothing save the Brahman or the Ātman, the one unity, which was at once real, thought, and bliss. The force of these terms must be understood in a special sense: reality is not something outside the Brahman: no predication is possible of the Brahman, for predication involves diversity and in the Brahman there is no diversity. Thought or consciousness, which is not an attribute of, but the essence of the Brahman, does not mean actual activity; ..... it is consciousness without any object or subject, and therefore differs so entirely from the very nature of consciousness as not in our view to deserve the name at all. The bliss also is that of being which has no consciousness of any kind and no feeling, and therefore is merely a metaphorical expression. This single thing is all that the world really is, the one Brahman which is the Ātman. All the multiplicity of phenomena is unreal: the saving truth which redeems the individual from the constant stream of births is the recognition of this fact, that he himself is really the one Ātman, not related as part to it, but solely and absolutely it. In the expression 'That thou art', which is enunciated in the Upaniṣads, is set out the fundamental fact of all existence, the indivisible unity.

"The apparent multiplicity of the universe and the empirical knowledge of man is not in the view of Śaṅkara to be denied for a moment. Śaṅkara wages war both against the idealistic school of Buddhism, which denies that there is any real distinction between dreams and waking reality, and the nihilistic school, which asserts that all is mere void. Existence is not momentary at all : it has a substantiality and is real, but only from the point of view of the lower knowledge. The Ātman in itself has allied with it a power, Māyā illusion, which limits it : the limitation is not indeed real, for that would hopelessly violate the essential doctrine of Śaṅkara which denies any dualism whatever; but from the point of view of the lower knowledge that illusion exists, and through that illusion exists all that there is in the universe as known to us. Thus, there is room for a great god, the Hiraṇyagarbha of the Veda, who occupies the position of a demiourgos, inasmuch as he is the Ātman, when it is obscured by illusion, and there is afforded an explanation for the seeming multiplicity of souls, for the unending stream of life, for the world of living creatures and inanimate nature. All indeed is an illusion, but it has within that fundamental fact all the appearance of reality.

"It will be seen at once that in this doctrine Śaṅkara has a powerful weapon, with which to explain the whole of the system of the Upaniṣads as the product of a single philosophical impulse. Nevertheless, the attempt is undoubtedly merely a clever *tour de force* without final validity, and its ingenuity is as great but no greater than its improbability. That this is the case could be easily proved by the examination of the Upaniṣads in detail, but it is sufficient to state that the Brahma Sūtra itself did not take the view adopted by Śaṅkara : it is now certain, thanks to the efforts of Thibaut, Sukhtankar, and Jacobi, among others, that the real

view taken by Bādarāyaṇa was more akin to, though not identical with, that taken by the commentary of Rāmānuja, whose work dates some two centuries after Śaṅkara. The view of that scholar was that the explanation of the world and of the individual souls as mere products of illusion, enveloping the nature of the Brahman, was wholly wrong : on the contrary the two elements, the world and the individual souls, had a definite entity of their own, which was perfectly real, even if they were only parts of and therefore, much inferior in order of rank to, the Brahman, who is conceived no longer as mere impersonality but as personal being. The views of Rāmānuja are in many points difficult to formulate with precision: there is vagueness regarding the position of the individual soul, the world and the divinity, which is probably unavoidable, but certainly undeniable. But at any rate the system of pure idealism of the most abstract kind, which Śaṅkara put forward, is confronted with a system which is pantheistic, for the individual souls and the world are in some sense part of deity, but which has also a strong theistic element in the fact that the individual souls, even when they become free from transmigration through the influence of their devotion to the lord and his compassion for them, are deemed still to retain a separate existence and not be merged in the deity. As in the case of all Indian thinkers, the tendency of Rāmānuja is to be hazy regarding the nature of the deity, and the part played in that nature by consciousness, which, as we have seen, for Śaṅkara disappears into a meaningless abstraction, but the individual soul seems, contrary to the clear tendency of the Upaniṣads, and of the epic Sāṁkhya-Yoga, to retain in its final form of existence some kind of consciousness which is consistent with its enjoyment of the most perfect bliss."[23]

23. A.B. Keith, *Op. cit.*, Pp.507-509.

Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao opines: "But our modern scholars have differed from Śaṅkara in their interpretation of the Upaniṣads. They all hold to monism but are not reconciled to the view that the world is an illusion. They have interpreted the nature of Brahman in a different manner. They declare that the Infinite does not exclude the finite. The universe is rooted in It. The Infinite is the Real of the Real. It is in all. *All this is Brahman. The world is the moving image of eternity.....* The logical difficulties of synthesising contradictions made Śaṅkara describe the Infinite as devoid of any determination or action. Modern commentators declare that there is a special logic of the Infinite. In the words of Aurobindo "the logic of the Infinite is the magic of the finite".... The Infinte is immanent as well as transcendent...... Activity is attributed to the Infinite as entering the souls and things of men...The individual soul is represented as a friend of the Infinite. He is to dedicate himself to the Lord........ Dr. Radhakrishnan has done a great deal in establishing the positive interpretation of the nature of the Infinite in the Upaniṣads.... The positive view of the Infinite and the view that the world is not an illusion is supported by scholars like Dr. Bhandarkar and Hopkins. Dr. Bhandarkar writes that "the opinion expressed by some eminent scholars that the burden of the Upaniṣadic teaching is the illusive character of the world and the reality of one soul only is manifestly wrong, and I may even say, is indicative of an uncritical judgment." Prof. Hopkins puts the question and answers it; "Is there anything in the early Upaniṣads to show that the authors believed in the objective world being an illusion? The answer is nothing at all."[24]

24. *Op. cit.*, Pp.85-87.

Restricting our discussion to the interpretation of the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* as given by Śaṅkara, some of the modern scholars who have gone into the details, have, on more than one occasion, disapproved his interpretation. Aurobindo observes: "He (Śaṅkara) interprets *karmāṇi* in the first line (2nd mantra) in the sense of Vedic sacrifices.... The whole expression and construction in this rendering, becomes forced and unnatural."[25] Principal M.R.Desai in his study `*The Īśa Upanishad*"[26] has found fault with Śaṅkara's interpretation of several *mantras*: "Śaṅkara's is obviously a one-sided stand and secondly he has done a lot of mangling and twisting of the meaning." (p.41) "Śaṅkarācārya again is very unnatural and clumsy in his interpretation." (p.48) "The word `*nāma*', therefore he summarily disposes off as an unmeaning interpolation. Really, a dictatorial way of liquidating the unwanted"! (p.49). "He takes `*sah*' as the pronoun of the Ātman (soul); and takes all the eleven words from `*Paryagāt*' to `*Svayambhū*' as adjective of the soul. But neither grammar nor sequence justifies this." (p.65) "He dictates to treat these neuter nouns as masculines. This change of the gender, is made with no apologies." (p.66) "He dictates *sambhūti* to be taken as *asambhūti*. This stand goes against all logic. His wriggling out is audacious and absurd. Mr. Rajwade has rightly observed in Marathi (on page 637) that `by this wonder logic any word can mean anything, without any difficulty." (p.96) R.C.S. Bhatia opines: "It hardly needs to be argued that Śaṅkara inflicts his own ideas, theories and bias on the Upaniṣad."[27]

25. *Eight Upaniṣads* Shri Aurobindo Ashrama, Pondichery, 1963, P.5.
26. Sushila Prakashana, Kolhapur, 1970.
27. *Ishvasyopanisad - A New Interpretation*, JGJRI, Allahabad, Vol.XVIII, 1961-62, P.105.

On the other hand, we note that Madhvācārya's interpretation has been expressly approved at many places. On Madhvācāryas's interpretation of *'Tena tyaktena'* in the first *mantra*, Swami Chinmayananda remarks : "We are indebted to Śrī Madhvāchārya for the beautiful new meaning to this portion of the mantra. *'Tena'* means also 'by Him', who has been indicated already as Īśa, the Lord in the first line."[28] R.C.Vidyarthi follows Madhvācārya: "Enjoy what he has given and do not desire the wealth of others."[29] "Regarding the meaning of *Bhuñjīthāh*, Śaṅkara's interpretation 'to protect' is not at all in consonance with the *mantra* and not accepted by modern scholars too. Mostly, all modern scholars like R.H. Griffith, Mrs. Chitra Devi, M.R. Desai, Hume, Aurobindo, Max Muller among others have taken it to mean 'to enjoy'. Thus, it is evident that Madhva's interpretation is at the head of the interpretations of modern scholars."[30] "Madhva's view of *Vidyā* and *Avidyā* is also conveyed by the *Brahmasūtra* (IV.i, 3)."[31] B.D. Basu commends Madhvācārya's interpretation of *mantras* 9-11: "Madhva enunciates the great altruistic doctrine, so gloriously illustrated in the lives of all great teachers that great responsibility rests with him who knows. He is bound to teach others in order to dispel the ignorance of the world; otherwise his lot is even worse than those of the ignorant."[32] "Madhva's interpretation is interesting. They are called *asuras* or miserable for they do not (*a*) enjoy happiness (*su+ar*) and suffer great pains."[33] And on the interpretation

28. *Ishavasyopanishad*, Chinmaya Publication Trust, Madras, 1977, p. 79.
29. *Prasthanik Trayi or Three-fold Vedānta.* Gita Bhavan, Agra, p.19.
30. Dr. K.B. Archak, *Op. cit.*, pp.30-31.
31. *Ibid.*, P.121, fn. 24 (b).
32. *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, Introd.iii.
33. Dr. Sitanath Goswami, *Īśopaniṣad*, Published by P. Bhattacharjee, Calcutta, III Edn., p.40.

of *Asmi* in *mantra* 16, Basu remarks: "Thus among the Israels also both these names were well-known: God is called 'I AM' or Ahmir of the Parsis and Asmi of Madhva; and also 'I am that I AM' the same, word for word as 'Ahmi yad Ahmi' of the Parsis, and '*So' ham Asmi*' of Madhva. Another point which Madhva clearly brings out is the indwelling of the Lord in *Asu*. Now *Asu* is a word derived 'from '*as*' 'to be' 'to breathe'. *Asu* means life or *Prāṇa*. It is the First Begotten of God, the Spirit. The God dwelling in *Asu* is called *Asura* (or Ahura of the Parsis)- the active Saguṇa Brahman. This *Asu* or *Prāṇa* is the Christ-principal of the Gnostics. These strange coincidences cannot all be accidental. They prove that all prophets whether Zarathushtra or Moses or Madhva, were messengers of the Great White Lodge: and so naturally taught the same doctrine."[34] Any reader of His Divine Grace A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada's '*Śrī Īśopaniṣad*' will become convinced that His Divine Grace has been considerably influenced by Madhvācārya in his discourse on the Upaniṣad.

Dr. K.B. Archak who undertook a comparative and critical study of the interpretations of Śaṅkara and Madhva, of the *Īśopaniṣad* concludes: "From an impartial study of the two chief commentators on the *Upaniṣad*, Śaṅkara and Madhva, one cannot but come to the conclusion that apart from the so-called die-hardness of schools of thought, Madhva's interpretations have an amazing consistency and convincingness. He does not at all labour to refute *Śaṅkara*. Śaṅkara stands discredited by his own inconsistencies and self-contradictions and constant betrayal of the text on which he is commenting. .... Madhva unwaveringly pierces through the difficult passages of the text and weaves a perfect pattern

34. *Op. cit.*, Vol.I, Introd., Pp.ii-iii.

of meaning which beautifully preserves the dignity and grandeur of the Upaniṣadic thought. By his aptness and sureness of touch, by his profound insight and extensiveness of vision, Madhva makes the beautiful and brief Upaniṣad into a perfect symphony of devotional work conducive to right action and contemplation which are but the true pointers on the path of salvation."[35]

All this suffices to convince one and all the need of a study of Madhvācārya's interpretation of the Upaniṣads to know their import. As an aid to such a study here an attempt is made to give the interpretation of Madhvācārya of the *Īśopaniṣad.*

iv. Summary of Madhvācārya's Commentary

Emperor Svāyambhuva Manu had a daughter by name Ākūti. Lord Viṣṇu incarnated Himself as the son of Ākūti and had the name Yajña. Once the Emperor was attacked by demons to be devoured. To escape from this calamity, he praised his grandson with these *mantras* and got the desired relief. These *mantras* have come down in the form of this Upaniṣad.

1. The whole universe is the abode of the Lord. It does not have any independent capacity to move. It derives all its capacity from the Indwelling Lord. Everything in this universe belongs to Him. Hence, whatever has been given by Him should be enjoyed; one should not beg any other's wealth. One should be contented with whatever one has been granted by Him.

35. *Op. cit.*, Pp.173-4.

2. One should desire to live for full one hundred years by performing one's ordained duties in this life. Performance of duties is a must. It is verily the worship of the Lord. Failure to perform one's duties brings sin. Even an ignorant should perform his duties. He incurs sin even if fails to do his duties. In the case of the wise, failure to perform the ordained duties will diminish their bliss. Hence duty is a must; otherwise incur sin.

3. There are dark regions called '*Asuryas*' which are full of intense misery and unhappiness. Those who worship the Lord by erroneous or wrong means, or those who turn away from the Lord are called '*Ātma-han*' or Ātma-killers. Such persons, as a rule, go to those dark regions. Hence, one should always be devoted to the Lord.

4. The Supreme Lord is One Alone. He is fearless and is swifter than even the swiftest mind. Even the gods are unable to know Him fully. By His very nature He knows everything completely from beginning to end. His powers are inconceivable and He is all-pervading. Hence, without moving He overtakes the fastest. All the activities of both the moving and the unmoving universe are submitted to Him by Mātariśvan, the principal Vāyu.

5. The universe is always afraid of Him and consequently trembles. But He trembles not. He is All-pervading; hence, He is both far away and also very near. He is the Indweller of all and also He is outside of all.

6. That devotee who sees all creatures in the Supreme Lord, and the Supreme Lord in all creatures becomes quite fearless. Hence, he need not guard himself from others. Being fearless he is never worried about protecting himself.

7. The truth is : "The Supreme Lord is the Indweller of all and all exists in the Supreme Lord." One who knows this truth and sees the Supreme Lord in all beings and every where can have no delusion, nor any sorrow. He will have undiluted bliss.

8. That devotee who knows this truth attains to the Supreme Lord, the Sorrowless, Bodiless, Full, Pure, Sinless and Omniscient. The Lord rules over the minds of all beings from Brahmā downwards. He is the best of all and is never dependent upon another. He creates the world under fixed rules in beginningless and endless time. He creates this world as a reality and it is eternal as a current, even though ever-changing. His head, arms, body and feet do all consist of pure existence, intelligence and bliss. Such is the Supreme Lord, Mahāviṣṇu. He created this beginningless and endless world by His mere will.

9. Those men, who hold *Avidyā* or wrong ideas about the Lord and hence worship Him wrongly, fall into regions of blinding darkness. And those who have *Vidyā* or know Him correctly but do not condemn and correct others holding wrong notions, fall certainly into regions of still worse darkness.

10 Wise sages have explained that the fruits achieved by *Vidyā* and *Avidyā* are quite different.

11. Hence, those who know both *Vidyā* and *Avidyā* together, i.e. those who know the true form of the Lord, worship Him properly and also condemn the wrong-worshippers, are truly good men. They by condemning the wrong notions and wrong worship, nature of which is grief and ignorance, cross over grief and ignorance, and by knowing the true nature of the Lord and by worshipping Him rightly they attain absolute knowledge and bliss.

12-14. Those men who worship the Supreme Lord as only Destroyer go to regions of blinding darkness. And those who worship Him as Creator alone, go to regions of even worse blinding darkness. Therefore, it is essential to know Him as always full of all qualities, as the Creator, the Destroyer, the Overlord of the entire Universe. This knowledge can free a devotee from the bondage of birth and death. The knowledge of the Lord as the Destroyer frees the devotee from the bonds of the embodied existence and the knowledge of Him as the Creator brings him the true knowledge and bliss. Hence, one should not know the Lord as merely the Destroyer nor as merely the Creator. The Lord should be known as full of all auspicious qualities and absolutely free from all faults. The devotee should not divide or take away any of the Lord's qualities. He should also never imagine that the released souls can ever become equal to the Lord. He should also not imagine Brahmā and others as equal to the Lord. All should realise that there is appropriate difference among the released souls from Brahmā down to human beings. The only means to salvation is to know correctly and completely Viṣṇu, the Supreme Lord.

15. Such a devotee when reaches the state of salvation prays to the Lord: "O Full Lord Viṣṇu! Thy form is hidden by the glittering golden orb of the Sun. Please remove this veil so that I may have the sight of Thy form, which is possible by only winning Thy grace. I am Thy devotee, the lover of Truth.

16. "O Lord Viṣṇu, Thou art Full Lord, Omniscient, All-controller, Goal of the wise and also of Brahmā. Please expand my innate knowledge and illumine my outer knowledge. Thereby, by Thy grace, I may become able to see Thy most auspicious form. The Supreme Lord who is the

Indweller of the solar orb and also of all else in this universe is also the Indweller of my life-breath."

17. At the time of death, only the physical body of a being gets burnt: but Vāyu, the *Prāṇa* (vital air) remains immortal, as immortal as the Indwelling Lord. The individual soul is immortal too. The devotee then prays to the Lord: "O Lord, have mercy on me! Remember my deeds and bestow Thy grace upon me."

18. At last an ardent prayer is offered to the Lord by Emperor Svāyambhuva Manu: "O Lord! lead us on a good path of no return, which is the treasure of salvation. O God! Thou knowest the limits of our knowledge. Please take away the sins which degrade us by causing us to have rebirths. I offer Thee repeatedly salutations enriched with knowledge and devotion. Kindly confer salvation upon me."

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CHAPTER III

MADHVĀCĀRYA, CĀRVĀKAS AND INDIAN TRADITION

Among the systems of Indian Philosophy, Cārvāka or Materialism is also a pretty ancient one. "The materialistic philosophy known as the *Lokāyata*, the *Cārvāka* or the *Bārhaspatya* is probably a very old school of thought."[1] "Materialism is as old as philosophy, and the theory is to be met with in the pre-Buddhistic period also. Germs of it are found in the hymns of the Ṛg-Veda .... The Materialists must have preceded Buddhism, since the oldest Buddhist books mention them. There are references to this doctrine in the epics. ... The classic authority on the materialist theory is said to be the sūtras of Bṛhaspati, which have perished. Our chief sources are the polemical works of other schools. The Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha gives a summary of the teachings of the school in its first chapter."[2]

Due to the freedom of thought and expression practised sincerely by the followers of true Indian tradition, even those who were not in agreement with the Cārvāka doctrines of materialism gave it a place, to consider and weigh its doctrines. The *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadrasūri (6th Cent.A.D.) gives a brief account of six schools of Indian philosophy, viz, Bauddha, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya,

1. S.N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy* Vol.III.Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1991, p.512.
2. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy,* Vol.1. George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London, 1948, pp.277-8.

Jaina, Vaiśeṣika and Jaiminīya and remarks that as some consider Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika as one school, the author deals with the Lokāyata school to make up the number six, connoted by the name of the work.[3] Again, the *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* of Mādhavācārya (14th Cent. A.D.) begins with an account of the Cārvāka system itself. This is how Mādhavācārya introduces the system : "(We have said in our preliminary invocation "Salutation to Śiva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the store-house of supreme felicity") but how can we attribute to the Divine Being the giving of supreme felicity when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Cārvāka, the crest-gem of the atheistical school, the follower of the doctrine of Bṛhaspati ? The efforts of the Cārvākas are indeed hard to be eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current refrain :

While life is yours, live joyously;
None can escape Death's searching eye ;
When once this frame of ours they burn ;
How shall it ever again return?

The mass of men in accordance with the śāstras of policy and enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the only ends of man, and denying the existence of any object belonging to a future world, are found to follow only the doctrine of Cārvāka. Hence another name for that school is Lokāyata- a name well accordant with the thing signified."[4]

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3. नैयायिकमतादन्ये भेदं वैशेषिकैः सह । न मन्यन्ते मते तेषां पञ्चैवास्तिकवादिनः ।।78.
पड्दर्शनसंख्या तु पूर्यते तन्मते किल ।लोकायतमताक्षेपात्कथ्यते तेन तन्मतम् ।। 79
Ṣaḍ-darśanasamuccaya Ed.M.Sivakumaraswamy, Prasaranga, Bangalore University, Bangalore, 1977,p.99
4. अथ कथं परमेश्वरस्य निःश्रेयसप्रदत्वमभिधीयते। बृहस्पतिमतानुसारिणा नास्तिकशिरोमणिना चार्वाकेण तस्य दूरोत्सारितत्वात् । दुरुच्छेदं हि चार्वाकस्य चेष्टितम्। प्रायेण सर्वप्राणिनस्तावत्
यावज्जीवं सुखं जीवेन्नास्ति मृत्योरगोचरः ।
भस्मीभूतस्य देहस्य पुनरागमनं कुतः ।।
इति लोकगाथामनुरुन्धाना नीतिकामशास्त्रानुसारेणार्थकामावेव पुरुषार्थौ मन्यमानाः पारलौकिकमर्थमपह्नुवानाश्चार्वाकमतमनुवर्तमाना एवानुभूयन्ते । अत एव तस्य चार्वाकमतस्य लोकायतमित्यन्वर्थमपरं नामधेयम् ।।
English Transl. by Cowell and Gough *The Sarva-Darśana-Saṁgraha*. London, 1914, p.2

After giving an account of the doctrines of the Cārvāka school, Mādhavācārya, at the beginning of the next chapter devoted to the school of the Buddhists, takes objection to the Cārvāka's non-recognition of *anumāna* or inference as a valid means of knowledge. Others like Śaṅkara have criticised the *Dehātmavāda* or the belief in holding the identity of the soul and the body, of the Cārvākas.[5] Scholars like S.Radhakrishnan,[6] S.N.Dasgupta[7] and Mm. Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar[8] among others have pointed out that the

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5. ननु शास्त्रप्रमुख एव प्रथमे पादे शास्त्रफलोपभोगयोग्यस्य देहव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनोऽस्तित्वमुक्तं सत्यमुक्तं भाष्यकृता ननु तत्रात्मास्तित्वे सूत्रमस्ति, इह तु स्वयमेव सूत्रकृता तदस्तित्वमाक्षेपपुरस्सरं प्रतिष्ठापितम् । - Śaṅkara on *B.S.*III.iii-53.
6. *Op. cit.* p.284
7. *Op. cit.* pp.533-550
8. Mm.Vasudeva Shastri Abhyankar who has written an original commentary in Sanskrit on the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* observes in his Introduction :-
अत्रेदं वोध्यम्- प्रत्यक्षैकवादिनश्चार्वाका अतीव स्थूलदृश्वान इति न ते विचारसहाः । अनुमानप्रमाणं विना प्राणिनां व्यवहारो लुप्तप्राय एव भवेत् । अतीतवर्तमानाध्वसाम्येन ह्यनागतेध्वनि प्रवर्तमानो लोको दृश्यते । चार्वाका अपि परमितरवद् व्यवहारे वस्तुनोनुमानप्रमाणसिद्धं प्रमेयमङ्गीकुर्वन्त्येव । यथा परस्येङ्गितं दृष्ट्वा तदभिप्रायादिकम्। एवं सत्यप्यनुमानं प्रमाणं न भवतीति कथं वदन्तीति त एव प्रष्टव्या भवन्ति । अत एव च ते चार्वाका अतीवोपहास्या इति खण्डनीयत्वेनापि तन्मतस्योल्लेखो व्रह्मसूत्रकारैः श्रीमद्बादरायणैर्नाकारि । (Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1924, Introd.p.60)

Mm. Shastri means to say that even worldly affairs are impossible without a firm belief in the validity of inference and that even the Cārvākas accept the validity of inference when they infer the intention of a person on observing his face. As such the Cārvākas should not deny validity to inference. If they still do, their stand becomes ridiculous and unfit to be considered.

But the contention of the revered Shastri that the opinions of the Cārvākas have not been considered by Bādarāyaṇa even for refutation is not true to fact. Śaṅkara considers two *sūtras* (III.iii.53-54) as devoted to an examination and refutation of the *Dehātmavāda* or the theory →

Cārvāka has been criticised on these two points viz. non-acceptance of inference and the belief in the identity of the body and the soul.

It is only Madhvācārya who has shown that the Cārvāka philosophy is unacceptable because it does not accept anything like *Dharma* and *Adharma* or good & benevolent conduct leading to unseen merit and bad & malevolent conduct leading to unseen demerit. His refutation of the Cārvākas is too brief, but at the same time quite clear-cut. It is in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* (II.ii.6); he states " What is the purpose of that philosophy which does not accept *Dharma and Adharma* ? Hence, it should be disregarded because of self-contradiction."[9]

The argument of Madhvācārya can be elaborated in the light of the gloss of Jayatīrtha :

→ of the identity of the soul and the body held by the Cārvākas (*Supra* fn.5), whereas Madhvācārya holds one *sutra* (II-ii-6) as devoted to refute the Cārvāka-school. Again, if as the revered Shastri contends, it is true that Bādarāyaṇa did consider the Cārvākas as unworthy of even accepting them for argument's sake, then one would have to remark that Mādhavācārya who begins his work with an account of the Cārvāka school is not in tune with Bādarāyaṇa !

In fact, Guṇaratna in his commentary on Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* states that the Cārvākas do admit the validity of inference in so far as it is useful in worldly activities : विशेषः पुनश्चार्वाकैः लोकयात्रानिर्वाहणप्रवणं धूमाद्यनुमानमिष्यते क्वचन्, न पुनः स्वर्गादृष्टादि साधकमलौकिकमनुमानमिति । (83)- *Śrī Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, Sri Muktabai Jñāna Mandira Samsad, Dabholi, 1949, p.143.

9. लोकायतिकपक्षं निराकरोति ।
   ।। ॐ अभ्युपगमेऽप्यर्थाभावात् ॐ ।।
   यस्य धर्माधर्मौ न स्तः तत्सिद्धान्ते किं प्रयोजनम् । अतः स्वव्याहतेरेवोपेक्ष्यः ।

Madhvācārya asks a pertinent question to the Cārvākas who deny the authority of the scriptures- "Do you accept the existence of principles like *Dharma* and *Adharma* or actions leading to the unseen merit and demerit : Because, a firm belief in the scriptures laying down *Dharma* and *Adharma* is essential for all those who accept *Dharma* and *Adharma*. And the answer of the Cārvākas is well known- "We do not accept anything unseen, including *Dharma* and *Adharma*." And Madhvācārya takes exception to this refusal of the Cārvākas to believe in *Dharma* and *Adharma*. He asks a simple question- " Then, what is the purpose of your precepts ? Verily, every school should have a purpose of bringing happiness to its followers."[10] The Cārvāka does not believe in heaven or hell as they are unseen. He cannot say that the purpose of his school is to make people happy by guiding them to secure wealth by which one can secure worldly happiness. Because, such wealth is not gained by following his doctrines, but by engaging oneself in business, agriculture and the like. Thus the Cārvāka fails to help his followers to get even worldly happiness.

Now the Cārvāka contends- "My purpose is different. It is only to free people from the snares of *Dharma* and *Adharma* with which you have bound them by propagating the existence of an unseen God and His delivering joy or sorrow depending upon the performance of *Dharma* and *Adharma* which too are unseen. Because of their belief in your preachings, the people are constrained from enjoying,

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10. Read : i) सर्वस्यैव हि शास्त्रस्य कर्मणो वापि कस्यचित् ।
    यावत्प्रयोजनं नोक्तं तावत् तत्केन गृह्यते ।।
    कुमारिलभट्ट, श्लोकवार्तिक, I.i.12.
    ii) प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तते ।। सुभाषित

to their heart's content, the worldly pleasures. Hence, our function in a way is a negative one. We preach that there is nothing like God, *Dharma* and *Adharma* and thereby we induce people to enjoy fully all the worldly pleasures, without any hesitation or any constraints. Thus our precepts do have a purpose of bringing happiness to the people."

Here one can note that the Cārvāka presumes that a belief in God, *Dharma* and *Adharma* is a constraint or hindrance to worldly enjoyment. And Madhvācārya shows the flaw in this presumption of the Cārvākas. The fact is quite opposite to his presumption. The non-belief in *Dharma* and *Adharma* will make people hanker after worldly pleasures without caring for the joy or the welfare of others. And thereby the *Mātsya-nyāya* or the law of jungle where 'might is right' will come into force and there would result misery of one and all as every person will have someone, mightier than himself. Thus by following the teachings of the Cārvāka, not worldly happiness nor joy to one's heart's content, but all round and widespread misery and unhappiness will be the net result. Thus the doctrines of the Cārvākas have no purpose beneficial to humanity.

Secondly, every school of philosophy worth its name should have its own subject-matter. Now, what can be the subject-matter of the Cārvāka-school? It cannot be something unseen because the Cārvāka-school does not believe in anything unseen. It can neither be something seen. Because, the visible results can be obtained by following specific authoritative treatises dealing with worldly affairs. For example, the physical pleasures can be best enjoyed by following the guidance given in the *Kāmasūtras*. The wealth can be earned by following the *Arthaśastra*. The diseases can be cured by following the *Āyurveda*. The houses can be built

by following the *Vāstuśastra* or books on architecture ; and so on. The Cārvāka need not teach all this. Moreover, he must also remember that anything to become a *Śāstra* or a treatise worthy to be followed, should teach something which cannot be obtained by other simpler and worldly means- अप्राप्ते हि शास्त्रमर्थवत् ।[11]

Next, the Cārvāka cannot say that the subject-matter of his school is the *Dharmābhāva* or absence of *Dharma* and *Adharma,* and that, by showing the absence of *Dharma* and *Adharma,* it is easy to remove the illusion regarding them. But Madhvācārya asks : "Well, how do you cognise the *Dharmābhāva* ? Clearly, the only *pramāṇa* viz. perception which you admit, cannot cognise *Dharmābhāva.*"

Thus, as the Cārvāka-school does not have any *prayojana* or purpose to serve, and as it does neither have any *viṣaya* or subject-matter, it can never have any *adhikārin* or an aspirant or a follower. Without these three essential requirements no school of philosophy can be considered as

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11. Read : i) तस्माच्छास्त्रं प्रमाणं ते कार्याकार्यव्यवस्थितौ ।
ज्ञात्वा शास्त्रविधानोक्तं कर्म कर्तुमिहार्हसि ।। - गीता XVI.24
ii) इह प्रेक्षापूर्वकारिणः पुरुपार्थसम्पदमभिवाञ्छन्तः तत्साधनाधिगमोपायमन्तरेण तदवाप्तिममन्यमानाः तदुपायावगमनिमित्तमेव प्रथममन्वेपन्ते । दृष्टादृष्टभेदेन च द्विविधः पुरुपार्थस्य पन्थाः । तत्र दृष्टे विषये सुचिरप्ररूढवृद्धव्यवहारसिद्धान्वयव्यतिरेकाधिगतसाधनभावे भोजनादावनपेक्षितशास्त्रस्यैव भवति प्रवृत्तिः । न हि 'मलिनः स्नायात्' 'वुभुक्षितो वाऽश्नीयात्' इति शास्त्रमुपयुज्यते । अदृष्टे स्वर्गापवर्गमात्रे नैसर्गिकमोहान्धतमसविलुप्तालोकस्य लोकस्य शास्त्रमेव प्रकाशः । तदेव सकलसदुपायदर्शने दिव्यं चक्षुरस्मदादेः, न योगिनामिव योगसमाधिजज्ञानाद्युपायान्तरमपीति । तस्मादस्मदादेः शास्त्रमेवाधिगन्तव्यम् ।
-*Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa* (Vol.I) Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, 1969, p.4
iii) अनेकसंशयोच्छेदि परोक्षार्थस्य दर्शकम् ।
सर्वस्य लोचनं शास्त्रं यस्य नास्त्यन्ध एव सः ।
-*Hitopadeśa*, कथामुख, २०

such. Hence, the Cārvāka fails to come up to the level of being a School of Philosophy itself.

An additional argument is advanced by Madhvācārya in his *Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya,* while refuting the Cārvāka-school. And that is, not only does the Cārvāka-school not do any good to the people, it even does not earn anything beneficial for its propagator himself. The reason is obvious : By following the teachings of the Cārvāka, the law of jungle would prevail and people would harm each other. And when they realise that the all-round harm has been caused by following the teachings of the propagators of the Cārvāka-school, people would certainly catch hold of him and inflict any punishment upon him, even of lynching him on the spot.

Thus the Cārvāka-school does not do good to its followers nor to its propagator himself. Hence, it should be discarded lock, stock and barrel. Accordingly, Madhvācārya concludes. "Therefore, by speaking of the absence of *Dharma,* he himself accepts the futility of his preachings and hence he cannot be treated as a philosopher of whatever sort!"[12]

In this refutation of the Cārvāka-school by Madhvācārya, one can note that he does not find fault with

12. न चापौरुपेयं वाक्यमेव नास्तीति वाच्यम् तदभावे सर्वसमयाभिमतधर्माद्यसिद्धेः । यस्य तौ नाभिमतौ नासौ समयी समयप्रयोजनाभावात् । न च तेन लोकोपकारः । धर्माद्यभावज्ञाने परस्परहिंसादिना अपकारस्यैव प्राप्तेः । न चोपकारेण तस्य प्रयोजनम् । अदृष्टाभावात् । अतो धर्माद्यभावं वदता स्वसमयस्यानर्थक्यं अङ्गीकृतमेवेति नासौ समयी ।। - विष्णुतत्त्वविनिर्णय, Ed. Prof.K.T.Pandurangi, Dvaita Vedanta Studies and Research Foundation, Bangalore, 1991, p.2.

Read also : "Lokāyata does not deserve the name of a school as it is condemned by all the other schools"- T.Ganapati Sāstri, Preface to his Edn. of *Prapañcahṛdaya,* Trivandrum Sanskrit Series No.XLV, Trivandrum,1915.

the Cārvāka-view of non-acceptance of inference as a *pramāṇa,* nor its *Dehātmavāda* or the identity of the body with the soul. His main contention is that any school of philosophy worth its name should serve some useful purpose to the humanity. By following its teaching, people should be able to attain happiness here as well as hereafter. The way of life attempted by the Cārvāka to teach and propagate, need not be taught to anyone by any preacher. The worldly enjoyment is secured by even animals by their instinct itself. As Mm.Umesh Mishra observes, " If we take the main doctrines of this school (Cārvāka) and compare them with the activities in the primary stage of our life, it will be quite clear how very closely they resemble each other..... Looking at the materialistic advancement of the present day, it may be said that most of us at present are no better than a materialist in practice and have no definite faith in moral responsibilities and would like only to eat, drink and be merry. We think that with death everything perishes."[13]

In this sense, the Cārvāka is called *Lokāyata* also. Because, his teachings secure an easy access to the common man who wants pleasure with ease and without any hardship.[14]

13. *History of Indian Philosophy,* Vol.I.Tirabhuti Publications, Allahabad, 1957, pp.190-1.

14. तत्र चार्वाकमतस्याधिकः प्रचारश्चार्वाकनाम्ना दैत्येन सम्पादितः । अत एतद्दर्शनं चार्वाकदर्शनमित्यभिधीयते । चारुः सुन्दरो वाको वचनं यस्येति चार्वाकशब्दनिर्वचनम् । अदृष्टापेक्षया हि दृष्टसुखार्थं दृष्टदुःखनिवृत्त्यर्थं वा प्रवर्तते निसर्गतो जन्तुः । स्वर्गसुखप्राप्तये यज्ञादिकर्मणि प्रवर्तमाना विरला एव । तथा नरकदुःखभीत्या पापकर्मणः सकाशान्निवर्तमाना अपि विरला एव प्राणिनो दृश्यन्ते। ततश्च स्वाभाविकप्रवृत्त्यनुरोधेन कस्यचिदुक्तिः श्रुता चेत्तामनायासेनैव चारुत्वेन गृह्णाति लोक इति लोकप्रवत्त्यनुसारिण्या उक्तेश्चारुता सम्पद्यते । अत एवेदं दर्शनमनयासेनैव लोके प्रसृतं भवतीत्यतो लोकायतमित्युच्यते ।।
-Mm. Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar, *Op.cit.* p.133.

Guṇaratna in his commentary on the *Ṣaḍdarśarnasamuccaya* asserts that the Cārvākas were called as *Lokāyatas* or *Lokāyatikas* because they were behaving like common men having no capacity to think.[15]

Thus the teaching of the Cārvāka appealed to the animal instincts in man which hanker after worldly pleasures. But man is not born to live an animal life. He has to rise

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15. तन्नामानि चार्वाका लोकायता इत्यादिना । 'गल चर्व अदने' चर्वन्ति भक्षयन्ति तत्त्वतो न मन्यन्ते पुण्यपापादिकं परोक्षं वस्तुजातमिति चार्वाकाः । ... लोकाः निर्विचाराः सामान्यलोकास्तद्वदाचरन्ति स्मेति लोकायता लोकायतिका इत्यादि, वृहस्पतिप्रणीतमतत्वेन वार्हस्पत्याश्चेति । (Verse 80)

Read also : i) "Lokāyata literally means restricted to the world of common experience" - M.Hiriyanna, *The Essentials of Indian Philosophy,* Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1995, p.57.

ii) "The significance of the term 'Cārvāka' applied to it is not quite clear. Some say that it was originally the name of the disciple to whom the doctrine was first communicated by its founder. More probably the word is to be understood as the equivalent of 'sweet tongued' (cāru-vāka) which aptly describes the advocates of a doctrine characterised by so much of superficial attractiveness "-M.Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1994, p.187.

iii) "Lokāyata literally means ' One who goes the worldly way' - P.T.Raju, *The Philosophical Traditions of India,* Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1992, p.86

iv) "Lokāyata means a commoner and thereafter, by implication, a man of low and unrefined taste" -Dr.Chandradhar Sharma, *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1994 p.41

Still attempts are being made to prove that the Cārvāka was called *Lokāyata* because it was popular among the people and its influence was deep and widespread. Read :'Lokāyata did mean the philosophy of the people"(p.2) " "Many evidences may be mentioned to show that the influence of the Lokāyata views was deep and wide spread. The name Lokāyata is itself one ; it meant that which was spread among the people."(p.31) -
Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, "*Lokāyata: A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism*," People's Publishing House, New Delhi, IV Ed. 1978.

above the animal instinct and has to live intelligently with his co-beings following the principle of co-existence, viz., " Live and let live". He should enjoy pleasures without obstructing other's enjoyments. He should follow a path which would lead him to eternal peace without harming the peace of others. And it is well said that *Dharma*[16] is the guiding principle which shows him such a path. And, *Dharma* is declared to be the distinguishing factor of man in the oft-quoted *Subhāṣita* :

आहारनिद्राभयमैथुनं च सामान्यमेतत्पशुभिर्नराणाम् ।
धर्मो हि तेषामधिको विशेषो धर्मेण हीनाः पशुभिः समानाः ।।

[Food, sleep, fear and intercourse-these are common to men and animals. But *Dharma* is the additional characteristic feature of men. Men devoid of *Dharma* are equal to animals.] And one can note that Madhvācārya's

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16. Read ; i) "Dharma is one of those Sanskrit words that defy all attempts at an exact rendering in English or any other tongue. That word has passed through several vicissitudes,"
P.V.Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. I. p.1.

ii) "The conception of Dharma was a far-reaching one and it established the whole life of man. The writers on Dharmaśāstra meant by Dharma not a creed or religion, but a mode of life or a code of conduct, which regulated a man's work and activities as a member of society and as an individual and was intended to bring about the gradual development of a man and to enable him to reach what was seemed to be the goal of human existence "-P.V.Kane,*Ibid*., Vol.II.p.2

iii) *Dharma* is etymologically what sustains, supports. It is what supports life, and life is sustained only when it is not in discord with its basis, the origin of our being. *Dharma* has, therefore, come to mean the law, and then the law of life. Existence depends upon the laws of its being. If they are violated, existence becomes non-existence. *Dharma* is therefore the law of life, the way of life, that keeps it running in union with foundations of our being. In this sense, *Dharma* is a way of life in accord with reality" - P.T.Raju, *Op cit.* pp.27-28.

refutation of the Cārvākas is in accordance with this basic requirement to be possessed by all human beings.

It is also true that Indian tradition informs us that the teachings of the Cārvāka were preached only to harm its followers and not to their benefit. "The original propounder of the school is said to be Bṛhaspati, the presiding deity of learning and the preceptor of the *devas*. It is believed that when gods were at war with the devils (*asuras*), the former requested their preceptor and leader Bṛhaspati to devise some means by which, the devils would lose the sympathy of Śukrācārya who was their (*asuras*) preceptor ; for, under latter's guidance, the devils were gaining ground. So once, when Śukra was out, Bṛhaspati, in the guise of Śukra entered the camp of the *asuras* and taught them the doctrines of Materialism. When the real Śukra came back he was not respected and obeyed by the *asuras* as before. This made Śukra angry and the *asuras* lost his sympathy and assistance."[17]

17. Mm. Umesh Mishra, *Op.cit* pp.192-3
Read also: तत्र नास्तिकदर्शनान्तर्गते चार्वाकदर्शने वृहस्पतिना सूत्रं प्रणीतम्। यद्यप्येतद्दर्शनं वृहस्पतेर्नाभिमतं तथापि सूत्रं विरचयतस्तस्य देवगुरोरयमभिप्रायोऽवगम्यते। इत्थं हि तस्य मतिः संभवति । यत्स्वशिष्याणां देवानामसुरेभ्यः सकाशाज्जायमाना संभाव्यमाना च पीडा येन केनापि प्रकारेण परिहरणीयेति। असुरगणो हि यज्ञादिकर्म कृत्वा तत्सामर्थ्यलव्धोत्साहो देवाञ्जेतुमीहते। अतस्तस्यारिगणस्य यथा यज्ञादिकर्मसु श्रद्धा नोत्पद्येत यथा चोत्पन्ना सुतरां विनिवर्तेत तथोपदेशं चिकीर्पुस्तथाविधार्थवोधकानि सूत्राणि विरचयामास। तेन चासुरेष्वेतद्दर्शनप्रचारः समजनि। अश्रद्दधानाश्च ते कर्मभ्रष्टा असुराः स्वर्गादिसुखोपभोगानर्हा अभूवन् ।

विष्णुपुराणे तृतीयेंशे सप्तदशाध्याये चेदृशी कथा दृश्यते। पुरा कदाचन नर्मदारोधसि श्रुतिप्रतिपादितं मार्गमवलम्ब्यैकाग्रयान्तःकरणवृत्त्या कतिपये दैत्या तपश्चेरुः। भयाकुला देवा नारायणं जग्मुः। ततो नारायणस्तथाविधांस्तानवलोक्य तेपामाधिं परिजिहीर्पन् स्वशरीरात्कञ्चन पुरुपं मायामोहनामानं समुत्पाद्यायं वः कार्यं सम्पादयिष्यतीत्यवोचत्। मायामोहश्च स्वनामावयवार्थानुसारेण स्वप्रवृत्तिं प्रदर्शयन् स्वमायया दैत्यान् व्यामोहयन् सन्मार्गात्प्रभ्रंशयांचकार। वृहस्पतिप्रणीतसूत्रानुसारिणं मायामोहोपदेशं श्रावं श्रावं विस्रम्भितान्तःकरणास्ते तपश्चर्यातः परावृत्ताः वभूवुः ततो निश्चिन्ता देवाः। स्वर्गसुखमन्वभूवन्।। Mm. Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar, *Op.cit.* p.131-2

The *Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad* clearly states(VII-9):

"Bṛhaspati, the preceptor of gods, became Śukra, the preceptor of demons and for the safety of Indra created this nescience which is condusive to the destruction of demons. Due to it, the good is preached as bad and bad as good."[18]

Besides, there is an incident narrated in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* which tells how Indra representing the gods, and Virocana representing the demons approached Prajāpati to know the true nature of Brahman or the Supreme Soul. And when Prajāpati, with an intention of imparting instruction to them in a graded manner, preachesd *Dehātmavāda* or the identity of the body with the soul, both of them depart showing satisfaction. Then Prajāpati remarks - "Whosoever they may be, gods or demons, if they have such a doctrine (i.e.belief in the identity of the body with soul), they *will surely be defeated*." [Further, it is said that Virocana preached this doctrine to demons, whereas being

18. वृहस्पतिर्वै शुक्रो भूत्वेन्द्रस्याभयायासुरेभ्यः क्षयायेमामविद्यामसृजत् ।
तया शिवमशिवमित्युद्दिशन्त्यशिवं शिवमिति ।। मै उ ७ ६

Here one must note that Bṛhaspati was *not* a 'heretical teacher'. As Debiprasad Chattopadhyay observes, Bṛhaspati was 'deliberately propagating this false knowledge' among the Asuras in order to bring about their downfall (*Cārvāka/Lokāyata*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1990, p.6) Hence, The following statements are improper. (i) "Bṛhaspati whom the *Maitrī Upaniṣad* describes as a heretical teacher"-M.Hiriyanna, *Outlines*.p.187, (ii) "Bṛhaspati, a heretical teacher is regarded as the traditional founder of this school" - Dr.Chandradhar Sharma, *Op.cit* p.40. P.T.Raju rightly states "Tradition tells us that this priest of gods propounded a rankly materialistic philosophy in order to mislead the enemies of gods, namely, the demons " - *Op.cit* p.86

not satisfied Indra came back to Prajāpati and got the right knowledge][19]

These references to the Cārvāka-teachings show that they are preached only to harm their followers and not for any good purpose. And it is clearly stated that the doctrine leads to defeat and destruction.

Moreover, Indian tradition tells us clearly that the followers of the Cārvāka were not only admonished but the demon Cārvāka was even burnt to ashes. In the *Rāmāyaṇa*, when Bharata meets Rāma, the latter cautions the former to be away from the Materialists who are clever in preaching evil things.[20]

This clearly shows that everyone was advised not to follow the Cārvāka or the Lokāyata-teachings.

There is a tendency among some scholars to show that in ancient times the system of the Cārvāka was admired and his followers were held in high esteem. For example, Tarkatirtha Laxmanashastri Joshi, well known scholar of Maharashtra, states[21] that it has been said in the *Mahābhārata* (*Śāntiparva*, ch.218), that there were one

19. तौ हान्वीक्ष्य प्रजापतिरुवाचानुपलभ्यात्मानमननुविद्य व्रजतो यतर एतदुपनिषदो भविष्यन्ति
देवा वाऽसुरा वा ते पराभविष्यन्ति ।। छान्दोग्य. 8.8.4.

20. कच्चिन्न लोकायतिकान् ब्राह्मणांस्तात सेवसे ।
अनर्थकुशला ह्येते बाला पण्डितमानिनः ।।
धर्मशास्त्रेषु मुख्येषु विद्यमानेषु दुर्बुधाः ।
बुद्धिमान्वीक्षिकीं प्राप्य निरर्थं प्रवदन्ति ते ।। अयोध्या 100.38-39)

21. या जनदेवाच्या जवळ पाषण्डमताचे १०० आचार्य आश्रय करून राहिले होते त्यांच्याशीं नेहमी मरणोत्तर स्थितीची चर्चा चाले -Introd. to Prof. Sadasiv Athavale's Book *Cārvāka Itihās Āṇi Tattvajñāna* (Marathi) Prajnapathashala Mandal, Vai., 1958, p.12.

hundred *ācāryas* of heretic faith in the court of King Janadeva of Mithilā. But a perusal of the passage of the *Mahābhārata* reveals that no doubt there were 100 *ācāryas* in the royal court of King Janadeva but they were not of heretic faith nor were they followers of the Cārvāka. It is only stated that King was discussing with them regarding one's life hereafter.

(और्ध्वदेहिकधर्माणामासीद्युक्तो विचिन्तने ।)[22]

It is also made much of the usage of the word *Lokāyata* found in the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya (I.ii). It is suggested that this *Lokāyata* is the same as the philosophy of the Cārvākas and that it was given sufficiently important place in the times of Kauṭilya.[23] But even though it is a fact that Kauṭilya uses the word *Lokāyata*, the context and the explanation given by him show that it is not the philosophy of the Cārvākas. Firstly, Kauṭilya clearly states that there are four *Vidyās* or lores or sciences to be studied by a king and they are *Ānvīkṣikī* or the science of logic or reasoning, *Trayī* or the Triad or the three Vedas (*RK*, *Yajus* and *Sāman*), *Vārtā* or the science of commerce and business, and *Daṇḍanīti* or the science of state-craft. This shows that Kauṭilya unlike the Cārvākas, believed in the authority of the Vedas and the need of studying and following them. Secondly, he uses the term '*Lokāyata*' while giving the details of the '*Ānvīkṣikī* ' as

22. जनको जनदेवस्तु मिथिलायां जनाधिपः।
और्ध्वदेहिकधर्माणामासीद्युक्तो विचिन्तने ।।
तस्य स्म शतमाचार्या वसन्ति सततं गृहे ।
दर्शयन्तः पृथग्धर्मान्नानाश्रमनिवासिनः ।।
स तेषां प्रेत्यभावे च प्रेत्य जातौ विनिश्चये ।
आगमस्थः भूयिष्ठामात्मतत्त्वेन तुष्यति । शान्तिपर्व २१८ ३-५

23. Prof.Sadashiv Athavale, *Op.cit.*, pp.17-18

"*Sāṅkhyaṁ Yogo Lokāyataṁ ceti Ānvīkṣikī*" which means that *Ānvīkṣikī* consisted of *Sāṅkya*, *Yoga* and *Lokāyata*. Further he lays down that the *Ānvīkṣikī* helps the people by imparting the faculty of investigating the strength and weakness, or the advantages and disadvantages of whatever that has been laid down in the other three lores. And hence here the term *Lokāyata* does not and cannot mean the school of the Cārvākas. And we must note that such an investigation is not a gift of the Cārvākas to Indian Philosophy. This was asserted from very old times as can be seen from the Upaniṣadic injunction laying down *Śravaṇa Manana* and *Nididhyāsana* as the means to know and realise Ātman or the Supreme Soul.[24] Further it should be noted that the *Sāṅkhya* system had the name of *Ānumānika* or that which depends upon inference or logic.[25] And the *Yoga* is well-known as 'sister-school' of the *Sāṅkhya*. Hence Kauṭilya's mention of the *Lokāyata* cannot suggest his acceptance of the Cārvāka system nor can it indicate that the Cārvāka system had been given an important place by Kauṭilya. It must mean the science of logic or reasoning.[26]

On the basis of the Jābāli-episode of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the Cārvāka episode of the *Mahābhārata*, Debiprasad

24. आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः ।
- वृहदारण्यक उपनिषद् २-४-५

25. i) आनुमानिकमप्येकेषामिति चेन्न .... ।।ब्रह्मसूत्र, I.iv.1
ii) रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नानुमानम्।। ब्रह्मसूत्र, II.ii.1

26. i) प्रत्यक्षागमाभ्यामीक्षितस्य अन्वीक्षणं अन्वीक्षा । अनुमानमित्यर्थः ।
तद् व्युत्पादकं शास्त्रं आन्वीक्षिकी । -Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, *Op.cit*, p.19.
ii) One can note in this connection that K.Krishna Bhat has rendered the word '*Lokāyata*' as 'Nyāyaśāstra' in his Kannada translation of the *Arthaśāstra*, Published by Samaj Pustakalay Dharwad. 1972, p.45

Chattopadhyaya[27] tries to conclude - "*Lokāyata* did mean the philosophy of the people" (p.2). "Many evidences may be mentioned to show that the influence of the *Lokāyata* views was deep and wide-spread. The name *Lokāyata* is itself one; it meant that which was spread among the people". (p.31) "Even at the time of the composition of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, it was possible for one to remain a Brāhmaṇa and yet to go on preaching the *Lokāyata*-views. This is evidenced by the Brāhmaṇa, Jābāli trying to persuade Rāmacandra to heretical ideas "(p.31) The words of Cārvāka uttered in that episode of the *Mahābhārata* are according to Chattopadhyaya "indications of the positive moral values upheld by the Lokāyatikas."(p.134).

And hence it is pertinent to consider whether Indian tradition, at any point of time, gave an important and honourable place to the Cārvāka philosophy. As we have seen above (fn.18) this philosophy of materialism was taught by Bṛhaspati only to harm the demons and not for anybody's welfare. All the tenets of the Cārvākas have been considered to be harmful to the individual as well as to the society.

One of the tenets accepted to have been preached and professed by the Cārvākas is that there is no God as understood by the Vedas and their followers, and that the visible ruler himself is the God.[28] And we can see that this

27. *Lokāyata : A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism*, Peoples Publishing House, New Delhi, IV Ed. 1978

28. लोकसिद्धो भवेद्राजा परेशो नापरः स्मृतः ।।
- सर्वदर्शनसंग्रह , चार्वाकदर्शन

view was held by Vena,[29] Hiraṇyakaśipu[30] and other despotic rulers who met their death and destruction, because of their not accepting any God as held by the Vedic followers. The condemnation of this tenet is too clear in the *Bhagavadgītā* (Ch.XVI)

"Demoniac persons know not action or inaction; neither purity nor yet (correct) conduct nor veracity are in them. They say the universe is devoid of truth, devoid of fixed principle, and devoid of a ruler, produced by union (of male and female) caused by lust, and nothing else. Holding this view, (these) enemies of the world of ruined selfs, of little knowledge, and of ferocious actions , are born for the destruction (of the world). Entertaining insatiable desire, full of vanity, ostentatiousness, and frenzy, they adopt false notions through delusion, and engage in unholy observations.

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29. बालिशा वत यूयं वा अधर्मे धर्ममानिनः ।
ये वृत्तिदं पतिं हित्वा जारं पतिमुपासते ।।
अवजानन्त्यमी मूढा नृपरूपिणमीश्वरम् ।
नानुविन्दन्ति ते भद्रमिह लोके परत्र च ।।
को यज्ञपुरुषो नाम यत्र वो भक्तिरीदृशी ।
भर्तृस्नेहविदूराणां यथा जारे कुयोपिताम् ।।
विष्णुर्विरिञ्चो गिरिश इन्द्रो वायुर्यमो रविः ।
पर्जन्यो धनदः सोमः क्षितिरग्निरपाम्पतिः ।।
एते चान्ये च विबुधाः प्रभवो वरशापयोः ।
देहे भवन्ति नृपतेः सर्वदेवमयो नृपः ।।
तस्मान्मां कर्मभिर्विप्रा यजध्वं गतमत्सराः ।
बलिं च मह्यं हरत मत्तोऽन्यः कोऽग्रभुक् पुमान् ।।
- वेन, भागवत, ४-१४. २३-२८

30. यस्त्वया मन्दभाग्योक्तो मदन्यो जगदीश्वरः ।
क्वासौ यदि स सर्वत्र कस्मात्स्तम्भे न दृश्यते ।।
- हिरण्यकशिपु, भागवत ७-८-२३

Indulging in boundless thoughts ending with death, given up to the enjoyment of objects of desire, being resolved that that is all, bound down by nets of hopes in hundreds, given up to anger and desire, they wish to obtain heaps of wealth unfairly for enjoying objects of desire. "This I have obtained today ; this wish I will obtain ; this wealth is mine ; and this also shall be mine ; this foe I have killed ; others too I will destroy; I am Lord, I am the enjoyer, I am perfect, strong, happy; I have wealth ; I am of noble birth; who else is like me ? I will sacrifice, I will make gifts, I will rejoice," - Thus deluded by ignorance, tossed about by numerous thoughts, surrounded by the net of delusion, and attached to the enjoyment of objects of desire they fall down into impure hell."[31]

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31. प्रवृत्तिं च निवृत्तिं च जना न विदुरासुराः ।
न शौचं नापि चाचारो न सत्यं तेषु विद्यते ।।
असत्यमप्रतिष्ठं ते जगदाहुरनीश्वरम् ।
अपरस्परसम्भूतं किमन्यत्कामहैतुकम् ।।
एतां दृष्टिमवष्टभ्य नष्टात्मानोऽल्पबुद्धयः ।
प्रभवन्त्युग्रकर्माणः क्षयाय जगतोऽहिताः ।।
काममाश्रित्य दुष्पूरं दम्भमानमदान्विताः ।
मोहाद् गृहीत्वासद्ग्राहान्प्रवर्तन्तेऽशुचिव्रताः ।।
चिन्तामपरिमेयां च प्रलयान्तामुपाश्रिताः ।
कामोपभोगपरमा एतावदिति निश्चिताः ।।
आशापाशशतैर्बद्धाः कामक्रोधपरायणाः ।
ईहन्ते कामभोगार्थमन्यायेनार्थसञ्चयान् ।।
इदमद्य मया लब्धमिमं प्राप्स्ये मनोरथम् ।
इदमस्तीदमपि मे भविष्यति पुनर्धनम् ।।
असौ मया हतः शत्रुर्हनिष्ये चापरानपि ।
ईश्वरोऽहमहं भोगी सिद्धोऽहं बलवान्सुखी ।।
आढ्योऽभिजनवानस्मि कोऽन्योस्ति सदृशो मया ।
यक्ष्ये दास्यामि मोदिष्य इत्यज्ञानविमोहिताः ।।
अनेकचित्तविभ्रान्ता मोहजालसमावृताः ।
प्रसक्ताः कामभोगेषु पतन्ति नरकेऽशुचौ ।।
- भगवद्गीता XVI, 7-16 English rendering by K.T.Telang, Sacred Books of the East Series, Vol.VIII.pp.115-116.

Another major tenet of the Cārvākas is "Physical pleasure alone is the goal of human life." (*Kāma eva puruṣārthah*)[32] and hence they advocate unrestricted sense-enjoyment. Guṇaratna in his commentary on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* tells us that the Cārvākas ate meat, drank wine and indulged in unrestricted sex-indulgence and that each year they gathered together on a particular day and had unrestricted intercourse with women.[33] Hemacandra in his *Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacaritramahākāvyaṁ* also records this unrestricted sensual enjoyment of the Cārvākas (I.i.324) In the words of S.N.Dasgupta "The only thing that the Cārvākas cared for was the momentary sense-pleasure, unrestrained enjoyment of sensual joys. They did not believe in sacrificing present joys to obtain happiness in the future.... Immediate sense-pleasures were all that they wanted and any display of prudence, restraint, or other considerations which might lead to the sacrifice of present pleasures was regarded by them as foolish and unwise."[34] The consequences of such unrestricted enjoyment has been effectively portrayed by Daṇḍin (about 650 A.D.) in his *Daśakumāracarita* (Ch.VIII). It is a story of King Anantavarman of Vidarbha. He discards the advice of the aged minister Vasumitra and listens to the words of one, by name Vihārabhadra who was 'a scandal-monger, an arch-villain, capable of extracting bribe

32. अङ्गनालिङ्गनाज्जन्यसुखमेव पुमर्थता ।।

-सर्वदर्शनसंग्रह, चार्वाकदर्शन

33. *Op.cit.* p. 144, Read also : " They take spirituous drinks and meat and also copulate with those unfit to be sexually approached (*agamyā*) like mother, etc. Every year, on a particular day they assemble and copulate randomly with women. They do not consider *dharma* to be anything different from *kāma*. "- Debiprasad's translation of Guṇaratna, *Cārvāka/Lokāyata*, *Op.cit* p.267.

34. *Op.cit* p.550

even from ministers, a teacher of all misconduct, an aide in matters of lust.' He teaches the philosophy of 'Eat, drink and make merry,' ridiculing the political philosophy of Kauṭilya.[35] The gist of his teaching is :

"Doing away with excessive restrictions, enjoy the pleasures of sense as much as your majesty would like ..... Your majesty may assign the burden of kingdom to trustworthy and devoted ministers capable of shouldering it and make the attainment of human form worthwhile by enjoying in the company of the ladies of the harem that resemble Apsarases, and by arranging sessions of song, music and drink, at proper occasions."

What was the result ?

"And he (King) too followed his advice very respectfully like the advice of a preceptor as though. The subjects following his conduct, took to vices in an unbridled way. None would find fault with others because of the equal guiltiness of all. The Superintendents of various departments misappropriated the yield of their activities, imitating the disposition of their master. Then gradually the sources of income dried out, while the avenues of expenditure of the King increased day after day on account of the subservience of the King to rogues. The feudatories and leading citizens and country-folk (or state-officers), who along with their wives were included in the drinking bouts by the King, who began to confide in them through a like (dissolute) nature, transgressed their proper code of conduct. The King had intercourse with their wives under different pretexts (or

35. This also indicates that Kauṭilya does not approve Cārvāka doctrines and hence his use of the word '*Lokāyata*' need not be construed as referring to the Cārvākas as shown above.

devices). And these (feudatories etc) enjoyed various pleasures with the inmates of his harem, which had lost character, without any fear. And all ladies of noble families listened to the intrigues of their paramours, being attracted by the shrewd speech of lewd persons, having no control on character and being utterly defiant of their husbands. And thereby arose the quarrels of angry persons. The weak were assaulted by the strong. The wealth of the wealthy was robbed by thieves and the like. The paths of sin were freely trodden, with all sense of shame therefrom being lost. The populace bemoaned in tears piteously, with their kinsmen killed, wealth looted, and they themselves being subjected to death and imprisonment. Punishment meted out unjustly created fear and wrath. Greed took possession of poor families. Spirited persons, being offended, smarted through self-respect. Intrigues of enemies succeeded in bringing about many an evil thing"[36] Finally, King Anantavarman was destroyed by his enemies.

So this is the fate of following unrestricted sensual enjoyment preached by the Cārvākas.

It must be noted here that even Vātsyāyana, the author of the *Kāmasūtras* does not approve of the teaching of the Lokāyatas or the Cārvākas (even though they hold *Kāma* alone to be the *Puruṣārtha*) In the second section of the I chapter he takes up for consideration the tenets of the Lokāyata who discard *Dharma* or religious conduct on the ground that it speaks of not immediate fruit but of the fruits hereafter, that too which are doubtful. They advocate that it is foolish to leave the single bird in hand with the hope of

36. English rendering by Prof. S.V.Dixit (Editor) *Daśakumārcaritam* (*Ucchvāsas VI-VII-VIII*), Published by the Editor, Belgaum, 1957, pp.54.59,60,65-66

securing two in the bush ! In reply, Vātsyāyana asserts that *Dharma* should be observed *(Cared-dharmān)* ; because the import of the scriptures laying down *Dharma* is that, beyond doubt, religious actions are seen to be fruitful, the movements of sun, moon, stars, planets and others are seen to be for the good of the world, the life of the humanity requires the observance of the religious duties according to one's own *varṇa* (class) and *āśrama* (stage in life) and because it is a fact that every sane person renounces a seed today to secure a big tree tomorrow (*sūtras* 25 to 31).

All this shows that at no point of time and in no class of literature, the doctrines preached by the Cārvākas had been given any important place of even a little credence in any way. And so Madhvācārya is justified in dismissing the Cārvākas lock, stock and barrel as quite futile and purposeless and positively harmful.

Now it remains to consider the episodes of Jābāli of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and of the Cārvāka of the *Mahābhārata* mentioned above.

It is true that in the *Ayodhyā -kāṇḍa* of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Jābāli, one of the ministers of the royal court of Ayodhyā, does speak in the fashion of a Cārvāka. But the context and the motive of his speech show that he was not a follower of the Cārvāka-school. At best it can be said that he knew the Cārvāka doctrines ; and one must note that knowing a doctrine and practising the same is quite different; because one may know many things as a precaution only to avoid them or to be away from them.

The context is the meeting of Bharata and Rāma at Citrakūṭa, where the former tries his best to persuade Rāma to return to Ayodhyā. When he fails in his attempts, Jābāli

speaks like a materialist to force Rāma to return to the kingdom. Here Vālmīki clearly states that the words of Jābāli are *Dharmāpeta* [37] or opposed to *Dharma* or right conduct. Secondly, on listening to these *Dharmāpeta* words of Jābāli, Rāma becomes quite angry and replies - "What you spoke to please me, is certainly the misconduct in the form of right conduct and harmful even though appearing as beneficial."[38] Rāma thus makes it clear that the speech of Jābāli i.e. the Cārvāka-doctrines, can never be beneficial nor fit to be followed, even though they appear to do good and bring welfare. And on seeing the infuriated Rāma, Jābāli himself confesses- "I am not a *Nāstika* nor am I irreligious. I spoke in that manner to see whether at least by that you can be made to return to Ayodhyā"[39] And this intention of Jābāli is also confirmed by Vasiṣṭha who pacified Rāma by telling that Jābāli spoke only to make Rāma return.[40] All this

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37. आश्वासयन्तं भरतं जाबालिर्ब्राह्मणोत्तमः ।
उवाच रामं धर्मज्ञं धर्मापेतमिदं वचः ।।अयोध्या 108.1

38. भवान् मे प्रियकामार्थं वचनं यदिहोक्तवान् ।
अकार्यं कार्यसंकाशमपथ्यं पथ्यसंनिभम् ।। *Ibid.*, 109.2
Compare this with the words "तया शिवमशिवमित्युपदिशन्ति अशिवं शिवमिति of the *Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad* quoted above (fn.18)

39. इति ब्रुवन्तं वचनं सरोषं रामं महात्मानमदीनसत्त्वम् ।
उवाच पथ्यं पुनरास्तिकं च सत्यं वचः सानुनयं च विप्रः ।।
न नास्तिकानां वचनं ब्रवीम्यहं न नास्तिकोऽहं न च नास्ति किञ्चन।
समीक्ष्य कालं पुनरास्तिकोऽभवं भवेय काले पुनरेव नास्तिकः ।।
स चापि कालोऽयमुपागतः शनैर्यथा मया नास्तिकवागुदीरिता ।
निवर्तनार्थं तव राम कारणात् प्रसादनार्थं च मयैतदीरितम् ।। 109-37,38,39

40. क्रुद्धमाज्ञाय रामं तु वसिष्ठः प्रत्युवाच ह ।
जाबालिरपि जानीते लोकस्यास्य गतागतिम् ।।
निवर्तयितुकामस्तु त्वामेतद्वाक्यमब्रवीत् ।। 110.1.20

conclusively proves that Jābāli was not a follower of the Cārvāka-school nor was he going on preaching the Lokāyata views, as tried to be made out by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya.[41] The episode of Jābāli is a clear indication of the love and admiration which Rāma commanded at that young age, not only from the general public and his 'kith and kin, but also from sages and learned persons like Jābāli who did not hesitate to advise only for the sake of having Rāma as their ruler, in the manner of a materialist and atheist, even though they held, professed and preached theistic and religious views and lived a perfectly religious life.

Coming to the episode of the Cārvāka in the *Śāntiparva* of the *Mahābhārata*, it should be noted that not only there is a clear condemnation of his views but also he was burnt to ashes for his treacherous act. It so happened that Yudhiṣṭhira after winning the glorious victory in the dreadful Mahābhārata-war was seated in the assembly of thousands of brahmins who had gathered to shower blessings on him. Then suddenly there arose a brahmin and began to address Yudhiṣṭhira on behalf of all the brahmins, even though he had not been called upon to address in any capacity. The poet calls him 'wicked' and 'one who wanted to harm the great Pāṇḍavas'[42] While addressing Yudhiṣṭhira, he condemns him for bringing about the brutal slaughter of his

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41. " Even at the time of the composition of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, it was possible for one to go on preaching the Lokāyata- views. This is evidenced by the Brāhmaṇa, Jābāli, trying to persuade Rāmacandra to heretical ideas" - Quoted above. p.57

42. वृतः सर्वैस्तथा विप्रैराशीर्वादविवक्षुभिः ।
परःसहस्रै राजेन्द्र तपोनियमसंवृतैः ।।
स दुष्टः पापमाशंसुः पाण्डवानां महात्मनाम् ।।
अनामन्त्र्यैव तान् विप्रांस्तमुवाच महीपतिम् ।।
- शान्तिपर्व, ३८।२४-२५

own kith and kin. Here it should be noted that with a view to exploit Yudhiṣṭhira's high regard for brahmins he states[43] that he is speaking not his individual opinion, but the unanimous decision of all the brahmins assembled there, and thereby he desires to draw Yudhiṣṭhira's full attention to his words to receive and act upon them. But the poet tells us that not only was he not representing the opinion of the brahmins assembled there, but even his words came to them as a bolt from the blue! [44] And immediately they assert in one voice- "O king, these are not our words. All glory be unto you!"[45] Then they desire to know the identity of their self-imposed representative and see with their divine vision that he is a demon by name Cārvāka, a friend of Duryodhana, who had come there in the garb of a brahmin to harm Yudhiṣṭhira.[46] The brahmins assembled there, did not stop at simply exposing his true form, but punished him by death and destruction.[47]

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43. इमे प्राहुर्द्विजा सर्वे समारोप्य वचो मयि ।
धिग् भवन्तं कुनृपतिं ज्ञातिघातिनमस्तु वै ।।
किं तेन स्याद्धि कौन्तेय कृत्वेमं ज्ञातिसंक्षयम् ।
घातयित्वा गुरूंश्चैव मृतं श्रेयो न जीवितम् । *Ibid.*, 38.26-27

44. इति ते वै द्विजाः श्रुत्वा तस्य दुष्टस्य रक्षसः ।
विव्यथुश्चुक्रुशुश्चैव तस्य वाक्यप्रधर्षिताः ।। *Ibid*, 38.28

45. नैतद्वचोऽस्माकं श्रीरस्तु तव पार्थिव ।। *Ibid*, 38.31b

46. एष दुर्योधनसखा चार्वाको नाम राक्षसः।
परिव्राजकरूपेण हितं तस्य चिकीर्षति ।। *Ibid*, 38.33

47. ततस्ते ब्राह्मणाः सर्वे हुंकारैः क्रोधमूर्छिताः।
निर्भर्त्सयन्तः शुचयो निजघ्नुः पापराक्षसम् ।। *Ibid*, 38.35

Thus this episode also shows that the Cārvāka preached only to *harm righteous persons* and not for any good purpose nor for anybody's any kind of welfare. Even though this is what the epic narrates, efforts are being made to hold Cārvāka to be a benevolent preacher and not a demon. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya observes, "The story of Cārvāka being a demon in disguise, secret agent of the wicked Duryodhana, etc, is maliciously fanciful and much too crude to be accepted seriously."[48] The learned scholar wants to accept the words of Cārvāka uttered in this episode as an "indication of the positive moral values upheld by the Lokāyatikas," but is not prepared to accept Cārvāka to be a

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48. *Lokāyata*, *Op.cit*, p.34

There is a tendency to blame the orthodox priestly class for being 'malicious' and antagonistic while mentioning Cārvāka or his doctrines. Such persons should read ; i) "The special ridicule to which the Cārvāka is held up by the orthodox may be due to the denouncement by him of Vedic authority and of the priestly profession; but this by itself cannot explain it fully, for the Buddhists and the Jains also were hostile to the Veda. We have, therefore, to seek for its cause at least in *part in the deficiencies of the doctrine itself, especially on the ethical side, which tended to undermine the foundations of social order and of moral responsibility."* (emphasis added)- M.Hiriyanna, *Outlines. Op.cit.* p.188

(ii) "It has sometimes been said that it is the "Priests" of the Hindu Religion that completely eradicated all traces of that school of thought (Cārvāka), it is the work of the orthodox defenders of tradition. It is unfortunate that there should have been such condemnations. We must remember that it is the "Priests" the defenders of orthodoxy that have preserved some elements of their system.... Such "Priests" have preserved many other things that must be objectionable to orthodox virtuosity.....How can we say that the "Priests" and defenders of Hindu orthodoxy are responsible for the elimination of all records about this school of thought ? We must be grateful to them for preserving the main lines of thought"- C.Kunhan Raja, *Some Fundamental Problems in Indian Philosophy.* Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1989, pp.17-8.

demon and a friend of wicked Duryodhana as stated clearly in this episode itself. This is to say the least, what is called as the '*ardhajaratīyanyāya*' or consuming one half of the egg and leaving the other to hatch ! Such partial acceptance of authoritative texts does not lead us to definite conclusions.

Moreover, in calling Duryodhana 'wicked' and in stating Cārvāka to be his secret agent there is nothing 'maliciously fanciful,' because after all it is a fact. In the *Ādiparva* of the *Mahābhārata* it is stated that Duryodhana was born with the essence of Kali and he would be hated by the world,[49] (verily, due to his wickedness). Again in the *Strīparva* while consoling Dhṛtarāṣṭra, sage Vyāsa tells him that his son viz. Duryodhana was born with the essence of Kali for bringing about destruction in the world and hence one need not lament over his death.[50] In the *Śalyaparva* (65.38), Duryodhana himself confesses that Cārvāka happens to be his bosom friend.

In this connection, it remains to be examined whether the Cārvāka school was held with respect at any time, as is tried to be proved by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya on the basis of an episode in the *Vanaparva* of the *Mahābhārata*.[51] Therein Draupadī tries to instigate Yudhiṣṭhira to take action

49. कलेरंशस्तु संजज्ञे भुवि दुर्योधनो नृप ।
जगतो यस्तु सर्वस्य विद्विष्टः कलिपूरुषः ।। आदिपर्व, 68.67.

50. स एष ते सुतो राजन् लोकसंहारकारणात् ।
कलेरंशः समुत्पन्नो गान्धार्या जठरे नृप ।।
दैवयोगात्समुत्पन्ना भ्रातरः तस्य तादृशाः ।
समुत्पन्ना विनाशार्थं पृथिव्याः सहिता नृपाः ।।
मा तान् शोचस्व राजेन्द्र न हि शोकेऽस्ति कारणम् ।।
स्त्रीपर्व 29.34-35.

51. *Lokāyata. Op.cit*, pp.31ff

against Duryodhana who had usurped the kingdom of Pāṇḍavas by deceit and who had driven them into the forest. Draupadī thinks that Yudhiṣṭhira is suffering in the forest with passivity relying on his fate and as such forcefully argues for quick action against Duryodhana.[52]

"Please do your duty. Action brings fruits not inaction. Everyone acts for his growth and prosperity. If one remains passive depending solely on Fate, he suffers defeat and falls down. Even the Creator gives fruits depending upon past deeds. Even Manu has laid down that one's duty should be done. Be active and do your duty. Inaction and laziness lead to ruin ; whereas activity and effort bring prosperity."

52. कर्म खल्विह कर्तव्यं जनतामित्रकर्शन ।
अकर्माणो हि जीवन्ति स्थावरा नेतरे जनाः ।।३।।
सर्वे हि स्वं स्वमुत्थानमुपजीवन्ति जन्तवः ।
अपि धाता विधाता च यथायमुदके वकः ।।७।।
यो हि दिष्टमुपासीनो निर्विचेष्टः सुखं शयीत ।
अवसीदेत् स दुर्बुद्धिरामो घट इवोदके ।।१४।।
धातापि हि स्वकर्मैव तैस्तैर्हेतुभिरीश्वरः ।
विदधाति विभज्येह फलं पूर्वकृतं नृणाम् ।।२२।।
तेपु तेपु हि कृत्येपु विनियोक्ता महेश्वरः ।
सर्वभूतानि कौन्तेय कारयत्यवशान्यपि ।।२३।।
कर्तव्यमेव कर्मेति मनोरेष विनिश्चयः ।
एकान्तेन ह्यनीहोऽयं पराभवति पूरुषः ।।२४।।
कुर्वतो हि भवत्येव प्रायेणेह युधिष्ठिर ।
एकान्तफलसिद्धं तु न विन्दत्यलसः क्वचित् ।।४०।।
अलक्ष्मीराविशत्येनं शयानमलसं नरम् ।
निःसंशयं फलं लब्ध्वा दक्षो भूतिमुपाश्नुते ।।४२।।
-वनपर्व, अध्याय, ३२.

One can note that the the entire speech of Draupadī is filled with the *Karmayoga* or the doctrine of Action. She instigates Yudhiṣṭhira to act as a *Kṣatriya* in attacking Duryodhana to get back his rightful kingdom lost by the deceit of Duryodhana.

At the end of her speech, she informs that this theory of Action was preached to her father and brothers by a brahmin who had been given shelter by her father. She adds that the theory was taught by Bṛhaspati (*Bṛhaspati-proktā*) and that she learnt it from her brothers.[53]

Anybody can note that there is no mention of Cārvāka or Lokāyata here. Further Cārvāka, the supposed founder of Indian Materialism is not an advocate of the theory of Action. He is the advocate of the theory of physical pleasure.

But surprisingly those who attempt to prove that the doctrines of Cārvāka did enjoy a respectable place in ancient times, desire to rely upon this statement of Draupadī.

On the basis of this statement of Draupadī, Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya desires to conclude :- "In the *Vanaparva* of the *Mahābhārata*, Draupadī said that when she was a child her father invited a Brāhmaṇa to live with them. It was from him that her father as well as her brothers received instructions in the Bārhaspatya views..."

"Bārhaspatya was but an alternative name for the Lokāyata. To deny this, we have to question our ancient

53. ब्राह्मणं मे पिता पूर्वं वासयामास पण्डितम् ।।
सोऽपि सर्वामिमां प्राह पित्रे मे भरतर्षभ ।।
नीतिं वृहस्पतिप्रोक्तां भ्रातॄन् मेऽग्राहयत्पुरा ।
तेषां सकाशादश्रौषमहमेतां तदा गृहे ।।

- *Ibid.* 32.60-61

tradition seriously. Nor can it be argued that by the *Bārhaspatyamata* was meant here the ancient science of the state-craft, as Tucci contended. For there is nothing intrinsically heretical about the so-called science of the state-craft, whereas, in the *Mahābhārata* Yudhiṣṭhira after listening to the views of Draupadī, actually accused her of being influenced by heretical ideas. Thus the Bārhaspatyamata referred to could only be the Lokāyata-views....

"This learned teacher of the Lokāyata views is said to have been a Brāhmana...."

"Evidences like these perhaps indicate that we are in need of revising our notion of the Brāhmana, particularly of the Brāhmana of Buddhist India. They also call forth a necessary revision of our notion of Lokāyata derived from Mādhava (of the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*). For these are evidences not merely of some Brāhmanas professing and preaching the knowledge of Lokāyata, but of *learned* and *distinguished* ones doing so. The knowledge of Lokāyata, in other words, was considered vital to the accomplished mind, a mark of culture and knowledge."[54]

But an analysis of Draupadī's views shows that there is nothing of what are well known as Lokāyata-views. The learned author does not quote even a single verse from her speech, but wants to base his argument on the words '*Nītiṁ Bṛhaspatiproktāṁ* which only means that, that theory was taught by Bṛhaspati. It is true that the Cārvāka or Lokāyata-doctrines were taught by Bṛhaspati himself. But those were taught to harm demons and to favour gods, his own disciples.

54. *Lokāyata. Op.cit.* pp.32-33.

Secondly, those were not the only doctrines preached by Bṛhaspati. And here what Draupadī speaks is not with an intention of harming Yudhiṣthira but to help him. Hence she speaks of the duty of a king and her views can be summed up in the words of Bhīma who speaks after her to rouse the ire of Yudhiṣthira : स्वधर्मं प्रतिपद्यस्व जहि शत्रून् समागतान् ।। (33.52)

The learned author has stated that "Yudhiṣthira, after listening to the views of Draupadī actually, accused her of being influenced by heretical ideas." But there is nothing in the reply of Yudhiṣthira substantiating this statement. Yudhiṣthira simply replies-

"Plese remember my vow of truth. I always prefer truth to untruth. I do not want prosperity by untrue means. I am ready to sacrifice everything—kingdom, sons, fame wealth—for the sake of truth."[55] He wants to observe meticulously the agreement reached at the time of gambling. It was that, if he lost, he would live in forest for twelve years and reside for one year in cognito. He does not want to violate this agreement at any cost, even at the cost of immortality. He desires to remain truthful and not to enjoy royal pleasure by going against his own words. He does not want to eat his own words. And so the conclusion of the learned Chattopadhyaya can not be deduced from the words of Yudhiṣthira.

So, in this episode the teachings of Bṛahaspati are not Lokāyata-views, but views later on propounded in the *Gītā* through its *Karmayoga.*

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55. मम प्रतिज्ञां च निवोध सत्यां वृणे धर्मममृताज्जीवीताच्च ।
राज्यं च पुत्राश्च यशो धनं च सर्वं न सत्यस्य कलामुपैति ।।
- वनपर्व, 34.22

Here one point must be clearly borne in mind and that is, Brhaspati was a not a heretical teacher. He was *Devaguru,* preceptor of gods. He preached what was beneficial to them. Whatever "heretical" he taught to demons, was just to harm them. Hence his instructions to demons should not be taken to be the entire and exclusive instruction of *real* Bṛhaspati or real *Bārhaspatyamata*. Real Bṛhaspati and real *Bārhaspatyamata* have been referred to with respect in the *Mahābhārata* itself. These are some of the references to Bṛhaspati found in the *Śāntiparva* of *Mahābhārata.*

i) ततोऽतीते महाकल्पे उत्पन्नेङ्गिरसः सुते ।
बभूवुर्निवृता देवा जाते देवपुरोहिते ।।
वृहद् व्रह्म महच्चेति शव्दाः पर्यायवाचकाः ।
एभिः समान्वितो राजन् **गुणैर्विद्वान् वृहस्पतिः** ।।
तस्य शिष्यो वभूवाग्र्यो राजोपरिचरो वसुः ।
अधीतवांस्तदा शास्त्रं सम्यक् चित्रशिखण्डिजम् ।।
स राजा भावितः पूर्वं दैवेन विधिना वसुः ।
पालयामास पृथिवीं दिवमाखण्डलो यथा ।।
तस्य यज्ञो महानासीदश्वमेधो महात्मनः ।
वृहस्पतिरुपाध्यायस्तत्र होता वभूव ह ।। 336.1-5

ii) न च क्षान्तेन ते नित्यं भाव्यं पुत्र समन्ततः ।
अधर्मो हि मृदू राजा क्षमावानिव कुञ्जरः ।।
बार्हस्पत्ये च शास्त्रे च श्लोको निगदितः पुरा ।
अस्मिन्नर्थे महाराज तन्मे निगदतः शृणु ।। 56.37-38

iii) मरुत्तेन हि राज्ञा वै गीतः श्लोकः पुरातनः ।
राजाधिकारे राजेन्द्र **वृहस्पतिमते** पुरा ।।
गुरोरप्यवलिप्तस्य कार्याकार्यमजानतः ।
उत्पथप्रतिपन्नस्य दण्डो भवति शाश्वतः ।। 57.6-7

iv) एतत् ते राजधर्माणां नवनीतं युधिष्ठिर ।
वृहस्पतिर्हि भगवान् न्याय्यं धर्मं प्रशंसति ।। 58.1

v) उत्थानं हि नरेन्द्राणां **वृहस्पतिरभाषत** ।
राजधर्मस्य तन्मूलं श्लोकांश्चात्र निवोध मे ।।

उत्थानेनामृतं लव्धमुत्थानेनासुरा हताः ।
उत्थानेन महेन्द्रेण श्रैष्ठ्यं प्राप्तं दिवी ह च ।।
उत्थानवीरः पुरुषो वाग्वीरानधितिष्ठिति ।
उत्थानवीरान् वाग्वीरा रमयन्त उपासते ।।
उत्थानहीनो राजा हि वुद्धिमानपि नित्यशः ।
प्रधर्षणीयः शत्रूणां भुजङ्ग इव निर्विषः ।। 58.13-16

vi) अत्राप्युदाहरन्तीममितिहासं पुरातनम् ।
बृहस्पतिं वसुमना यथा पप्रच्छ भारत ।।
राजा वसुमना नाम कौसल्यो धीमतां वरः ।
महर्षिं किल पप्रच्छ **कृतप्रज्ञं बृहस्पतिम्** ।।
सर्वं वैनयिकं कृत्वा विनयज्ञो वृहस्पतिम् ।
दक्षिणानन्तरो भूत्वा प्रणम्य विधिपूर्वकम् ।।
विधिं पप्रच्छ राज्यस्य सर्वलोकहिते रतः ।
प्रजानां सुखमन्विच्छन् **धर्मशीलं बृहस्पतिम्** ।। 68.2-5

Hence, when Madhvācārya proves that the Cārvāka-school should be discarded completely, because its teachings harm the entire humanity, he is only following the age-old Indian tradition preserved in our authoritative texts which advise the humanity as a whole, to be away from the Cārvāka doctrines. This refutation of the Cārvākas given by Madhvācārya should have been dealt with, by S.N.Dasgupta while elaborating the criticism of the Cārvāka-school. He remarks "It (the Cārvāka philosophy) had a new logic, a destructive criticism of most of the cherished views of other systems of Indian Philosophy, a materialistic philosopy and it denied morality, moral responsibility and religion of every kind."[56] And one expected that the learned scholar will deal with the criticism of the Cārvāka for his denial of morality also. But he has devoted many pages for elaborating the

56. *Op.cit* p.533

criticism of the Cārvākas for not accepting inference as a valid means of knowledge and for accepting the *Dehātmavāda,* while he has not taken note of the criticism of the Cārvākas for not accepting the *Dharma* and *Adharma* highlighted prominently and exclusively by Madhvācārya. Because, as it is well-said, " One may think of a school of thought without the ideal of *mokṣa,* but not without that of *dharma* also. It may be that death is final and nothing remains afterwards ; but to believe in an ideal of life deviod of *dharma* is to reduce man to the level of the brute."[57]

This is one of the major contributions of Madhvācārya to the ethico-socio-philosophical field of Indian Thought which brings to light his concern for the welfare of the humanity as a whole.

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57. M.Hiriyanna, *Outlines*, *Op.cit*, p.194

CHAPTER IV

RATIONALE OF MADHVĀCĀRYA'S CLASSIFICATION OF SOULS

Madhvācārya is a firm believer of *bheda* or 'Difference' as being the very nature of all entities, both sentient and insentient, in this universe. He is also a firm believer in the plurality of sentient beings who are unique individuals distinct from one another. Moreover they are not equal, but graded as superior and inferior. In short, there is *svabhāva-bheda* and *tāratamya* among souls. Let us first consider Madhvācārya's concept of soul and then his concept of *bheda*. Regarding *jīva* or soul he states:[1]

अहमित्येव यो वेद्यः स जीव इति कीर्तितः ।
स दुःखी स सुखी चैव स पात्रं बन्धमोक्षयोः ।।

It means : The soul is known as 'I' ; whenever anyone utters the word 'I'., it should be understood that he is thereby referring to his *jīva* or soul. Further, this soul is subject to happiness and misery. That is, whenever one becomes happy or miserable, the concerned happiness or misery is experienced by the soul. It is the soul which enjoys happiness or suffers misery. Moreover, it is the soul which is subjected to this worldly bondage ; and it is the soul which gets release from this bondage and enjoys the (inherent) bliss of liberation.

This description of the soul proves that it is distinct from Brahman Who is full of absolute bliss and is never subject to bondage or sorrow.

1. *Viṣṇutattvavinirṇaya* (*VTN*) Ed. Prof. K.T. Pandurangi, Dvaita Vedanta Studies and Research Foundation, Bangalore, 1991, p.27

In the scheme of Madhvācārya's *pañcavidhabheda* or five-fold difference, there is the *jīva-jīva-bheda* or distinction of one soul from another soul. He is also emphatic in laying down the *jīva-tāratamya* or gradation among souls which is intrinsic and fundamental. In this connection it is necessary to deal with his concept of *bheda* or 'Difference' on which his scheme of *pañcavidhabheda* stands. If there is no *bheda*, there can never be anything like '*Pañcavidhabheda*' including *jīva-jīva-bheda*. (*jīveśa-bheda, jaḍeśa-bheda, jīva-jaḍa-bheda* and *jaḍa-jaḍa-bheda* are the other four *bhedas*).

Madhvācārya is quite emphatic in accepting *bheda* or 'Difference' to be a fundamental aspect of universal experience pervading the entire scheme of activities of all sentient beings. All the schools of Vedānta accept Brahman's supremacy. And this acceptance implies and must imply that other realities are different from Brahman. Without difference there is no possibility of any superiority or inferiority of status among reals.

While establishing the claim of 'Difference' to be so fundamental, Madhvācārya rightly examines the objections raised against the concept of 'Difference'. These are the major objections :

1) According to Maṇḍana, difference is a mere fabrication of beginningless nescience and as such, it has no real existence[2] : (न भेदो भावतोऽस्ति अनाद्यविद्याविलसितमेतत् ।)

2) Further, if difference were acceptable it should be accepted as either the *svarūpa* (form) or the *dharma* (attribute)

2. *Bramasiddhi*, Ed. S.S. Kuppuswamy Shastri, Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts No. 4, Madras, 1937, p.48.

of an entity.In the opinion of Śrīharṣa, it cannot be accepted as the *svarūpa* of an entity, because in that case, there can be no confusion about its distinction from other entities and thus there will be no scope for any doubt about the exact identity of the cognised entity[3]: (यदि च स्वरूपं भेदः स्यात्, तदा धर्मिणि दृष्टे स्वरूपं दृष्टमिति क्वचिन्न सन्देहः स्यात् ।)

3) Vimuktātman observes that it cannot be accepted as the *dharma* of an entity distinct from its *svarūpa*, because in that case it will differ from the entity and thus introduce another element of difference between the entity and the *bheda*, its *dharma*, and thus it would lead to the fallacy of *anavasthā* or *regressus ad infinitum*[4]: (भेदस्य वस्तुनो भेदे भेदाभेदे च तस्य भेदाद्वस्तुनोश्चान्योऽन्यो भेद इत्यनवस्थानान्न कश्चिद् भेदो वस्तु संस्पृशेत् ।)

4) Further, in the opinion of Maṇḍana, the universal experience reveals that every cognition of *bheda* depends upon the consideration of two distinct entities between which the difference is supposed to exist and this gives rise to the logical fallacy of *anyonyāśraya* or vicious inter-dependence. The reason is obvious--the *bheda* of X from Y depends upon a prior cognition of the *bheda* of Y from X. As a result there is scope for *anyonyāśraya-doṣa*.

Madhvācārya in his *VTN* considers these objections and points out the exact nature of *bheda* vis-a-vis an entity:

न च विशेषणविशेष्यतया भेदसिद्धिः विशेषणविशेष्यभावश्च भेदापेक्षः । धर्मिप्रतियोग्यपेक्षया भेदसिद्धिः भेदापेक्षं च धर्मिप्रतियोगित्वमित्यन्योन्याश्रयतया भेदस्यायुक्तिः । पदार्थस्वरूपत्वाद् भेदस्य ।[5]

3. *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, Medical Hall Press, Benares, 1888, p.125.
4. *Iṣṭasiddhi*, Ed. M. Hiriyanna, Gaekwad Oriental Series, LXV, Baroda, 1933, p.23.
5. *VTN*, *Op.cit.*, pp.12-13.

It means: The objectors (i.e. the Advaitins) who want to reject the existence of *bheda* desire to point out that it can be either the adjective qualifying an entity or the substantive being qualified. For example, there can be two types of statements: रामलक्ष्मणौ भिन्नौ or रामलक्ष्मणयोर्भेदः । In the former statement viz, "Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa are different" the term 'different' (*bhinna*) serves the purpose of an adjective, whereas in the latter, viz, "There is difference between Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa", the term difference (*bheda*) is in the capacity of a substantive being qualified. So these are the only two ways in which *bheda* can be cognised and stated. Now the difficulty is, to become either a qualifying adjective or a qualified substantive, it presupposes the knowledge of the concept of difference to distinguish an adjective from a substantive. Thus, there is the logical fallacy of *anyonyāśraya* or *itaretarāśraya* or vicious inter-dependence. The same thing can be expressed in a different manner, using the terms *Dharmi* (= *Dharmin*) and *Pratiyogi* (= *Pratiyogin*). The *Dharmi* is the given entity that differs, and *Pratiyogi* is the entity from which the *Dharmi* differs. Now the establishment of the concept of *bheda* depends upon the prior cognition of *Dharmi* and *Pratiyogi* as distinct from each other; and the knowledge of such distinction between the two, the one as *Dharmi* and the other as *Pratiyogi* depends upon the prior cognition of the concept of *bheda*. Thus, there is again the logical fallacy of vicious inter-dependence.

In reply to these objections, Madhvācārya declares the exact position of *bheda* : **पदार्थस्वरूपत्वाद् भेदस्य ।**

Bheda or 'Difference' is the *svarūpa* or the very form of an entity and hence the logical fallacy of vicious inter-dependence does not arise at all. Madhvācārya does take note of the objections raised against the *padārthasvarūpatva* of

bheda. Firstly, as pointed out by Śrīharṣa, *bheda* cannot be the very *svarūpa* of an entity because the cognition of *bheda* depends upon, as noticed above, the prior cognition of both *dharmi* and *pratiyogi*, whereas the cognition of *svarūpa* does not depend upon any such prior cognition. अथ भेद इत्येतावन्मात्रं पटस्य स्वरूपं, घटादिति च तद् घटेन प्रतियोगिनाऽन्येनैव निरूप्यते, तदपि नोपपद्यते । निष्प्रतियोगिकस्य भेदस्य प्रमाणागोचरत्वात् ।[6]

It can be explained: "It is not proper to hold *bheda* to be the *svarūpa* of an entity. The cognition of *bheda* takes the form of *asmādayaṁ bhinnah* or *asmādasya bhedah*, which is not the case with the *svarūpa* of entities. The essential form of things does not need the help of cognition of other entities. The propositions relating to *svarūpa* are *nirapekṣa* or non-relational, whereas those of difference are relational depending on the knowledge of particular co-relatives (*dharmī-pratiyogi-sāpekṣa*). To know the difference of X from Y, one must know Y beforehand; whereas to know the form of X, no such knowledge of any other entity is necessary. The perception of the form of an entity is direct and independent, whereas the cognition of difference is indirect and dependent as it involves a prior perception of the differing entities. Hence, the belief of *bheda* being the *padārthasvarūpa* is baseless and unsustainable.

Now Madhvācārya retorts : न च धर्मिप्रतियोग्यपेक्षया भेदस्यास्वरूपत्वम् । ऐक्यवत् स्वरूपस्यैव तथात्वात् ।[7]

Madhvācārya opens a page from the text of the Advaitins. If *bheda,* as argued above, cannot be accepted as the *svarūpa* of an entity because it depends upon a prior

6. *Op. cit.*, pp.113-114.
7. *VTN.*, p.13.

cognition of *dharmi* and *pratiyogi*, what do their authorities say about the *aikya* or identity between Brahman and *jīva*. They assert that there is the perception of the *aikya* or identity between Brahman and *jīva*, an identity which is nevertheless not dependent upon any other cognition and which is perceived directly and which exists in its own right. But the statement of this identity does make use of two terms, one serving as *dharmi* and the other as *pratiyogi* : जीवस्य ब्रह्मणा ऐक्यम् । ब्रह्मणो जीवेनैक्यम् । ब्रह्मजीवयोरैक्यम् । and so on. In such statements of identity, the idea of identity is *sāpekṣa,* that is, dependent upon the prior knowledge of both viz, Brahman and *jīva*. Even then, it is held by the Advaitins that *aikya* is the very *svarūpa* of Brahman and *jīva*. So, Madhvācārya rightly asks - "If this *sāpekṣatva* of *aikya* does not prevent *aikya* from being the *svarūpa*, what harm is there in holding the *bheda* even though held to be *sāpekṣa, for argument's sake*, to be the *svarūpa?*" The question is quite fair and in order. Madhvācārya is certainly justified in asking for the same standard of thinking to be applied to him as applied by the Advaitins to themselves. Hence, there can be no objection to hold *bheda* to be the very *svarūpa* of an entity.

Now, there is this objection raised by Śrīharṣa: "If *bheda* is the *padārtha-svarūpa*, i.e. if an object is cognised as quite different from all other objects, there will not arise any cases of doubt nor will there be any confusion about its difference from other objects. But our worldly experience shows that such doubts about the distinct identity of an object do arise and as such one is forced to reject the contention that *bheda* is *padārtha-svarūpa.*"

Madhvācārya replies : स्वरूपसिद्धावपि तदसिद्धिश्च जीवेश्वरैक्यं वदतः सिद्धैव ।[8]

8. *Ibid.*, p.13.

It means : Even in the Advaita, the knowledge of Brahman does not at once reveal the identity and the bliss which are said to be the very nature of Brahman. Even after the knowledge of Brahman, there do occur doubts and clarifications. The seeker wants to know the relation between himself and Brahman and he is answered through such statements like '*Tattvamasi*'. When Brahman is Identity Itself, there need not arise any such queries about the 'relation.' The rise of queries even after the knowledge of Brahman, shows that inspite of such knowledge of Brahman, identity which is Brahman's very nature still remains unrevealed. So too is the case of *bheda*. Being the very nature of entities the *bheda* may remain uncognised on the *mere* perception of the entity and thus there might be scope for doubt and clarification arising out of perception of similarity and has to be corrected by closer examination.

But the question remains: "How do doubts arise even when *bheda* is *padārthasvarūpa?*" Madhvācārya as a true metaphysician, is alive to this problem. He draws the attention of all truth-seekers to analyse the phenomenon of doubt. On such an analysis one discovers that the phenomenon of doubt is governed by *sādṛśya* or resemblance between or among entities and not merely by *bheda* alone, as Śrīharṣa appears to believe. So Madhvācārya asserts :

ज्ञात्वैव प्रायः सर्वतो वैलक्षण्यं कस्मिंश्चिदेव सदृशे संशयं करोति ।[9]

It means: Generally one cognises an entity as distinct from all else and then a doubt crops up regarding its distinction from a similar entity. Nobody should ignore the fact that at

9. *Ibid.*, p.13.

the basis of doubt or confusion, there is necessarily the factor of resemblance or similarity. As Jayatīrtha explains, an entity possesses only one *bheda* because there is no proof to believe it to be manifold. This *bheda* is cognised at the first moment of cognition of the entity together with its *svarūpa*. And this *bheda* has many attributes like '*ghaṭād-bhedah*' (difference from a pot), '*paṭād-bhedah*' (difference from a piece of cloth) and so on. The aspect *bheda* is one but it has got as many facets or attributes as it has the *pratiyogis* or counter co-relates. When due to *sādṛsya* or resemblance the particular aspect of the counter co-relate is not cognised there arises doubt about the distinction of the entity from that particular counter co-relate. It cannot, therefore be said that if *bheda* is accepted as *padārtha-svarūpa*, there will not be any scope for the rise of doubt.

अयमभिप्रायः - एक एव वस्तुनो भेदः अनेकत्वे प्रमाणाभावात् । स च वस्तुप्रतीतौ प्रतीयत एव । किन्तु तस्य घटप्रतियोगिकत्वपटप्रतियोगिकत्वमित्यादयो धर्माः । तत्र भेदनिष्ठो यत्प्रतियोगिकत्वरूपो धर्मः सादृश्यादिवशान्न प्रतीयते तत्र संशयादिकमुत्पद्यते; न तु तत्रापि भेदस्याप्रतीतिः । अतः संशयादेरन्यथोपपत्तेर्न तदर्थं धर्मिप्रतीतौ भेदाप्रतीतिरङ्गीकार्या, यया भेदस्यास्वरूपं भवेदिति। (*VTN ṭikā*)

Madhvācārya further explains the concept of *bheda* logically on the basis of uncontradictable experience: भेदस्तु स्वरूपदर्शन एव सिद्धः । प्रायः सर्वतो विलक्षणं हि पदार्थस्वरूपं दृश्यते ।[10]

It is everybody's experience that when an entity is perceived it is cognised only as different from other entities. Generally, mere cognition of an entity reveals also its difference from others. Madhvācārya is a pragmatic realist and an objective thinker. He accepts the universally acceptable

10. *Ibid.*, p.13.

principle of स्थितस्य गतिश्चिन्तनीया । (A fact should be considered as it exists) As such, he frames his phrases and sentences very meaningfully with significant terms. One such sentence is this one, viz. प्रायः सर्वतो विलक्षणं हि पदार्थस्वरूपं दृश्यते, wherein the term प्रायः is quite significant. Even when accepting that together with the identification of an entity its distinction from others is also cognised, he does not ignore the possibilities causing the phenomena of doubt and confusion about its distinction from others occurring on some occasions due to some extraneous conditions, like the defective sensory organs or the adverse environmental effects. Hence, he uses the term *prāyah* meaning 'generally' or 'in most cases' which is a fact experienced by one and all. Generally one cognises an entity with its identification with itself and its distinction from others. The term '*prāyah*' leaves scope for doubt which is also a matter of experience. He has explained already the causes giving rise to doubt or illusion.

Madhvācārya further clarifies : सामान्यतः सर्ववैलक्षण्ये ज्ञात एव घटत्वादिज्ञानम् ।[11]

It means that the *bheda* happens to be cognised together with the *svarūpa* and this can be understood by viewing the phenomenon from another view-point. When we come across a pot before our eyes, we assert: "This is a pot." How do we call it a pot, and not a plate or a jug ? When we call it a pot, we reveal our knowledge of its possessing 'potness' and not possessing 'plateness' or 'jarness'. It means that not only its potness but also its distinction from others is known and revealed through the assertion "This is a pot". Hence also *bheda* is the *padārtha-svarūpa*.

11. *Ibid.*, p.13.

In this assertive sentence, the term '*sāmānyatah*' is significant. It leaves no scope for believing that the knowledge of *sarvavailakṣaṇya* or 'distinction from all' will make the cognising agent a *sarvajña* or omniscient. As explained above, usually knowledge reveals its entity as something that is distinct from all else, in a general way, depending upon the wealth of knowledge possessed by the cognising agent. Such general knowledge of 'all else'; is not sufficient to make anyone *sarvajña* or omniscient. Madhvācārya has asserted this in his commentary on the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* (II chapter) :

न च भेददर्शनमसुकरम् । स्वरूपत्वाद्भेदस्य । सर्वव्यावृत्तं हि सर्वस्य स्वरूपं सर्वैरनुभूयते । अन्यथाहं वा दृष्टोऽन्यो वा दृष्ट इत्यपि संशयः स्यात् । न च पश्चाद् भेदो ज्ञायत इत्यत्र किञ्चिन्मानम् । न हि दृष्टवस्तुनः पुरुषस्य तस्य वस्त्वन्तराद् भेदे संशयः क्वचिद् दृष्टः । न च सर्वतो व्यावृत्त्यनुभवे सर्वज्ञताऽपेक्षितेति दोषः । सामान्यतः सर्वस्य सर्वैरपि ज्ञातत्वात् ।

It means : It is not difficult to cognise the *bheda* or 'Difference'. Because it is the very nature of an entity. All cognise the nature of each and every entity as distinct from all other entities. If it is not so, when oneself is cognised, there would arise a doubt whether oneself or someone else is cognised. There is no valid proof to contend that first the nature of an entity is known and thereafter is known its distinction from others. When a person cognises an entity, he does not have any doubt about its distinction from other entities. It should not be pointed out that if it is believed that one cognises an entity as different from all else, then there would arise the fault of considering one as omniscient. Because when it is said that an entity is cognised as distinct from all else, it is, in a general way and not exhaustively. It depends upon the wealth of knowledge possessed by the cogniser.

Then Madhvācārya likes to show the absurdities that will result if *bheda* is not accepted as *padārthasvarūpa*. He states : यदि न स्वरूपं भेदस्तदा पदार्थे दृष्टे प्रायः सर्वतो वैलक्षण्यं तस्य न ज्ञायेत। अज्ञाते च वैलक्षण्ये आत्मनि घट इत्यपि संशयः स्यात् । न हि कश्चित्तथा संशयं करोति ।[12]

It means: It is everybody's experience that when an entity is cognised, it is cognised, in a general manner, as different from all else. This experience cannot occur if *bheda* were not the *svarūpa* of the entity. Everybody agrees that the very perception of an entity reveals it as different from other entities, of course, in a general way. This is because the *svarūpa* and *bheda* are cognised in one and the same cognition. If this *bheda* is not revealed along with the *svarūpa*, how will one come to know that 'one' is only 'oneself' and not a pot, or some one or something else? The non-perception of any instantaneous difference would deny him even the knowledge of himself as distinguished from, for example, a pot or a plate. Only because one cognises one's identity, one becomes aware of oneself and does not confuse oneself with others or other things.

Here nobody should think that it is not possible to be aware of the *svarūpa* of the object and its *bheda* from all else simultaneously in one and the same moment. Madhvācārya points out: न च युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्दोषः । यथा युगपदेव दीपदर्शने सामान्यतः सर्वे ज्ञायन्त एवं तथा स्यात्।[13]

It means: It should not be considered that "there is no possibility of simultaneous cognition of more than one aspect like the *svarūpa* of an entity and its *bheda* from all else and so it is not proper to hold *bheda* to be the *padārtha-svarūpa*."

12. *Ibid.*, p.13.
13. *Ibid.*, p.13.

The fact is: Our experience shows that when one comes across thousands of lights burning simultaneously, in one and the same moment, one does get the simultaneous cognition of all of them in a general way. Similar is the simultaneous cognition of the *svarūpa* and the *bheda* of an entity.

Now one more objection has been raised by Śrīharṣa :भेदो हि भवन् कस्मादपि भवति । अन्यथा स्वरूपं भेद इति पारिभाषिकं नाम स्यात् ।[14]

That is, "*Bheda* cannot be the *padārtha-svarūpa*. It is always a related concept, inasmuch as, when there is a *bheda* it is from something else. On the other hand, if *bheda* is believed to be the *svarūpa*, the two terms would become synonymous, and the use of one of them would serve the desired purpose, making the use of the other term superfluous; either the term *ghaṭa* or the term *bheda* should suffice to denote a *ghaṭa*. But our usages show that a *ghaṭa* is termed as *ghaṭa* and is not and cannot be, termed as *bheda*. Hence *bheda* cannot be the *padārtha-svarūpa*."

Madhvācārya is aware of this difficulty and has shown that even though *bheda* is the *padārtha-svarūpa* there is no fallacy of redundancy. He has introduced his concept of *Viśeṣa* which points out the exact relation between the *svarūpa* and *bheda* and also convincingly answers the charge levelled by Śrīharṣa. He states in his *Anuvyākhyāna* :

भेदहीने त्वपर्यायशब्दान्तरनियामकः ।
विशेषो नाम कथितः सोऽस्ति वस्तुष्वशेषतः ।।[15]

It means: It has been shown that *bheda* is the *svarūpa* and so identical with the entity. Still there is no fallacy of

14. *Op.cit.*, p.112.
15. *Anuvyākhyāna*, Ed. Prof. K.T. Pandurangi, p.15. (I.i.2, 109-110)

redundancy because of the relation between them being of the nature of *saviśeṣa-abheda* or identity-in-difference. *Viśeṣa* has been termed as '*bheda-pratinidhi*' by Jayatīrtha. That is, it is 'pluralising or differentiating agency'. The *abheda* or identity rules out the possibility of any vicious reciprocity and the *viśeṣa* or the pluralising agency entitles both the entity and its *bheda* to exist independently and in their own right. Even as heat and light are felt in one and the same perception of fire, so too the entity and *bheda* are simultaneously experienced and so it cannot be contended that the *svarūpa* and *bheda* do not constitute the same entity. Both heat and light are the nature of fire; similarly *svarūpa* and *bheda* are the very nature of an entity. Thus the entity and *bheda* are not synonymous. They have different import and as such are 'distinguishable' through *viśeṣas*.

Madhvācārya emphatically asserts - सः अस्ति वस्तुषु अशेषतः। No entity can exist without this *bheda-pratinidhi* or differentiating agency. He points out that even the Advaitins have accepted the existence of *viśeṣas* in entities in interpreting Upaniṣadic statements like नेति : एकस्मिन्नेव वस्तुनि विशेषस्तैरप्यङ्गीकृत एव । नेति नेतीत्यत्र सर्ववैलक्षण्याङ्गीकारात् । विशेषानङ्गीकारे च पुनरुक्तेः ।[16]

It means: Let us take Yājñavalkya's famous statement in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*. — स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा which is quoted by the Advaitins to establish their Attributeless Brahman. Yājñavalkya declares that Ātman or Brahman is different from all else in this universe. The repetition as *Neti Neti* serves a two-fold purpose: It points out that Brahman is different from other entities, which are also distinct from one another. And so it should be understood that Brahman is distinct from a

16. *VTN, Op.cit.*, p.13.

plurality of entities. This is possible only with the help of *viśeṣas*. Madhvācārya clarifies the manner through which two नेतिs convey two ideas. It should not be taken to be a meaningless repetition. Each नेति has a distinct meaning to convey. He has given convincing examples :

न च घटाद् वैलक्षण्यमेव पटाद् वैलक्षण्यम् । अनुभवविरोधात् ।[17]

When one says, as in riddles, that a particular entity is not a pot, nor is it a cloth, what does he mean? Does he not mean that it is not made up of clay, nor is it made up of cotton? So when an entity is said to be *Na ghaṭaḥ, na paṭah*, the speaker has in his mind two distinct objects from which the given entity is distinct. Both the distinctions are possessed by one and the same entity. Hence it is not only that the object is distinct from the two, those two are also distinct from one another.

In fine, Madhvācārya concludes :

तस्माद् भेददर्शनं युक्तमेव ।[18]

"Therefore, it is but proper and reasonable to cognise *bheda* as the *padārthasvarūpa*." Hence none should think as does Maṇḍana that *bheda* is *anādyavidyā-vilasita* or fabrication of beginningless nescience. Nor should anyone observe as does Vimuktātman that acceptance of the concept of *bheda* will lead one to the fallacy of *anavasthā* or *regressus ad infinitum*.

Now coming to the *jīvas* or souls which are distinct from Brahman, according to Madhvācārya, there is a two-fold classification : सूक्ष्म (subtle) and स्थूल (gross). In the first subtle classification each soul is individual and distinct.

17. *Ibid.*, p.13.
18. *Ibid.*, p.13.

According to Madhvācārya souls are infinite in number and are essentially distinct from one another. He quotes with approval in his *VTN* statements of *Vatsa-śruti* and *Skanda-purāṇa*:

1) अनागता अतीताश्च यावन्तः सहिताः क्षणाः।
अतीतानागताश्चैव यावन्तः परमाणवः।
ततोऽप्यनन्तगुणिता जीवानां राशयः पृथक् । (वत्सश्रुति)

2) परमाणुप्रदेशेऽपि ह्यनन्ताः प्राणिराशयः ।
सूक्ष्मत्वादीशशक्त्यैव स्थूला अपि हि संस्थिताः ।।
सहस्रयोजनसभां प्रभावाद्विश्वकर्मणः ।
अनन्ता राशयोऽनन्ताः प्रजानामधिसंस्थिताः ।। (स्कन्दपुराण)[19]

The passage from the *Vatsa-Śruti* asserts that the souls are infinite in number. One might try to calculate the number of moments of time from the beginning of this creation upto its end; one might try to add up all the atoms existing in this universe; still it would not be possible for one to exhaust the number of souls in enumeration. Because, they are infinite in number and hence are beyond any enumeration or computation. The *Skanda-purāṇa* states that an infinite number of souls occupy due to their inherent extreme minuteness, the space of an atom. Even when they attain grossness, they do so due to the prowess of the Lord. An infinite number of congregations of infinite number of souls occupy the assembly-hall spread over a thousand *yojans* due to the might of Viśvakarman.

It is true that the Sāṅkhyas also believe in plurality of souls and they have stated the reason thereof :

19. *VTN*, p.34.

जननमरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमादयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च ।
पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव ।।[20]

Accordingly, the reason is three-fold : Firstly, the souls are perceived to have birth and death at different times, and also to possess organs of sense and action entirely different from one another. Secondly, no two souls engage in the same activity simultaneously. And thirdly, the souls are experienced to possess *guṇas* viz, *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* in different proportions. Some like divinities possess more of *sattva-guṇa*: others like human beings possess more of *rajo-guṇa* and lower creatures are seen to possess more of *tamo-guṇa*.

But the question remains: "What is the cause of the said inequality observed in the world among the souls? Is it intrinsic or extrinsic? Is it inherent in the soul or caused by some external factors?" The Sāṅkhyas did not raise this question and so no answer was possible from them. But Madhvācārya did take note of this important question. He went deep into the root-cause of the inequality of souls and he has asserted that the inequality among souls is intrinsic. The inequality also means plurality of souls. It is inherent and not caused by any external factors.

Madhvācārya states : आत्मस्वभावभेदस्य निर्दोषत्वेन चाखिलः। प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधाच्च दुष्टः पक्षोऽयमञ्जसा ।। चेष्टालिङ्गेन सात्मत्वे परदेहस्य साधिते । अन्यत्वं स्वात्मनस्तस्मात् सर्वैरेवानुभूयते ।।[21].

According to Madhvācārya one has to depend upon one's own ingrained experience to realise that souls are basically distinct

20. *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, No.18.
21. *Upādhikhaṇḍana, Khaṇḍanatrayam*, Ed. G.M. Bhat, Sukrtindra Oriental Research Institute Cochin 1977, p.35.

from one another. What does anybody witness around him? He perceives several physical bodies functioning in their own unique ways. He begins to ponder over the cause of the activities of these bodies and concludes that the said activities are due to the souls possessed by them. This conclusion is based on his own intuitive experience; because, he has the experience that his own body functions because of the presence of a soul in it.

Here one must note that Madhvācārya goes deep into the question of the plurality of souls to find out the exact cause of this plurality. The arguments advanced by the Sāṅkhyas do not answer the question regarding the cause of diversity in the birth, death, organs &c., of souls in this world. Even the *Karma*-theory laying down that the diversity is caused by the *Karma* or deeds performed by those souls in the previous birth or births does not give a satisfactory answer. Because, this answer gives scope to a further question: "Why were the previous *Karmas* different from one soul to another?"

And Madhvācārya has given a satisfactory and convincing answer. In the words of Dr. B.N.K. Sharma, "Madhva finds the basis of the doctrine of plurality of selves in the intrinsic diversity of their *essences*, which he shows to be the *inevitable presupposition of the* (Hindu) *theory of Karma*. It is accepted that the inequalities of individual equipment and endowment are regulated by one's past life and its Karma. But, by its very nature the Karma theory would be powerless to explain the *why of such inequalities, in the remotest past, without recourse to the hypothesis of an intrinsic peculiarity (anādiviśeṣa) that is uncaused.* It is this *anādiviśeṣa,* says Madhva, that distinguishes one soul from another:

यद्यनादिविशेषो न, सांप्रतं कथमेव सः ? आकस्मिको विशेषश्चेददृष्टे क्वचिदिष्यते। सर्वत्राकस्मिकत्वं स्यात् , नादृष्टापेक्षिता क्वचित् । अदृष्टाच्चेद्विशेषोऽयमनादित्वं कुतो न तत् ।। (AV. III.p.49)

"Unseen merit, which accounts for similar merit in the present, should presuppose a like merit. This series should regress *ad infinitum*. If it breaks down in any particular instance, the principle of unseen merit might as well be dispensed with, even at the outset. If it holds good in all cases without exception, *as far back as human thought could reach,* it is a clear admission of the fact that such unseen merit is *ingrained in the nature of individuals.*"

"Plurality of selves cannot be merely contingent upon the accidents of psycho-physical embodiment or differences of Karma. Even the Karma-theory would be unable to explain why particular selves are susceptible to particular Kārmic propensities and tendencies for good or evil. There is no place for accidents in a moral universe. Everything is governed by definite causes. If the individual peculiarities of equipment etc, are finally to be attributed to some inexplicable *adṛṣṭa* or unseen merit that is also beginningless and uncaused, it would be as good as admitting that the plurality of selves is, in the last analysis, intrinsic and beginningless"[22] "*This is the decisive contribution which Madhva has made to the interpretation of the problem of life and its diversities. He has thus gone beyond the principle of Karma, unerringly, to the "Svabhāvabheda" (intrinsic or essential differences in the nature of beings). No other philosopher, in the East or in the West, has done this. Herein lies the boldness, originality*

22. *Madhva's Teachings in His Own Words*, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1970, pp. 78-79.

and thoroughness of Madhva's approach to philosophical problems. He does not stop at any half-way house on the philosophical road to Truth."[23]

[But with due respects to revered Dr. Sharma, the great scholar, I like to point out that long before Madhvācārya, Kuntaka, the author of the *Vakroktijīvita* (*circa* 950 A.D.) has done this i.e., has gone to the *svabhāvabheda* existing among souls. While discussing the cause of different poetic styles, Kuntaka concludes that the nature of poets is the cause of different poetic styles :

कविस्वभावभेदनिवन्धनत्वेन काव्यप्रस्थानभेदः समञ्जसतां गाहते । सुकुमार- स्वभावस्य हि कवेस्तथाविधैव सहजा शक्तिः समुद्भवति, शक्तिशक्तिमतोरभेदात्। तथा च तथाविधसौकुमार्यरमणीयां व्युत्पत्तिमाबध्नााति ताभ्यां च सुकुमारवर्त्मनाभ्यासतत्परः क्रियते ।....[24]

Kuntaka also observes :

वाजिवारणलोहानां काष्ठपाषाणवाससाम् ।
नारीपुरुषतोयानामन्तरं महदन्तरम् ।।[25]

It means that every horse, elephant, metal, wood, stone, garment, woman, man, water and so on is unique and individual. No two or any class are completely equal and similar. This verse is found in *Tantrākhyāyikā* (I.40) and also in *Hitopadeśa* (II.40)

Hence as objective thinkers, we can observe that the *svabhāvabheda* is not the original contribution of Madhvācārya.

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23. *Philosophy of Śrī Madhvācārya*, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1962, p.197.
24. *Vakroktijīvita* Ed. Dr. K.Krishnamoorthy, Karnatak University Dharwad, 1977, pp. 41-42.
25. *Ibid.*, p.15.

It should also be placed on record that in the revised edition published in 1991 by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, revered Dr. Sharma has deleted the sentence, "No other philosopher, in the East or in the West, has done this." (p.282)]

Hence, Madhvācārya has successfully discovered the truth that souls are intrinsically distinct from one another; he has also discovered another truth regarding souls and that is, souls are graded. There is *tāratamya* or *svarūpatāratamya* among souls. They are graded regarding their knowledge, power, bliss and the like. Madhvācārya declares :

सर्वेषां च हरिर्नित्यं नियन्ता तद्वशाः परे ।
तारतम्यं ततो ज्ञेयं सर्वोच्चत्वं हरेस्तथा ।।
एतद्विना न कस्यापि विमुक्तिः स्यात्कथञ्चन ।।[26]

It means that Lord Viṣṇu is always the Absolute Controller of everything else, both sentient and insentient in this universe. Anybody aspiring liberation should necessarily realise the truth of the over-all supremacy of Lord Viṣṇu and also the inherent gradation among souls. This gradation together with the distinction among souls is not only intrinsic but also ever-persisting even in the liberated state.

It is well known that Madhvācārya classifies souls *broadly* into three varieties : 1) *Muktiyogya* or eligible for liberation; 2) *Nityasaṁsārin* or eternally bound to worldly life; and 3) *Tamoyogya* or only fit for hell. It is true that this three-fold classification of souls condemns some to be eligible for only hell or sorrow and misery. But one should not forget that Madhvācārya is an objective thinker. His definition of *pramāṇa* is *Yathārthaṁ pramāṇaṁ*..[27] That knowledge is valid

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26. *Mahābhāratatātparyanirṇaya* (*MTN*) I.80-81.
27. *Pramāṇalakṣaṇa*

which cognises an object as it is. As such he does not hesitate to call a spade a spade. Objectivity is and should be the necessary base and the source of true philosophy. It is the basic criterion of recognising a real philosopher. There is nothing strange about the graded classification of souls. None need become shocked to know that there is a class of souls who deserve only misery and sorrow. Such a classifier need not be banged as cruel and merciless. If a murderer is found guilty and pronounced fit to be hanged, the judge is not and should not be banged as cruel and merciless. The judge has simply discovered the truth about the accused who had committed the heinous crime of murder, judged him to be guilty and passed the resultant order to hang him. The judge has brought out the truth. He should be admired and not condemned. So too is the case of Madhvācārya's third class of souls who are fit for only hell. His three-fold classification is a universal truth and has been declared not only by Lord Kṛṣṇa Himself but has also been suggested in their own way by such great writers like Bharata, Kauṭilya, Kālidāsa, Bhavabhūti, Bhartṛhari and others. In fact even to-day one observes such graded peculiarity among all living beings in their physical and mental capacities, competency, strength and the like. Just as any two beings are distinct mutually, so too they are not similar or equal in all aspects. Some are rich and others are poor; some are literate and learned, others are illiterate and ignorant; some are tall, others are short; some are strong and others are weak, and so on;

Thus we can take any aspect and we will come across inequality between any two beings. Madhvācārya has grouped them broadly into three divisions. He asserts:

स्वभावतस्त्रिविधा जीवा उत्तमाधममध्यमाः । (III.27-35)

. श्रद्धा स्वरूपं जीवस्य तस्मात् श्रद्धाविभेदतः ।
उत्तमाधममध्यास्तु जीवा ज्ञेयाः पृथक् पृथक् ।।(XVII.3)[28]

It means: The souls are by their very nature graded as superior, mediocre and inferior. The term '*Śraddhā*' stands for the inherent nature of a soul. And it differs from one soul to another. Hence the souls are graded three-fold as superior, mediocre and inferior.

Moreover, Madhvācārya approves the popular saying- स्वभावो दुरतिक्रमः । He states :

देवासुरनरत्वाद्या जीवानां तु निसर्गतः ।
निसर्गो नान्यथैतेषां केनचित्क्वचिदेव वा ।। (XVI.24)[29]
तस्मादनाद्यनन्तं हि तारतम्यं चिदात्मनाम् ।

तच्च नैवान्यथा कर्तुं शक्यं केनापि कुत्रचित् ।। (I.92)[30]

That is, the souls get the form of gods, demons, men and so on due to their own unique nature. This unique nature possessed by them cannot be changed by anybody, at any time. The gradation among souls is beginningless and endless. It cannot be changed by anybody, at any time.

That the soul's unique nature cannot be changed even by the Lord has been stated by the Lord Himself in the *Gītā*:

कामैस्तैस्तैर्हृतज्ञानाः प्रपद्यन्तेऽन्यदेवताः ।
तं तं नियममास्थाय प्रकृत्या नियताः स्वया ।।
यो यो यां यां तनुं भक्तः श्रद्धयाऽर्चितुमिच्छति ।
तस्य तस्याचलां श्रद्धां तामेव विदधाम्यहम् ।। (VII.20-21)

28. *Gītātātparyanirṇaya* (*GTN*) Ed. D. Prahladachar, Poornaprajña Vidyapeetha, Bangalore, 1987, pp.111 and 296.
29. *Ibid.*, p.293.
30. *MTN* I.92.

It means: There are some souls, inspite of possessing true knowledge of the Lord, fall victims to their evil desires and worship other deities. This results due to their unique nature. The Lord declares that He makes that nature and also the resultant faith firm in them. The Lord is Omnipotent. He can change, if He wills, the nature and fate of any soul. But He does not will so. He has already determined the unique nature of each and every soul which even He will not change for good or bad. This truth has been stated by Madhvācārya :

i) नियमोऽयं हरेर्यस्मान्नोल्लङ्घ्यः सर्वचेतनैः ।
सत्यसङ्कल्पतो विष्णुर्नान्यथा तु करिष्यति ।।[31]

ii) शक्तोऽपि ह्यन्यथा कर्तुं स्वेच्छानियमतो हरिः ।
कारणैर्नियतैरेव करोतीदं जगत्सदा ।।[32]

At this stage anybody may ask: "How is it that gods by nature, were born as demons, as in the case of Prahlāda?" Madhvācārya points out the reason thereof :

देवाः शापबलादेव प्रह्लादादित्वमागताः ।
अतः पुनश्च देवत्वं ते यान्ति निजमेव तु ।।
हेतुतः सोऽन्यथाभावो रक्तता स्फटिके यथा ।
अतो नित्यश्च नाप्येष स्वभावविनिवर्तकः ।।[33]

It means that gods possessing divine nature were born as Prahlāda and others in the families of demons due to extraneous factors like a curse. This is just a temporary change like a crystal appearing as red in the vicinity of a red flower.

Next, one can note that this three-fold classification has been declared long before Madhvācārya by Lord Kṛṣṇa Himself in the *Gītā*. :

31. *Ibid.*, I.99.
32. *Anuvyākhyāna, Op.cit*, p.94,524.
33. *GNT. Op.cit.*, pp. 293-4.

त्रिविधा भवति श्रद्धा देहिनां सा स्वभावजा ।
सात्त्विकी राजसी चैव तामसी चेति तां शृणु ।।
सत्त्वानुरूपा सर्वस्य श्रद्धा भवति भारत ।
श्रद्धामयोऽयं पुरुषो यो यच्छ्रद्धः स एव सः ।। (XVII.2-3)

Here the Lord clarifies that *śraddhā* or faith, is not only three-fold but is the result of *jīva-svabhāva*. The souls are hence three-fold: *sāttvika* (superior) *rājasika* (mediocre) and *tāmasika* (inferior).

(The interested persons are requested to go through chapters XVI and XVII of the *Gītā* to know more details regarding this three-fold classification of souls)

Hence, Madhvācārya's three-fold classification has the approval of Lord Kṛṣṇa. This is a universal truth which was highlighted by Madhvācārya. All the commentators of the *Gītā* have accepted this truth. But it is interesting to note that in secular literature also this truth has been accepted.

1. Bharata : उत्तमाधममध्यानां नराणां कर्मसंश्रयम् ।
हितोपदेशजननं धृतिक्रीडासुखादिकृत् ।।
(नाट्यशास्त्र, अध्याय II)

2. Kālidāsa : i) नाट्यं भिन्नरुचेर्जनस्य बहुधाप्येकं समाराधनम् ।।
(मालविकाग्निमित्र I.4)
ii) श्लिष्टा क्रिया कस्यचिदात्मसंस्था संक्रान्तिरन्यस्य विशेषयुक्ता ।
यस्योभयं साधु स शिक्षकाणां धुरि प्रतिष्ठापयितव्य एव ।।
(*Ibid.* I.16)
iii) भिन्नरुचिर्हि लोकः । (रघुवंश, VI.30)

3. Bhavabhūti :

वितरति गुरुः प्राज्ञे विद्यां यथैव तथा जडे
न खलु तयोर्ज्ञाने शक्तिं करोत्यपहन्ति वा ।
भवति च तयोर्भूयान्भेदः फलं प्रति तद्यथा
प्रभवति शुचिर्बिम्बग्राहे मणिर्न मृदां चयः ।।
(उत्तररामचरित, II.4)

4. Bhartṛhari :

i) अज्ञः सुखमाराध्यः सुखतरमाराध्यते विशेषज्ञः ।
ज्ञानलवदुर्विदग्धं ब्रह्मापि नरं न रञ्जयति ।।

ii) एते सत्पुरुषाः परार्थघटकाः स्वार्थान् परित्यज्य ये
सामान्यास्तु परार्थमुद्यमभृतः स्वार्थाविरोधेन ये ।
तेऽमी मानवराक्षसाः परहितं स्वार्थाय निघ्नन्ति ये
ये तु घ्नन्ति निरर्थकं परहितं ते के न जानीमहे ।।(नीतिशतक)

5) Rājaśekhara :

कवीनां तारतम्यतश्चैष प्रायो वादः -
एकस्य तिष्ठति कवेर्गृह एव काव्य -
मन्यस्य गच्छति सुहृद्भवनानि यावत् ।
न्यस्याविदग्धवदनेषु पदानि शश्वत्
कस्यापि सञ्चरति विश्वकुतूहलीव ।। (काव्यमीमांसा,अध्याय ४)

6) Kauṭilya:

बुद्धिमानाहार्यबुद्धिर्दुबुद्धिरिति पुत्रविशेषाः ।
शिष्यमाणो धर्मार्थावुपलभते चानुतिष्ठति च बुद्धिमान् ।
उपलभमानो नानुतिष्ठत्याहार्यबुद्धिः ।
अपायनित्यो धर्मार्थद्वेषी चेति दुर्बुद्धिः ।। (अर्थशास्त्र, I.xvii)

7) Vāmana :

अरोचकिनः सतृणाभ्यवहारिणश्च कवयः ।। -1
पूर्वे शिष्याः विवेकित्वात् ।। -2

पूर्वेखल्वरोचकिनः शिष्याः शासनीयाः । विवेकित्वात् विवेचनशीलत्वात् । नेतरे तद्विपर्ययात् । -3

इतरे सतृणाभ्यवहारिणो न शिष्याः। तद्विपर्ययात् ।। अविवेचनशीलत्वात् । न शीलमपाकर्तुं शक्यम् ।। न शास्त्रमद्रव्येष्वर्थवत्।। -4 न खलु शास्त्रमद्रव्येष्वविवेकिष्वर्थवत् ।। न कतकं पङ्कप्रसादनाय ।।-5 न हि कतकं पयस इव पङ्कप्रसादनाय भवति ।।-6 (काव्यालङ्कारसूत्रवृत्ति I.ii)

At the end one many raise some pertinent questions: "What about Madhvācārya 's *tamoyogya* souls? Are such souls existing in the present times? Is it possible to identify them even to-day? What is the criterion to identify them? What makes them so condemned? Is it not possible to improve and elevate them? What prevents their improvement?" The questions are quite relevant and should be replied satisfactorily.

Here one must note that improvement of a soul is a joint venture of both the improver and the improvable. Both should co-operate. The helper should bend and invest his might to uplift the fallen. On the other hand, the fallen should show his willingness to rise up and respond favourably by devoting his own energies towards the attempted upliftment. If he does not respond favourably he cannot be extricated from the mire into which he has plunged and become stuck. It is well-said by S. Radhakrishnan "The supreme Lord confirms the faith of each and grants the rewards each seeks. Exactly as far as the soul has risen in its struggle does God stoop to meet it. ... He accepts our prayers and answers them at the level at which we approach Him"[34]

And there are some souls who refuse to co-operate. They refuse any kind of improvement and upliftment. Lord

34. *The Bhagavadgītā*, Backie and Son (India) Ltd, New Delhi, 1976, pp.221-2.

Kṛṣṇa has noted such souls :

> सदृशं चेष्टते स्वस्याः प्रकृतेर्ज्ञानवानपि ।
> प्रकृतिं यान्ति भूतानि निग्रहः किं करिष्यति ।। (गीता, III-33)

Lord Kṛṣṇa states that the souls do not give up their inherent nature inspite of their being given the knowledge of the right and benevolent path to be trodden by them to improve and elevate themselves from the mire of their misery. Even to-day we come across such people who do not heed to any advice, inspite of being convinced that it leads them to pleasure and prosperity. They will refuse to improve themselves. Ultimately they themselves force us to write them off as 'incorrigible' and 'irreparable' and as fit to be condemned. At this juncture one is reminded of Plato's statement: "Those who appear to be incurable from the enormity of their sins are hurled down to Tartarus whence they never come forth again"[35] This variety of human beings who willingly want to be left to themselves to suffer their own destined fate are not difficult to come across even in the present days. However humane and kindhearted we may be, they will force us to leave them off as incorrigible. This nature of the condemned souls has been pointed out by Madhvācārya in his own precise manner through the statement :

> असुराणां तमः प्राप्तिस्तदा नियमतो भवेत् ।
> यदा तु ज्ञानिसद्भावे नैव गृह्णन्ति तत्परम् ।।[36]

Here Madhvācārya points out that demoniac souls who are fit for only hell, do not understand the true nature of God

35. Quoted by Prof. B.Venkatesachar in his *English Translation of Tattavasaṅkhyāna*, Bangalore,1964 p.24,fn.
36. *MTN*, I.91.

inspite of being preached by the learned. And as God stands for all that is GOOD, we can understand the word *paraṁ* to mean Good in all its dimensions. So those who do not listen to and act upon the words conveying their good can be identified as the condemned souls fit for only unfathomable hellish misery. And Duryodhana stands as their model who pours out his inmost resolve :

> जानामि धर्मं न च मे प्रवृत्तिः जानाम्यधर्मं न च मे निवृत्तिः ।
> केनापि देवेन हृदि स्थितेन यथा प्रवृत्तोऽस्मि तथा करोमि ।।[37]

He means to declare that he cannot act, even though he knows, in the right manner, against the dictates of his inner nature. This tendency of ignoring the benevolent advice and acting, as per inner spirit's dictation, in a harmful manner is witnessed even to-day. There are so many Duryodhanas to-day and Duryodhana was considered to be the personification of Kali.[38] As against him we have Arjuna who acts as per the advice of Lord Kṛṣṇa confessing:

> नष्टो मोहः स्मृतिर्लब्धा त्वत्प्रसादान्मयाच्युत ।
> स्थितोऽस्मि गतसन्देहः करिष्ये वचनं तव ।।[39]

This is the nature of a superior soul. He heeds to the right and benevolent advice. He corrects himself. He changes his life and brings it on the right track and in the end reaches the goal with peace and prosperity.

37. *Pāṇḍavagītā*, Q. *Pañcadaśī* VI. 176.

38. Read: i) कलेरंशस्तु संजज्ञे भुवि दुर्योधनो नृप ।
जगतो यस्तु सर्वस्य विद्विष्टः कलिपूरुषः ।।
महाभारत, आदिपर्व, 68,67
ii) स एष ते सुतो राजन् लोकसंहारकारणात् ।
कलेरंशः समुत्पन्नो गान्धार्यां जठरे नृप ।। महाभारत, स्त्रीपर्व, 29.34

39. *Gītā*, XVIII. 73.

Hence even to-day it is not difficult to identify Arjunas and Duryodhanas. Those who correct themselves and do the good are Arjunas, the best souls fit for divine bliss. And those who refuse to correct themselves and persist in harmful and evil deeds are Duryodhanas, the worst souls fit for hellish misery.

One can note that Duryodhanas have been found by Kautilya and Bhartṛhari :

1. Kauṭilya:

i) त्यक्तं गूढपुरुषाः शस्त्ररसाभ्यां हन्युः । (अर्थशास्त्र, I. 18)
(कथञ्चिदपि विधेयतानासादनात् पित्रा परित्यक्तं राजपुत्रं
आयुधविषप्रयोगाभ्यां गूढपुरुषा हन्युः । -गणपतिविरचितव्याख्या)

ii) उपस्थितं च राज्येन मदूर्ध्वमिति सान्त्वयेत् ।
एकस्थमथ संरुन्ध्यात् पुत्रवान् वा प्रवासयेत् ।।(I.18) (....पुत्रवान् वा प्रवासयेत् वहुपुत्रसद्भावपक्षे अधार्मिकं पुत्रं हन्यादित्यर्थः। *Ibid*)

2. Bhartṛhari :

लभेत सिकतासु तैलमपि यत्नतः पीडय-
न्पिबेच्च मृगतृष्णिकासु सलिलं पिपासार्दितः ।
कदाचिदपि पर्यटञ्छशविषाणमासादये
न्न तु प्रतिनिविष्टमूर्खजनचित्तमाराधयेत् ।। (नीतिशतक)

In fine, one can note that Madhvācārya's subtle and broad classifications of souls is a discovery and not an invention. He is an objective thinker and believer of the maxim स्थितस्य गतिश्चिन्तनीया। The rationale behind the two classifications is just to lay bare the true principle governing the existence of souls in the universe. Among Indian philosophers it is Madhvācārya who has laid bare this fundamental truth and built his grand edifice of Dvaita Vedānta. It is a significant contribution of Madhvācārya to Indian Thought as a whole.

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CHAPTER V

MADHVĀCĀRYA'S THEORY OF ERROR

One of the important problems of Epistemology is the problem of error, which looms large in Indian philosophy. Error and illusion are not at all inconsistent with realism in philosophy. Madhvācārya as a pragmatic realist recognises that there is room in our experience, for illusions. But that does not mean that all experience is illusion, or can be dismissed as such. He is for taking a realistic view of knowledge. His introduction of the idea of *nirdoṣatva*[1] as a necessary adjunct, in the definition of the different *pramāṇas* clearly shows that error and illusion are in some way attributable to the presence of *doṣas* or faults. As Madhvācārya conceives souls as finite beings endowed with varying degrees and intensity and luminosity of knowledge as against Brahman possessing unlimited knowledge, it follows that there is room for error and illusions arising in the experience of the finite beings. Error is thus not incompatible with experience in a Realistic school of philosophy such as that of Madhvācārya.

Whatever the ultimate consistency or inconsistency of illusions as such in particular types of metaphysical thinking, practically all schools of Indian Thought, have accepted the existence of illusions and have proceeded to define the nature and status of illusory experience. Five main theories[2] of error

1. निर्दोषार्थेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षः प्रत्यक्षम् । निर्दोषोपपत्तिरनुमानम् । निर्दोषः शब्दः आगमः।
- -प्रमाणलक्षण

2. आत्मख्यातिरसत्ख्यातिरख्यातिः ख्यातिरन्यथा ।
तथानिर्वचनीयख्यातिरित्येतत्ख्यातिपञ्चकम् ।।

are familiar to students of Indian Thought: viz, (i) the theory of self-apprehension of Yogācāra or Idealistic school of Buddhism; (ii) the theory of non-being's apprehension of Mādhyamika or Nihilistic school of Buddhism; (iii) the theory of non-apprehension of Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas; (iv) the theory of other being's apprehension of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas; and (v) the theory of apprehension of the indefinable of Advaita school of Vedānta. This list has to be expanded to include Rāmānuja's theory of error called "*Akhyāti-saṁvalita-sat-khyāti*" or "Non-apprehension-cum-apprehension of reality", and Madhvācārya's own novel and corrected version of *Anyathā-khyāti* known as "*Abhinava-anyathā-khyāti.*"

To explain: The Idealistic school of Buddhism, recognises the reality of only *vijñāna* or consciousness. The term 'Ātman' in '*Ātma-khyāti*' stands for 'self' which is identical with consciousness and the school explains the phenomenon of error contending that this consciousness externalises itself in the form of objects like silver in the erroneous cognition of shell-silver. The Nihilists who do not recognise the reality of any entity in this universe (or outside) assert that in illusions cognition is of an absolutely non-being. Consequently, in the shell-silver-cognition, the silver which is apprehended, is an utter non-being according to them. To the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṁsakas, all cases of illusion are cases of non-apprehension of distinction between two distinct cognitions -either a perception and a recollection or two perceptions- for the time being (ज्ञानयोः विषययोः च विवेक-अग्रहाद् भ्रमः)[3] In the case of shell-silver there is one perception i.e., of the shell and a recollection i.e., of silver seen elsewhere.

3. दुष्टा हि हेतवः कार्यं संपूर्णं कर्तुमक्षमाः ।
तेन भेदग्रहो युक्तः शुक्तिकारजतादिषु ।।
- Śālikanātha, प्रकरणपञ्चिका

What happens is: one cognises the shell in the general way as 'this' (*idaṁ*) and not as possessing its distinctive features. One also recollects for the moment, the 'silverness' seen elsewhere, but does not think it to be a re-collection. That is, one cognises it as merely silver, stripped of its association with past time, and the particular place where it was seen (प्रमुष्टतत्ताकस्मरण). Then he identifies 'this' of the shell with 'silver' and the illusion arises. Here the distinction between a perception and a recollection is not apprehended for the time being. In the case of a conch seen as yellow, there arise two imperfect perceptions, one of conch devoid of its white colour and another being the visual perception of the yellow colour due to the proportional increase of bile (*pitta*) in the hody, the relation between bile and yellow colour being missed. And thus there arises the erroneous cognition of conch as yellow.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas explain the phenomenon of error or illusion as confounding one reality with another. There is real shell and in its place we cognise a new piece of silver seen elsewhere. This is due to extra-normal sense-relation (अलौकिक-इन्द्रिय-सन्निकर्ष) through *jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti* which brings the absent real silver within the range of the sense-organ cognising the shell. Or, it may be due to *sannikarsa* or being in close vicinity, as a crystal is seen red because of the china-rose lying beside it. And both of them are equally real. The Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṁsakas adhere to this theory of error with the only modification that the element of relation (*saṁsarga*) between the two is a non-existent (*asat*). So their theory is known as *Viparīta-khyāti* or contrary experience.

The Advaitins point out the weaknesses of all these theories. For a Nihilist, there is no reality and the non-existent (*asat*) is an absolute zero and cannot be presented in any experience on the strength of experience itself. Moreover, it

can also be pointed out that as they do not recognise any real entity, for them both the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and the superimposed object (*āropya*) are equally unreal and so there cannot be any distinction between the two which would give rise to *bhrama* or illusion. The Idealistic Buddhists do not recognise any real external objects and thus there could not be any support for the consciousness to externalise. Only because there are distinct objects externally, the consciousness takes distinct forms. In the absence of external objects there cannot arise any possibility of consciousness itself externalising in the form of objects.[4]

In the case of the *Ākhyāti-vāda* of the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas, the theory is inadequate to explain satisfactorily the *pravṛtti* or volitional activity that follows the apprehension of silver. Moreover, the theory fails to explain why there should be non-discrimination when the two 'this' and 'silver' are distinct cognitins.

The defect in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory is obvious. One reality cannot present itself as another nor can it exist in the form of another reality (*tādātmya*). It seems that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas as Realists do not tolerate attributing unreality to any entity. But this is too much stressing of the connotation of the term 'reality'. Genuine realism should go by the evidence of *pramāṇas*, in ascertaining the status of appearance and reality.

In endeavouring to avoid these difficulties and to explain illusions in their own way, the Advaitins propound their theory of *Anirvacanīya-khyāti* i.e. "experience of a relatively real object which is neither absolute being (*sat*) nor

4. अर्थोपलब्धिनिमित्ता हि प्रत्यर्थं नानारूपा वासना भवन्ति ।अनुपलभ्यमानेषु त्वर्थेषु किन्निमित्ता विचित्रा वासना भवेयुः ।। -ब्रह्मसूत्रशाङ्करभाष्य II.ii.30

absolute non-being (*asat*) nor both." The Advaitins base their theory on the belief that the existent never becomes an object of sublation (सत् चेत् न बाध्येत), and the non-existent, of cognition (असत् चेत् न प्रतीयेत) and thus conclude that the shell-silver is neither existent because it is sublated afterwards nor non-existent as it is actually cognised (*Sadasadvilakṣaṇa*). Besides, an object cannot be both existent and non-existent at the same time and so the sheli-silver is beyond any description (*nirvacana*) i.e. it is *anirvacanīya* or indescribable. Through this, the Advaitin wants to attribute *anirvacanīyatva* to the world of experience also, which contradicts the position of Realists as regards the world. And because of this motive behind this theory of *Anirvacanīyakyāti*, it is incumbent upon Madhvācārya the Realist *par excellence* to show the inherent defects in it.

Madhvācārya who is firm in asserting the reality of the world subjects this *anirvacanīyakhyāti* for logical and indepth examination. He declares :

सदसद्वैलक्षण्ये प्रमाणाभावात् ।[5]

That is, there is no *pramāṇa* to prove that there can exist an object which is neither *sat* nor *asat*. But the Advaitins put forward *arthāpatti-pramāṇa* or presumptive testimony to prove their *sadasadvailakṣaṇya*. Even though Madhvācārya does not consider *arthāpatti* as an independent *pramāṇa*, he accepts it for argument's sake and shows the inherent fallacies in this particular reasoning of the Advaitins. Their *arthāpatti* runs as follows:

असतः ख्यात्ययोगात् अस्य च ख्यायमानत्वात् न असत् ।
सतः बाधायोगात् अस्य च बाध्यमानत्वात् न सत् ।
अतः ख्यातिबाधान्यथानुपपत्त्या शुक्तिरजतादिकं सदसद्विलक्षणम् ।

5. *VTN. Op.cit*, p.14

(The *asat* or non-existent is not cognised; but it (shell-silver) is cognised; hence it is not *asat*. The *sat* or existent is not sublated; but it is sublated; hence it is not *sat*. As the cognition and sublation cannot be possible otherwise, the shell-silver should be treated to be neither *sat* nor *asat*)

Madhvācārya asks a basic question:

असतः ख्यात्ययोगादिति वदतः ख्यातिरभून्न वा । यदि नाभूत् न तत्ख्यातिनिराकरणम् । यद्यभूत्तथापि । न चासतो वैलक्षण्यं तत्प्रतीतिं विना ज्ञायते ।[6]

It means : "You (the Advaitin) have made the statement: "The *asat* cannot be cognised." In this statement '*asat*' is the subject of predication 'cannot be cognised'. Now when any entity thus becomes a subject of some predication in a statement, to become such a subject it should first be cognised by the person making the particular statement. Unless and until he knows the subject, he cannot make any predication regarding it. Here in your statement the *asat* is the subject. Did you cognise it (*asat*) or not? If you have not cognised it, how can you make it the subject of any predication? On the other hand, if you did cognise it (*asat*) how can you make the statement "The *asat* cannot be cognised"? Verily, the fact that an object is distinct from the *asat* can be known only after cognising the *asat*.

Madhvācārya asserts :असतः प्रतीतिं विनाऽसद्वैलक्षण्यज्ञानानुपपत्तेः ।[7]

That is, until one knows what is '*asat*' there cannot be the knowledge of the distinction of an entity from *asat*.

6. *Ibid.*, p.14
7. *Tattvodyota*, Ed. P.P. Lakshmīnarayaṇa Upadhyaya, Sriman Madhwaraddhanta Samvardhaka Sabha, Bangalore, 1971, p.319

Further, Madhvācārya points out that there cannot be any object which is neither *sat* or *asat* : न च सदसद्वैलक्षण्यं नामास्तीत्यत्र किंचिन्मानम् । अनुभवविरोधश्च तत्पक्षे । सदसतोर्द्वयोरेव सर्वैरनुभूयमानत्वात् ।[8]

It can be explained : The whole point is : Through his conception of *sadasadvilakṣaṇatva* or *anirvacanīyatva*, the Advaitin posits two contradictory terms in one and the same object. Any object cannot be both *sat* and *asat* nor distinct from both *sat* and *asat* at the same time, because such a case comes in the purview of the Law of Excluded Middle. There can be the absence of two contrary essences in one and the same object, but there cannot be the absence of two contradictories which together are exhaustive. We have the example of air wherein we see the absence of both form and colour, but we do not come across any object which is neither colourful nor colourless. Because, an object which is not colourful should be colourless and that which is not colourless should be colourful. No third alternative is possible. So too is the case with *sat* and *asat* which together exhaust all entities leaving no scope for a third alternative. These defects in the theory of *Anirvacanīya-khyāti* of Advaitins disprove the very basis on which he concludes that this world of experiences is *anirvacanīya* and hence illusory and unreal.

The other school of Realists within the Vedāntic fold viz. the Viśiṣṭādvaita school adopts the Prābhākara theory of *Akhyāti* with certain modifications. It holds like the *Nyāya-Vaiśesikas* that the object of *bhrama* is always real and there is strictly speaking no invalid cognition at all. Rāmānuja assumes that the substances which are similar, embody some parts in common. The shell embodies some parts of silver and the silver, of the shell. But the shell is called by that name

8. *VTN*, p.14.

because in it the shell-parts are more and silver takes its name because of the predominance of silver-parts. The cognition of silver in the shell arises when one beholds only the silver-parts in the shell.[9] Thus, according to Rāmānuja, we are really blundering into a subtle truth in error. When *alpāṁśas* are cognised as *bahvaṁśas* we have *akhyāti* or non-apprehension; but it is not totally *akhyāti* because the silver seen in the shell is present in it though in a small measure and when looked at from this point of view, it is *sat-khyāti* or correct apprehension. Thus the theory is known as *"Akhyāti-saṁvalita-satkhyāti."* But this cannot be a satisfactory answer to the phenomenon of illusion because even on this theory there is *asat-khyāti* in as much as the non-existent *bahvaṁśa* is cognised in the place of *alpāṁśa*. Rāmānuja's attempt at dividing an object into component parts and assuming some parts of some other substance present in the given substance, though ingenious, does not account for the illusion satisfactorily without falling back upon the theological dogmas like *trivṛtkaraṇa* for support.

Madhvācārya judges the theory of error primarily in the light of the sublating cognition (*bādhaka*-jñāna). Nobody can question the validity of this sublating cognition. When one mistakes shell for silver, the *bādhaka-jñāna* takes the form "Non-existent silver was seen" (*Asadeva rajataṁ pratyabhāt*). "There is no silver here, neither it was, nor will it be"

9. शुक्त्यादौ रजतादेश्च भावः श्रुत्यैव बोधितः ।
रूप्यशुक्त्यादिनिर्देशभेदो भूयस्त्वहेतुकः ।।
रूप्यादिसदृशश्चायं शुक्त्यादिरुपलभ्यते ।
अतस्तस्यात्र सद्‌भावप्रतीतेरपि निश्चितः ।।
कदाचिच्चक्षुरादेस्तु दोषाच्छुक्त्यंशवर्जितः ।
रजतांशो गृहीतोऽतो रजतार्थी प्रवर्तते ।।
- Rāmānuja, *Śrībhāṣya*, I.i.1.

(*Nāsti atra rajatam, na āsīt na bhaviṣyati*). In other words, it says that the shell was seen as something that was not there. It was *anyathā-jñāna*. Madhvācārya differs from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas who are intolerant of unreality and attribute reality even to the silver seen in the shell. His definition of *pramāṇa* as *yathārtha* shows that his valid knowledge consists in cognising objects as they are. Its natural corollary is that real objects should be cognised as real, and unreals as unreal. Realism would be untrue to its connotation if it should endow unreals also with reality as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas have done. True realism consists in recognising reals as real, and unreals as unreal.

Hence Madhvācārya explains the phenomenon of error as the perception of something else which is absolutely non-existent, as existent in a given substance. Other theories discussed above do not attach sufficient importance to the *bādhaka-jñāna* which is the strongest proof of the erroneous cognition itself. Madhvācārya alone gives it its due and formulates his theory of error on the basis of this valid knowledge. A question may arise here. The silver seen in the shell is '*asat*'; so also is a hare's horn. When both these and others of the kind such as round-squares are all *asat*, why should only silver be seen in the shell and not any other *asat?* The question has been anticipated by Madhvācārya who has laid down the conditions that govern the phenomenon of illusion.[10] Illusions depend upon a number of real factors like the sense-organ being influenced by the impressions left by a similar substance (silver and not hare's horn is similar to shell)

10. न हि सत्यशुक्तेः सत्यरजतस्य तयोः सादृश्यस्य चाभावे भ्रान्तिरस्ति । ...
अधिष्ठानं च सदृशं सत्यवस्तुद्वयं विना । न भ्रान्तिर्भवति क्वापि स्वप्नमायादिकेष्वपि ।।
-*VTN*, p.31-32

seen in a different context, and the object itself distorted by insufficient light or placed at an inappropriate distance or in an environment which is favourable to erroneous knowledge. These factors should not be ignored when accounting for an illusion. As R.N. Sarma puts it, "A little careful analysis will convince anyone that previous experience and the stock of imagery play a prominent part in the shaping and the determination of illusions."[11]

It is well said: "Among the Vedāntins, those of the dualistic school (*dvaitinah*) maintain what they call their own version of *anyathākhyāti* and contend that, in cases of erroneous experience like *śuktirajatabhrama*, the silver which is presented in *bhrama* is non-being out-and-out (*atyantāsat*) within the sphere of nacre, though it is real elsewhere; and the chief argument in support of this view is that the sublating cognition (*bādhakapratīti*), which arises later takes the form - "There was no silver at all here in the past, it is not here now; and it will never be here in the future" (*nātra rajataṁ āsīt, asti, bhaviṣyati*) and it totally denies the existence of silver within the sphere of nacre in the past, the present and the future."[12]

Here a clear distinction between the *Asatkhyāti* of the Nihilists and the *Abhinava-anyathākhyāti* of Madhvācārya should be noted. It is often missed by some thinkers, as can be seen by this observation of R.N. Sarma: "It is not at all clear why Madhva should be at such considerable pains as to explain that a totally non-existent silver, not the silver sensed

11. *Reign of Realism in Indian Philosohy*, National Press, Madras, 1937, p.626.
12. Mm. S.Kuppuswami Sastri, *A Primer of Indian Logic*, The Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, Madras, 1961, Part III.,p.126.

or experienced before in a previous situation or set of surroundings, enters into illusional situations. In maintaining a doctrine like that Madhva comes perilously and terribly near the Nihilism of Buddhists."[13]

In this connection one must note that Madhvācārya as shown above depends upon the *bādhakajñāna* or the sublating cognition which clearly states *'asadeva rajataṁpratyabhāt'* or 'totally non-existent silver appeared.[14] It does not say that "the silver sensed or experienced before in a previous situation or set of surroundings appeared" (*anyatra dṛṣṭaṁ rajataṁ pratyabhāt*). When one accepts the *bādhakajñāna* as valid and true to fact, one cannot conclude anything going against its verdict. Madhvācārya is fully and perfectly an objective thinker and as such he accepts the validity of the *bādhakajñāna* both in letter and spirit.

Now regarding the fear expressed by R.N. Sarma about Madhvācārya coming 'perilously and terribly near the Nihilism of Buddhists' none need be afraid if both the *Khyātivādas* are properly understood. The main and fundamental difference between Madhvācārya and the Nihilists is that the former holds *adhiṣṭhāna* or the substratum to be a real object whereas the latter deny reality even to the substratum. Moreover the Nihilists do not admit reality to any object; whereas Madhvācārya admits reality to objects elsewhere in the world. Thirdly, according to Madhvācārya, illusions are governed by

13. *Op.cit.*, p.625.
14. असदेव रजतं पत्यभात् इत्यनुभवात् । न च प्रतीतत्वादसत्त्वाभावः । असतः सत्त्वप्रतीतिः सतः असत्त्वप्रतीतिरिति अन्यथाप्रतीतेरेव भ्रान्तित्वात् ।
VTN, p.14

real *sādṛsya* or resemblance whereas this is not acceptable to the Nihilists for whom there is nothing real in this world.

Madhvācārya is very emphatic about *sādṛsya* between two *real* objects giving rise to illusions. As noted above (fn.10) he observes:

अधिष्ठानं च सदृशं **सत्यवस्तुद्वयं** विना ।
न भ्रान्तिर्भवति **क्वापि** स्वप्नमायादिकेष्वपि ।।

It must always be remembered that Madhvācārya is an objective thinker and a profound philosopher. As such he uses exact and significant terminology to express facts of experience cognised by one and all. This is one such statement. Here he states that there can be no illusion *anywhere without two real* objects, one serving as the substratum and the other bearing similarity to it. Here the terms सत्य and क्वापि are very significant. To cause illusions resemblance between two *real* objects is quite necessary. None can predicate anything, as shown above, about unreal or non-existent objects; and hence the Nihilists cannot speak of any mode of illusion. There can also be no similarity between one सत्य or सत् object and another असत्य or असत् object and hence Advaitins who believe in only one सत् object (i.e. Brahman) cannot speak of any illusion.

Therefore, every case of illusion is governed by three factors: (i) existence of one *real* object serving as substratum or subject of superimposition; (ii) existence of another *real* object serving as the superimposed object; (iii) existence of *real* resemblance between the two. This can be elaborated following Madhvācārya.

Let us analyse any case of an illusion. For example, what do we see in the familiar case of serpent seen in the rope.

Here an analysis will show that when one sees the rope, one mistakes it to be a serpent because of the rope's *sādṛsya* or resemblance with a serpent. So it means that the perceiver had previously perceived a serpent elsewhere and when he came across the rope he remembered the serpent perceived previously due to resemblance between the two and there was dim light which obstructed his sight in perceiving the rope as the rope. In other words, the serpent seen elsewhere was real and the rope lying in front was also real. Hence Madhvācārya pinpoints that without two similar and real objects (*satya-vastudvaya*), there cannot arise any phenomenon of illusion. Only because of this condition of similarity, rope is mistaken as a serpent and not as an elephant or as a man; because there is no resemblance between a rope and a man.

Thus, one can observe that illusions depend upon a number of *real* factors, like the sense-organ being influenced by the impressions left by a *similar real* object perceived in a different place and at a different time, and the *real* object lying in front itself distorted by insufficient light (e.g. rope-serpent illusion), or placed at an inappropriate distance or in an environment which is favourable to illusory cognition (e.g. shell-silver illusion).

Hence Madhvācārya is right in declaring the verdict *"An illusion is possible only in the event of resemblance between two similar and real objects."*

Thus anybody can see that there is no fear of Madhvācārya coming "perilously and terribly near the Nihilism of Buddhists."

Of course it does not mean that there is no negative element in Madhvācārya's theory of illusory experience. It has been already admitted at the beginning of this chapter

itself that, "Madhvācārya as a pragmatic realist recognises that there is room in our experience, for illusion." And illusion necessarily means cognising an object as it is *not*. Thus whatever may be the *khyātivāda* or the theory of error and illusion, it does involve a negative element. And as observed by S.S.Kuppuswami Sastri, all *khyātivādas* do contain one or the other element of negation: "An intelligent attempt to review synthetically all the theories of *bhrama* known to Indian philosophy will bring to light the fact that in some manner or other, a negative element is involved in every one of the five *Khyāti-vādas*. In the *Asat-khyāti* doctrine, the negative element is obvious; and in the *Ātma-khyāti* doctrine, it is obvious in so far as objective externality is concerned. In the *Anyathā-khyāti* view the negative element is to be found in the *saṁsarga* part or in the idea that one reality is presented as another reality which it is not or that a real substantive is presented as having a real attribute which it has not; and in the *Akhyāti* doctrine one can easily detect the negative elements in the idea of non-discrimination (*aviveka*). The *Anirvacanīya-khyāti* doctrine appears on the surface to eschew the negative element from the conception of *bhrama*; but, in fact, the negative element is replaced by relativity, which implies a negative element, and transfers the negative element from the side of object to the side of definite predications (*nirvacana*) with reference to the object."[15]

This negative element cannot be avoided as inherently the illusion is an error which consists in cognising something which is not present. Madhvācārya has therefore tried to re-examine the whole question of illusion on the basis of the only sound criterion which can test an illusion, viz, the *bādhaka-jñāna*. His approach to the problem is purely

15. Introduction to his Edn. of Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi*, Madras Govt. Oriental Manuscripts Library, No.4, Madras, 1937, p.lxxi

objective without any mental reservations or prejudice against the *asat*. He accepts the phenomenon as it is experienced and points out clearly where the negative element lies without giving any scope for *Asatkhyāti*. The clear acceptance of this negative element without running away from it shows his philosophical open-mindedness and his readiness to accept whatever the *pramāṇas* establish, be it about valid experience or about illusion. This is an important contribution of Madhvācārya to Indian Thought which highlights his objectivity in philosophysical thinking.

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CHAPTER VI

THE PROBLEM OF THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE BRAHMASŪTRAS-MADHVĀCĀRYA'S CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS ITS SOLUTION

Attempts have been made by scholars like Dr. S.K. Belvalkar to allege not only a multiple authorship[1] of the extant text of the *Brahmasūtras* but also the multiplicity[2] of texts having the title *'Brahmasūtras'*, even though Indian tradition holds strongly that Bādarāyaṇa, the same as Vyāsa, is the sole author of the extant *Brahmasūtras* and there was only one composition under the title '*Brahmasūtras*'. Dr. Belvalkar observes : "The extant *Brahmasūtra* refers to the views of at least six predecessors-namely, Ātreya, Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi, Kāśakṛtsna, Kārṣṇājini and Bādari, besides the several allusions to Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa, the reputed authors of the Pūrva-and the Uttara-Mīmānsā Sūtras-and of these we know from repeated references in Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya that Kāśakṛtsna wrote some treatise on Mīmānsā which must have covered the whole field of our extant Pūrva-and Uttara-Mīmānsā Sūtras . And the same is probably true of Āśmarathya and Auḍulomi, and Bādari, judging from the contexts in which these names are referred to in both the Pūrvamīmānsā and the Vedānta-sūtras. This leads one to expect that there were 'Brahmasūtras' earlier than the extant Brahmasūtra which is commonly attributed to the authorship of Bādarāyaṇa."[3]

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1. See: S.K. Belvalkar, 'The Multiple Authorship of the Vedāntasūtras', *Indian Philosophical Review*, Vol.II (1918-19), Pp. 141-154.
2. S.K. Belvalkar, *Shree Gopal Basu Mallik Lectures on Vedānta Philosophy*, Bilvakujña Publishing House, Poona, 1929, Lecture IV, pp. 135-150.
3. *Ibid.*, P.140.

Dr. Belvalkar thus places Bādarāyaṇa on an equal footing with other sages mentioned by name in the extant *Brahmasūtras*. He must have been led to hold such an opinion mainly because of Śaṅkara's interpretation of the *Brahmasūtras*. Śaṅkara, the first available commentator of the *Brahmasūtras* does not state at the beginning anything regarding the author or the authorship of the *Brahmasūtras*. He deals, in the introductory passage, with the concept of *adhyāsa* and at the end of this '*Adhyāsabhāṣya*' remarks-
एवमयमनादिरनन्तो नैसर्गिकोऽध्यासो मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूपः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वप्रवर्तकः सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः । अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय, आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते । यथा चायमर्थः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानां तथा वयमस्यां शारीरकमीमांसायां प्रदर्शयिष्यामः ।।

["It is in this manner that there is this beginningless and endless natural process of superimposition which is of the nature of erroneous conception and which promotes the notion of the self as being an agent and experiencer, which is perceived by all. It is with a view to destory this cause of all evil, and for acquiring the knowledge of the unity of the self, that all Vedānta is begun. How this is the meaning of all Vedānta (texts) we will endeavour to show in this present Shārīraka-Mīmānsā"-Translation by V.M. Apte[4]]

There is only one place in the whole of his *bhāṣya* where Śaṅkara clearly mentions the name of Bādarāyaṇa as the author of the *Brahmasūtras*, and that is, while introducing the last *sūtra* (IV. iv 22).[5] Otherwise, because Śaṅkara holds the views of Bādarāyaṇa wherever his name occurs in the

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4. *Brahma-Sutra Shaṅkara-Bhashya* (English Translation), Popular Book Depot Bombay, 1960, P.4.
5. ......अतः उत्तरं भगवान्बादरायण आचार्यः पठति ।

sūtras to be the *siddhānta-view*, one must conclude that Śaṅkara holds Bādarāyaṇa to be the author of the *Brahmasūtras*.

And wherever the names of Bādarāyaṇa, Jaimini, Ātreya and others occur in the *Brahmasūtras*, Śaṅkara refers to all of them equally with the honorific epithet '*Ācārya*'. This makes any reader of the *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* to infer that all these *ācāryas* are equal in eminence. It is also a fact that Śaṅkara interprets *sūtras* II.ii.42-45 as a refutation of the *Pāñcarātra* system, the founder of which is believed to be Lord Nārāyaṇa Himself.[6] It is also generally believed that the

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6. पञ्चरात्रस्य कृत्स्नस्य वक्ता नारायणः स्वयम् ।
ज्ञानेष्वेतेषु राजेन्द्र सर्वेष्वेतद्विशिष्यते ।।
पञ्चरात्रविदो मुख्या यथाक्रमपरा नृप ।
एकान्तभावोपगता वासुदेवं विशन्ति हि ।। (महाभारत XII.337-63.67)

It should be noted here that Śaṅkara's interpretation of this *adhikaraṇa* (II.ii.42-45) has not satisfied many a scholar like Thibaut and R.D. Karmarkar. Thibaut remarks-"It, however, appears to me that the explanations of the 'vā' and of the 'tat', implied in Rāmānuja's comment, are more natural than those resulting from Śaṅkara's interpretation. Nor would it be an unusual proceeding to close the polemical pāda with a defence of that doctrine which-inspite of objections-has to be viewed as the true one" [Sacred Books of the East Series No. XXXIV. Introduction, P.52] R.D. Karmarkar observes: "It seems that Śaṅkara, who wanted to discredit the Pāñcarātra system first explained the section as refuting the system. The hurried manner in which he explains this section, the very weak arguments such as that abuse of the Vedas is found in the Pāñcarātra system, that are brought by him against the Bhāgavatas and the many doctrines held by the Bhāgavatas which Śaṅkara is forced to admit as not being taken up for discussion-all this clearly shows that Śaṅkara was not quite at ease →

great sage Vyāsa is an incarnation of Lord Nārāyaṇa and he is the same as Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the *Brahmasūtras*. Thus inherently there should not be a refutation of the *Pāñcarātra*-system in the *Brahmasūtras*. But Śaṅkara's interpretation of the *Brahmasūtras* makes one doubt the identity of Bādarāyaṇa and Vyāsa which is expressed by reputed scholars like Prof. Max Muller and Dr. Belvalkar. Max Muller observes - "Śaṅkara, in the whole of his commentary on the Vedānta-Sūtras, never mentions that the Vyāsa of the epic (Mahābhārata) was the author of the book on which he is commenting, though he mentions Bādarāyaṇa as such. This convinced Windischmann that Śaṅkara himself did not consider these two Vyāsas as one and the same person, and this judgment ought not to have been lightly disturbed." (*The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, 1916, P.113). Dr. Belvalkar remarks: "Śaṅkarāchārya seems to keep Vyāsa distinct from Bādarāyaṇa whom he regards in the opening of his Bhāṣya on the last Vedānta-sūtra, IV. iv.22, as the author of the Vedānta sūtras."[7]

→ in his explanation of this adhikaraṇa" (*Comparison of the Bhāṣyas of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Keśava Kāshmīrin and Vallabha on some crucial Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa*, Poona, 1920, P.62). Even Dr. Belvalkar had to admit-"One expects that Śaṅkarāchārya would pick many more holes into the system (Pāñcarātra) under cover of this last sūtra (II.ii.45) than what he has actually done. His "Veda-vipratishedha" is absolutely untenable." (*The Brahma-sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa with the Comment of Śaṅkarāchārya, Chapter II, Quarters I & II*, II Edition, Bilvakuñja Publishing House, Poona, 1931, Notes, P.206). For a full discussion see Dr. B.N.K. Sharma, *The Brahmasūtras And their Principal Commentaries Vol.II, Bombay, 1974, pp.107 ff.*

7. *Ibid., Notes, P.27.*

The significant contribution of Madhvācārya in this regard is that at the very outset of his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtras*, he specifically mentions that Vyāsa the same as Bādarāyaṇa is the author of the *Brahmasūtras* and he is an incarnation of Lord Nārāyaṇa Himself. Even Rāmānuja is not very clear in this regard at the beginning of his *bhāṣya*.[8] Madhvācārya starts his *bhāṣya* as follows:[9]

द्वापरे सर्वत्र ज्ञान आकुलीभूते तन्निर्णयाय ब्रह्मरुद्रेन्द्राभिरर्थितो भगवान्नारायणो व्यासत्वेनावततार । अथेष्टानिष्टप्राप्तिपरिहारेच्छूनां तद्योगमविजानतां तज्ज्ञापनार्थं वेदमुत्सन्नं व्यंजयश्चंतुर्धा व्यभजत् । चतुर्विंशतिधैकशतधा सहस्रधा द्वादशधा च। तदर्थनिर्णयाय ब्रह्मसूत्राणि चकार । तच्चोक्तं स्कान्दे । 'नारायणाद्विनिष्पन्नं ज्ञानं कृतयुगे स्थितम् । किंचित्तदन्यथाजातं त्रेतायां द्वापरेऽखिलम् ।। गौतमस्य ऋषेः शापाज्ज्ञाने त्वज्ञानतां गते । संकीर्णबुद्धयो देवा ब्रह्मरुद्रपुरस्सराः ।। शरण्यं शरणं जग्मुर्नारायणमनामयम् । तैर्विज्ञापितकार्यस्तु भगवान्पुरुषोत्तमः ।। अवतीर्णो महायोगी सत्यवत्यां पराशरात् । उत्सन्नान्भगवान्वेदानुज्जहार हरिः स्वयम् ।। चतुर्धा व्यभजत्तांश्च चतुर्विंशतिधा पुनः । शतधा चैकधा चैव तथैव च सहस्रधा ।। कृष्णो द्वादशधा चैव पुनस्तस्यार्थवित्तये । चकार ब्रह्मसूत्राणि येषां सूत्रत्वमञ्जसा ।। ...... एवंविधानि सूत्राणि कृत्वा व्यासो महायशाः । ब्रह्मरुद्रादिदेवेषु मनुष्यपितृपक्षिषु । ज्ञानं संस्थाप्य भगवान्क्रीडते पुरुषोत्तमः ।।[10] इत्यादि

8. Rāmānuja's second *Maṅgala-śloka* only states that the Brahmasūtras are पाराशर्यवचःसुधा or 'The nectar of the teaching of Parāśara's son'.
9. *Sarvamūla Granthāḥ*, Vol.I. Akhila Bharata Madhva Mahamandala Publication, Bangalore, 1969, Sūtraprasthāna, Pp. 1-2.
10. These same verses from the Skandapurāṇa have been quoted in the *Śrutaprakāśikā*, the classical commentary on Rāmānuja's *bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtras*. See also:

    प्रादुर्भूतो हरिर्व्यासो विरिञ्चिशिवपूर्वकैः ।
    अर्थितः परविद्याख्यं चक्रे शास्त्रमनुत्तमम् ।।

    - Madhva, *Anuvyākhyāna*,3.

[In the age of Dwāpara, pure knowledge became everywhere disturbed (overlaid with doubt and misapprehension), and Brahmā, Rudra and the other gods having prayed for its correct exposition, the glorious Nārāyaṇa came (into the world) as Vyāsa. To those that desire to attain good and to get rid of evil, but do not perceive the means therefor, (Vyāsa) for the purpose of manifesting the same, He at once restored the Vedas that had been lost (forgotten), divided them into four, and these again into twenty-four, a hundred and one, a thousand, and twelve (branches respectively) and for the sake of the correct understanding of their import, He composed the Brahmasūtras. This is also declared in the Skānda-"The wisdom which had been derived from Nārāyaṇa was in the Krita age perfect as given. In the next age of Tretā, it was changed a little; and in Dwāpara it became wholly altered. Further, owing to the curse of the sage Gautama, (really correct) knowledge came to be looked upon as false knowledge; and Brahmā, Rudra and the other gods became confused in mind (out of compassion for the mortals) and sought refuge under Nārāyaṇa, the faultless, as the fittest to be resorted unto for refuge. Petitioned to by them as to what had to be done, the Almighty Supreme Person of divine glory manifested Himself in the form of a sage born of Parāśara and Satyavatī. Thus He, who is verily the Lord Hari of supreme glory, Himself gave forth the Vedas which had been lost to the world; and divided them into four, and these four again into twenty-four, a hundred and one, a thousand, and twelve, branches (respectively); and, for the proper understanding of their import, He composed the Brahmasūtras or the great aphorisms which possess in full the chief requirements of Sūtras (aphorisms)....... Having produced such aphorisms, the glorious Vyāsa who is the Supreme Person of infinite glory, once more established the

right knowledge in Brahma, Rudra, and the other gods, in men, fathers (Pitris) and birds, and in shines most illustriously;" and so on. - Translation by S. Subba Rau, *The Vedānta-sūtra with the Commentary of Sri Madhvācārya, Translated into English* II Ed. Tirupati, 1963, pp.3-5]

It is an admitted fact that the great Vyāsa was the redactor of the extant Vedas. The very name VYĀSA is explained in that sense and it is stated that Bādarāyaṇa is one of his names.[11] This tradition holding both Bādarāyaṇa and Vyāsa identical has been stated by Madhvācārya at the most appropriate place, i.e. at the beginning of his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, removing all possible doubts regarding the authorship of the *Brahmasūtras*. And this has been followed even by some followers of Śaṅkara himself. Vācaspatimiśra, the great commentator of the *Śānkarabhāṣya*, has the following as one of the *Maṅgala-ślokas* (No.5) of his *Bhāmatī* -

ब्रह्मसूत्रकृते तस्मै वेदव्यासाय वेधसे ।
ज्ञानशक्त्यवताराय नमो भगवतो हरेः ।।

11. i) वेदव्यासः - वेदं व्यस्यति पृथक्करोति इति । ...... मुनिविशेषः तत्पर्यायः। माणरः द्वैपायनः पाराशर्यः कानीनः बादरायणः व्यासः इति हेमचन्द्रः । ..... यथा विष्णुपुराणे - वेदमेकं चतुर्भेदं कृत्वा शाखाशतैर्विभुः । करोति वहुलं भूयो वेदव्यासस्वरूपधृक् ।।
शब्दकल्पद्रुम, Vol. IV. p.501.
ii) व्यासः - वास्यति वेदानिति । ....मुनिविशेषः । अस्य निरुक्तिर्यथा महाभारते -
यो व्यस्य वेदांश्चतुरस्तपसा भगवानृषिः ।
लोके व्यासत्वमापेदे कार्ष्णात्कृष्णत्वमेव च ।। *Ibid*, p.552.
iii) कृष्णद्वैपायनं व्यासं विद्धि नारायणं प्रभुम् ।
कोऽन्यो हि भुवि मैत्रेय महाभारतकृद्भवेत् ।।
तेन व्यस्ता यथा वेदा मत्पुत्रेण महात्मना ।
द्वापरे ह्यत्र मैत्रेय तन्मे शृणु यथार्हतः ।। विष्णुपुराण, III.4,5-6
पुराणप्रकाशकमण्डली, वाई, Edition

[Salutations to Lord Vedavyāsa, the author of the *Brahmasūtras*, the incarnation of the power of knowledge of Lord Hari]

Thus Vācaspatimiśra holds Bādarāyaṇa not only as identical with Vyāsa, but also as an incarnation of Lord Hari. This has been made clear by Amalānanda the author of the *Vedānta-Kalpataru*, who, while commenting on the above verse of the *Bhāmatī*, observes:

वेधसे विधात्रे ईश्वराय । हरेः ज्ञानशक्तेरवतारः प्राप्तिर्यस्मिन् स तथा । तथा चाह श्रीपराशरः -द्वापरे द्वापरे विष्णुर्व्यासरूपी महामुने ।वेदमेकं सुबहुधा कुरुते जगतो हितम् ।। इति ।

Sarvajñātman also identifies Bādarāyaṇa with Vyāsa in his *Saṅkṣepa-Śārīraka*, I. 6.

Following the hoary Purāṇic tradition, Madhvācārya does not hold other sages mentioned in the *Brahmasūtras*, on an equal footing with Bādarāyaṇa. He maintains that Jaimini and others are the disciples of Bādarāyaṇa and the preceptor is quoting the views of his disciples only to make them known to the public. He quotes authoritative verses in support of his this stand:[12]

व्यासचित्तस्थिताकाशादवच्छिन्नानि कानिचित् ।
अन्ये व्यवहरन्त्येतान्यूरीकृत्य गृहादिवत् ।। इति स्कान्दे ।
Under *B.S.*I.ii.28.

12. See also : इति यल्लोकवैमुख्यं जैमिन्यादिमतं वदन् ।
विद्याधिनाथो भगवानपाचक्रे स्वयंप्रभुः ।।
स्वशिष्याणां प्रसिद्ध्यर्थं मतमात्मीयमंशतः ।
विज्ञातं तैर्जगादात्र तारतम्यं नृणां वदन् ।।
Anuvyākhyāna, 331-333

सर्वज्ञस्यैव कृष्णस्य त्वेकदेशविचिन्तितम् ।
स्वीकृत्य मुनयो ब्रूयुस्तन्मतं न विरुध्यते ।। इति ब्राह्मे ।

Under *B.S.*I.iii.33

कृष्णद्वैपायनमतादेकदेशविदः परे ।
वदन्ति ते यथाप्रज्ञं न विरोधः कथंचन ।। इति पाद्मे ।

Under *B.S.*I.iv.23

("Other seers severally take up as their own views, sideas present in the spacious mind of Vyāsa and utilize them like houses enclosing open space. Having imbibed a part of Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana's wisdom, these sages expound views according to their comprehension. So there is no conflict between his views and theirs. The views of these sages are the views of Vyāsa himself. But a part of his views as grasped by them has been introduced by Vyāsa himself under their names so as to give them his disciples the necessary publicity. There is no conflict in the views held by them as they are meant to apply to aspirants of different levels of fitness"[13])

It is a fact that Bādarāyana Vyāsa had several disciples as mentioned in the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*[14] and one of them was Jaimini by name. That Jaimini had great admiration for Bādarāyaṇa and both of them held similar

13. English rendering by Dr. B.N.K. Sharma, The *Brahmasūtras And Their Principal Commentaries* Vol.I, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1971, P.1. fn.1.

14. ब्रह्मणा चोदितो व्यासो वेदान्व्यस्तुं प्रचक्रमे ।
अथ शिष्यान्स जग्राह चतुरो वेदपारगान् ।।
ऋग्वेदश्रावकं पैलं जग्राह स महामुनिः ।
वैशम्पायननामानं यजुर्वेदस्य चाग्रहीत् ।।
जैमिनिं सामवेदस्य तथैवाथर्ववेदवित् ।
सुमन्तुस्तस्य शिष्योऽभूद्वेदव्यासस्य धीमतः ।। III.4.7-9

opinions is also proved by a statement of Śabara, the classical commentator of Jaimini's *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā Sūtras*. Under Jaimini's *Sūtra* I. I.5. wherein the name of Bādarāyaṇa occurs, Śabara observes -

वादरायणग्रहणं वादरायणस्येदं मतं कीर्त्यते वादरायणं पूजयितुम्, नात्मीयं मतं पर्युदसितुम् ।।

[The name Bādarāyaṇa is mentioned to state his view and to honour him. Thus Jaimini strengthens his view and does not show any opposition to Bādarāyaṇa's view] Hence, it will not be wrong to hold that Śabara accepts Jaimini to be a disciple of Bādarāyaṇa.[15]

The facts adduced by Madhvācārya for the first time from the vast literature of the Purāṇas are conclusive enough to establish that Indian tradition regarding the authorship of the *Brahmasūtras* has throughout been uniform and consistent in holding Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana Vyāsa, the celebrated redactor of the Vedas, as identical with Bādarāyaṇa having Jaimini and others as his disciples. This tradition is equally held valid by important writers of the Advaita Vedānta School also as we have seen above. Hence, it is not likely that Śaṅkara would have made a fundamental distinction between Bādarāyaṇa and Vedavyāsa as alleged by modern scholars like Prof. Max Muller and Dr. Belvalkar. On other grounds if available, scholars might regard the two as different. But to bring in the tradition in support of such distinction is neither accurate nor warranted. Madhvācārya deserves, therefore, the highest credit for stating the facts of Indian tradition precisely and forcefully.

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15. See article *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* by Mm. Pramathanath Tarkabhushan, in *The Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol.III, The Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Calcutta, II Ed., 1953, P.151.

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